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ARTICLES
RACISM, GENOCIDE, AND MASS MURDER:
TOWARD A LEGAL THEORY ABOUT
GROUP DEPRIVATIONS
Winston P. Nagan, Author*
Vivile F. Rodin, Co-Author**
So you see, love for a job well done is a deeply ambiguous virtue. It
animated Michelangelo . . . Rudolph Hess, the Auschwitz commander,
boasted of the same virtue.
-Primo Levi
PROLOGUE
The problems of racial prejudice, anti-Semitism, apartheid, and geno-
cide are outcomes of a global perspective of socially based group depriva-
tions. As forms of group deprivations, they provoke the most challenging
threats to the dignity of the human being. More than that, they provoke
basic threats to the structures of peace and security and to the processes of
humane governance that are the hallmarks of an operational rule of law.
We may describe these processes of group deprivations essentially as forms
of social pathology. As forms of social pathology, group deprivations are
also of dramatic importance to the current state of world order since mod-
ern history has joined the human capacity for destructiveness with the sci-
entific advances in administration, organization, and technology to
reproduce patterns of mass prejudice, virulent forms of racial and ethnic
domination, and systematic' (almost industrialized) patterns for the extinc-
tion of human beings on a mass basis. To these, we may add the lamenta-
* Winston Nagan, FRSA is Sam T. Dell Research Scholar Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Florida Levin College of Law, Honorary Professor, University of Cape Town, South Af-
rica, Affiliate Professor of Anthropology, Visiting Fellow, Brasenose College, Oxford (2002-
2003), and Director, Institute for Human Rights, Peace, and Development at the University of
Florida.
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor J.K.B.M. (Barry) Nicholas, former Prin-
cipal of Brasenose College, Oxford, Professor of Comparative Law in the University of Oxford.
Professor Nicholas was an incomparable teacher, a loyal friend, and a voice of reasoned elo-
quence in a time of uncertain values.
** Vivile F. Rodin, J.D. University of Florida, former research assistant for Professor Nagan
and currently an attorney-at-law.
1. ROBERT JAY LIFrON AND ERIC MARKUSEN, THE GENOCIDAL MENTALITY: NAZI HOLO-
CAUST AND NUCLEAR THREAT 169 (1988):
In this purposeful momentum of destruction, the Nazi behemoth absorbed 'every pro-
fession, every skill, and every social status.' And once that momentum was under way,
'German bureaucracy was so sensitive a mechanism that... it began to function almost
by itself' and 'did not have to be told what to do.'
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ble policies and programs of ethnic cleansing that have occurred most
recently in southeastern Europe and in parts of Africa.
This Article is focused on a specific and important issue: the relation-
ship of law to the social reality of group deprivations.' From this primary
issue, several important sub-issues are generated having a real and substan-
tial impact upon the role of law in the management of group deprivations
at every level of social organization (local, national, regional, and interna-
tional). To focus on the social reality of group deprivations requires a criti-
cal starting point. This starting point is determining whether we are
adequately describing or assaying the etiology of the human personality
types and self-systems that are normally characterized by feelings, senti-
ments, and behaviors and which, in the context of group deprivations, are
prejudice-prone and, in egregious circumstances, are the kinds of personali-
ties that are central to the operations of the policies and practices of geno-
cide.3 This Article seeks to provide insight into this process, and further
suggests that an in-depth and realistic understanding of legal responses to
these problems will contribute to the control, regulation, and eventual
elimination of these problems. Our approach is to radically contextualize
the social context that reproduces the anti-Semitic or otherwise prejudice-
prone personality type. This Article essentially argues, that if we can pro-
vide a systematic, contextually-based, socially-constructed framework
within which to understand the general conditions conducive to the repro-
duction of discrimination, prejudice, anti-Semitism, or the general outlook
that seeks to depreciate and destroy "others," we can provide a stronger
scientific predicate from which to more carefully construct and evaluate the
legal theories of racial discrimination, apartheid, and genocide. This kind
of insight may demonstrate the links between these phenomena as they
emerge from the larger social context of human relations. They may help
us understand more adequately how we may modify our legal theories and
strategies to place a greater emphasis on moderation and prevention, tim-
ing our critical interventions as lawyers to improve the human prospect,
and minimizing the reproduction of the -social dynamics of hate, prejudice,
and extermination.
This Article seeks to make a theoretical and methodological contribu-
tion to the understanding of the process of group deprivations as a social
construct. In order to socially construct an important aspect of social or-
ganization, such as the processes of group deprivation and the efforts to
constrain, prevent, or eliminate them, it is important that social construc-
tion be informed by an adequate technique of assaying the relevant con-
text. In general, the development of a contextual basis for legal
2. From a global perspective, one of the most important aspects of human relations is the
fact of human diversity. Diversity presents a challenge for collaboration and communication in
the common interest, as well as a challenge that may provoke isolationism, parochialism, chauvin-
ism, and attendant problems of non-collaboration, conflict, and deprivation. See generally,
DAEDALUS, JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES, VOL. 126, No. 2(1997)(devoting entire volume to the theme of diversity). The concept, diversity, has become
increasingly en vogue in academic and political circles. It is "much used by those who preach
tolerance and understanding of races, nations, individuals, and communities presumed to be dif-
ferent, separated in significant ways by their belief and experience from those others thought to
belong to whatever is taken to be the majority." Id. at v (emphasis added).
3. See LIFTON AND MARKUSEN, supra note 1, at 16-50.
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phenomena is often an intuitive or even anecdotal exercise. The authors
have borrowed the technique of contextualizing from the jurisprudence of
the New Haven School of International Law as further refined and genera-
lized in the recently published volumes, Jurisprudence For a Free Society:
Studies in Law, Science, and Policy.4 In essence, the issue of context re-
volves around the related concepts of person, institution, values, and out-
comes.' These conceptual markers are keys to understanding the
conditions and processes of group deprivations as a global problem. Pro-
viding a method whereby we might contextualize systematically and realis-
tically the processes of group deprivations at any level of particularity or
abstraction (local, national, regional, global) requires a technique of disci-
plined and flexible conceptual markers to give coherence to such a
challenge.
The deeper specification of the context of group deprivations is devel-
oped along the lines of the identification of the relevant participants (vic-
tims, victimizers, interveners, etc.), the relevant perspectives of who they
are, what they want, and what realistic expectations they hold about group
deprivation or the freedom from it. Also identified are the bases of power
to inflict or resist group deprivations, the strategies available to parties in
this struggle, the "arenas" within which these phenomena occur, and their
outcomes, which include the prospect of the reproduction of deprivation or
respect. This approach represents a methodological addendum to the dis-
course about group deprivations based on race, the apartheid process, or
the lethal processes of genocide. We suggest in this Article that the tech-
nique of contextualizing important social phenomena such as racism,
apartheid, democide6 , or even genocide, along the lines of the methods and
procedures of the New Haven School, provide us with a more systematic
and coherent, socially-constructed concept of racism, apartheid, genocide,
or more generally, the entire social process of group deprivations.
Since group deprivations provoke decisional interventions, the entire
"process" of group deprivations must account for a critical variable: policy-
directed interventions, which secure deprivations or secure their prohibi-
tion through community sanctions. It would appear that a theory of group
deprivations to guide relevant inquiry must combine or map the social pro-
cess context of group deprivations onto a deliberate emphasis on policy
and relevant institutions of decision-making germane to the struggle
against injustice and deprivation. To this end, the authors hold that the
inter-relationship between context and policy provides the key to a general
theory of group deprivations. To further this objective, the Article focuses
upon the social process of deprivations through the lens of a deliberate
emphasis on policy and decision-making.7 To develop this framework, the
4. See generally, LASSWELL AND McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY ( New Haven Press, 1992).
5. HAROLD D. LASSWELL AND ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY 3-51 (Yale Uni-
versity Press, 1950).
6. See infra note 10 and note 232 and accompanying text.
7. The social process approach we proffer, bringing the problem of social conflict before the
inquirer's lens, in a sense, is an integration of a number of disciplinary approaches to the study
and understanding of conflict and peace studies. For example, implied in our perspective are
approaches associated with anthropological and social organization perspectives, economic and
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authors suggest that context be given focus and coherence by discharging
certain key intellectual tasks. These tasks include the following:
(1) The clarification of social goals, values, and objectives relevant to the
issues of race, apartheid, and genocide;
(2) The description of relevant historical trends, and most crucially, con-
ditions or factors and variables about the occasion of group deprivation;(3) An appraisal and predictive assessment of relevant trends and condi-
tions; and
(4) The evaluation and construction of alternatives regarding responses to
these processes.
A critique is made of the conception of genocide literature from pre-
cisely this perspective, showing its limitations as a realistic theory about
genocide and its hindrance of more comprehensive inquiry relating to all
major forms of group deprivations. This kind of study, at its heart, is con-
cerned with an adequate conception of the rule of law at every relevant
level of social organization.8 We would submit that such a theoretical con-
struct would contribute in important ways to the enlightenment and scien-
tific bases of an effective rule of law that works at all levels, from the local
to the global levels of world order.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most important outcomes of the experience of World War
II is the scale of human atrocity. The most visible, if not morally para-
lyzing, aspect of the atrocities of this period is capsulated in the term "the
Holocaust." The Holocaust, seen in the context of the World War II expe-
rience, provoked serious reappraisal of the adequacy and morality of the
forms of human governance on a global basis. The Holocaust was an event
involving a self-conscious policy on the part of the Nazi Herrenvolk to use
the apparatus of state power to systematically extinguish whole groups of
human beings on the basis of group labels of identity. It was a process
facilitated by the technological capacity of an industrial state waging an
industrial form of total war. Hidden under the veil of political and juridical
sovereignty, the Holocaust represented complete denial of people's right to
game theory analyses, cognitive science (including psychological and sociological approaches), as
well as political and geopololitical, situational approaches to these problems. For a general orien-
tation, see LASSWELL AND McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY: STUDIES IN LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY (NEw HAVEN, NEW HAVEN PRESS, 1992), supra note 4. See also WALTER
ISARD, UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT AND THE SCIENCE OF PEACE (Blackwell Publishers 1992).
8. This study, in fact, starts with the exact opposite premise of the influential book, REDE-
FINING EQUALITY (Neal Devins and Davison McDouglas, eds., 1998). Here we begin analy-
sis and inquiry with the defining the reach and construction of the concept of equality, which we
contend is a normative proposition. Our beginning point is to understand the problems and pros-
pects of equality (and more generally, equal respect), therefore one must focus the inquirer's lens
on the facts of human diversity and on the larger social or community context with a lens focused
on the facts of differentiation and the problems fueled by the power and policy processes that
create or reinforce processes of group-based deprivations of which racial prejudice, apartheid,
genocide, ethnic cleansing, minority oppression, and even domination are ubiquitous social phe-
nomena or outcomes. It may be that these studies come at the problem from two different van-
tage points. Devins and Douglas approach the problem from a normative perspective. The
authors of this study approach the problem from a more empirically grounded social process
perspective, informed by the intellectual tools specialized to the study of policy and policy-deter-
mined interventions. See REDEFINING EQUALITY (Neal Devins and Davison M. Douglas
eds., Oxford University Press, 1998).
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existence, subject to Nazi dominance. A form of governance based on ap-
parently limitless sovereignty, it raised a profound question about the fun-
damental rights of persons caught in the web of sovereign omnipotence.
The power of the State and its agents to victimize minorities identified by
psycho-social markers and make them candidates for extinction raises a
very deep concern for understanding both the predispositional and the
socio-cultural factors in a community leading to forms of group differentia-
tion, stratification, domination, and subjugation. This predisposition may
culminate in policies and practices of mass extermination or gross viola-
tions of human rights and humanitarian standards for those identified as
"others" or part of the out-group. Genocide has not been confined to the
experience of the Holocaust, but even in the enlightened post-war period's
explicit criminalization of genocide, it remains a widespread phenomenon.
Unless we better understand genocide in global terms, we will be severely
disadvantaged in devising intervention strategies to prevent genocide from
occurring in the first place. This Article seeks to make a modest contribu-
tion toward that objective.
This Article, therefore, explores, in a foundational sense, the nature of
the problems of some of the most important human rights' concerns of the
twentieth century, namely, the problems of group deprivation, including
racial discrimination, racial domination, apartheid, and policies of racial
and/or ethnic extermination identified with genocide. The Article starts
with an exploration of the interrelationships between racism, apartheid,
and genocide. It seeks to secure an underlying theoretical framework
within which the similarities, differences, and inter-determinations of these
phenomena are more adequately understood. We maintain that racial dis-
crimination, prejudice, and domination are necessary, although insufficient,
conditions of genocide. In short, genocide is an outcome of cultural stratifi-
cation, characterized by patterns of domination and subjugation. These
patterns of stratification and division, we argue, are based on psycho-so-
cially and culturally constructed identities, which are recognizable through
complex communication codes, signs, symbols, myths, and narratives. Ra-
cism is a key outcome of such stratification.
While an immense amount has been written on "race", the precise in-
terrelationships between racial discrimination in a domestic environment
like the United States and apartheid in a domestic environment like South
Africa have not been effectively used to shed light on the problem of ra-
cism and/or apartheid in a global, cross-cultural perspective, or on the
problem of genocide and its local to global implications. Indeed, the juris-
prudence of racial discrimination is so often expressed in formalistic terms
as to minimize the critical importance of understanding the phenomenon
contextually. As a result, a depreciated understanding of the context of
race obscures our capacity to understand the interrelationships between
race and apartheid, and race and genocide. It is, therefore, proposed that a
socially-constructed conception of race, apartheid, and genocide be devel-
oped not simply for scholastic edification, but also for clarification, in the
most realistic sense, of the scope and dangers of discrimination leading to
prejudice and of the capacity of prejudicial disposition to lead to genocide
and mass murder. The Article, thus, seeks to develop a general theory
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about group deprivation and to map the specific problem of genocide and
mass murder with the process of group deprivation.9
Part I of the Article is the Introduction. Part II focuses upon the prel-
ude to genocide and mass murder, stressing the contextual linkages among
racism, apartheid, and genocide. Part III provides a historical perspective
of genocide and mass murder. Part IV focuses upon the issues of legal and
social theory as they relate to problems of genocide and mass murder.
More specifically, Part IV discusses the impact of various disciplines of
study on the genocide issue and critiques different conceptions of genocide.
The theory is extended in Part V to include the roles of players involved in
the discourse on genocide, focusing on a concern for decision-making and
responsibility in the context of structural conflict. Part V also suggests a
broader range of interventions such as sanctioning policies to prevent or
deter genocide and mass murder. The Article concludes with Part VI, an
acknowledgment of the complexity of constructing a working theory of
group deprivations. Part VI suggests that the disciplined procedures that
relate to the development of context, specifically aspects of context relating
to conflict and the concept of agency and responsibility, relate to the rele-
vance of policy-to-theory construction and are guidelines that provide for a
much more coherent picture of the world of group deprivations, its cause,
and its possible cure.
In overview, this Article presents a socially constructed conception of
genocide. This is a necessary basis for giving the preventive aspect of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
[hereinafter Genocide Convention] a more coherent predicate for rational
intervention to suppress it. This focus throws additional light on the rela-
tionship of genocide to racial discrimination and cultural dominance that
are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of genocide. The Article ex-
plores the adequacy of the legal conception of genocide against the data
about mass killings and mass murder. In addition, the Article examines the
structure of social conflict and relevant decision-making processes to im-
prove the strategies that the international community might use to prevent
genocide campaigns. The Article suggests that the conception of legal ge-
nocide must be more broadly conceived to accord with social reality. To
support this viewpoint, the Article gives a special focus to decision-making
outcomes that relate to the larger community process that seeks to inter-
vene to prevent, suppress or punish genocide, by examining the broader
sanctioning processes and policies of society. These problems in theory,
9. This study is in part meant to complement the work of Alex P. Schmid, Research on
Gross Human Rights Violations (2d ed.) (Leiden, The Netherlands: Center for the Study of Social
Conflicts, 1989). In Schmid's study, the focus is on the identification of specific kinds of gross
human rights violations (GHRVs) such as killing, summary execution, killing in prescriptive
armed conflicts, killling by torture, killing by abuse of power in law, killing by death squades,
genocide, detained and disappeared victims, and torture. Id. at 25-26. Schmid's study connects
outcomes known as (GHRV) to the issues of "violence and terror" (id. at 29), the determinants of
state violence in conflict situations (id. at 32-33), the problems of aggression and violence (id. at
23-24), and the heuristic necessity of mapping (a global map) of GHRV in conflict contexts (id. at
46-80). For an outline on participants in the processes of GHRV, violence, conflict, and aggres-
sion, see P.I.O.O.M. Projects #3-6, "Perpetrators of GHRV," id. at 105-58. Our study seeks to
deepen the context with a specific focus on groups and individuals in the broader processes of
group deprivations, which are inclusive of GHRVs.
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method, perspective, and practice suggest that now is a propitious time to
begin a rethinking of the theory and practice of genocide. This Article
seeks to make a contribution to that urgent task. The first problem is how
to mold what we have legally into a more effective sanctioning instrument
of genuine expectation. Finally, there is the larger question of "domi-
cide,"' which is mass murder usually, but not exclusively, by the govern-
ment. This Article discusses whether this problem is to be handled by a
revision of the Genocide Convention, the creation of a separate instrument
of law and policy, or some other form of effective intervention.
II. THE PRELUDE TO GROUP DEPRIVATION: THE INTERRELATIONSHIPS
AMONG RACISM, APARTHEID, AND GENOCIDE
A. Identity, Groups, and Prejudice
The most conspicuous fact of social organization is that human beings
identify with and are invariably affiliated with groups of some sort. If we
describe social processes as involving human beings (participants) pursuing
values (desired goods, services, honors) through institutions (political par-
ties, corporations, labour unions, colleges, hospitals, churches, etc.), based
on resources (bases of power, base values), it will be apparent that institu-
tions are often group-based and specialized to the vindication of basic val-
ues. For example, power and ideology find expression in political parties,
the wealth interests in commercial actors, the professional concern for
health and well-being in the institutions of health care, education in schools
and universities, the skill interest in organized labour and professional
groups, and the moral concern in religious or faith-based groups.11 The uni-
versal nature of groups in social order is as ubiquitous as the "individual,"
who is invariably a part of an aggregate or group. 12 Sometimes groups are
10. The concept of domicide (Rummel's term is "democide") is both broader and narrower
than the concept of genocide. Domicide refers to the killing of masses of human beings, regard-
less of their ethnic, racial, religious, or national label of identity. In this sense, it is broader than
genocide. It is narrower in the sense that it does not necessarily cover behaviors calculated
through conspiracy to destroy aggregates of human beings, in whole or in part. In this sense,
genocide does not actually have to involve the direct mass murder of a group to be genocide
within the legal definition.
11. See LASSWELL AND McDOUGALSUpra note 4, at 375-507.
12. The group nature of American society is well-documented and often comes under the
label, "American pluralism." A critical question emerges as to the nature of national American
identity and the sub-identities of various groups, ethnic and otherwise, which constitute the body
politic. See, e.g., MICHAEL LIND, THE NEXT AMERICAN NATION: THE NEW NATIONALISM AND
THE FOURTH AMERICAN REVOLUTION 7(The Free Press 1995).
The American people, then, constitute a genuine nation; with its own nation-state, the
U.S.A., and with its own genuine, if largely inarticulate, nationalism. The really interest-
ing argument, it turns out, is not the stale debate between multiculturalists and demo-
cratic universalists about what kind of nonnational state the United States is: multi- or
post? It is another controversy, a less familiar dispute, over how the "nation" in the
American "nation-state" is to be defined. In this debate among nationalists, the two
sides are nativists and liberal nationalists.
See also LASSWELL & KAPLAN, supra note 5, at 10-15. Lasswell and Kaplan discuss the process of
identification and group identity, stating as follows:
An ego is an actor using symbols.... Identification is the process by which a symbol user
symbolizes his ego as a member of some aggregate or group of egos.... Symbolizing
distinguishes the process but does not exhaustively characterize it: other acts, external-
ized as well as internalized, occur in conformity with the symbolic relationship .... The
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easy to identify, for example, some people are "black" and are thought to
belong to the black group. Others are "white" and thought to belong to
the white group; others may be "brown" and thought to belong to the His-
panic group, and so on. Sometimes the same person may have an ascribed
"ethnic identity" based on physical characteristics, but will have voluntarily
affiliated with a political party and acquire a political identity as, for exam-
ple, a Republican or a Democrat. A person's income may weaken or
strengthen the links of "ethnic" identity if that person's primary neighbor-
hood and professional associations are in striking correspondence with eco-
nomic and/or skill-related patterns of stratification. a3 Social organization,
thus, witnesses a rich plurality of "groups" as outcomes of social process,
and depending on context, a wide proliferation of individual identifications
with multiple group-based processes. These processes of individual-group
relationships constitute the foundations of social interaction. a4 Moreover,
the outcomes of some group processes have important consequences for
the system of power relations, both within States and across State lines.' 5
One of the most important outcomes of the social reality of groups is
the problem of group "dominance" and group "subjugation."' 6 It is often
the case that "minorities" are the subjugated, at-risk class, as in the United
States. However, a majority may be subjugated by a minority and conse-
quently become the subjugated or dominated class, as in the Republic of
self is the ego and whatever it identifies with that ego. The concept is close to what
William James designated as the "social self". A man has as many different social selves
as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares. He generally
shows a different side of himself to each of these different groups. The self as here
defined is the set of these different sides in their inter-relatedness. It thus comprises all
the roles which the ego adopts, and is characterized by specifying the individuals and
groups with which the ego identifies.
Id. at 10-13 (quoting William James, PSYCHOLOGY Vol. I, at 294 (Henry Holt, 1892). See generally
Ethnic Conflict and International Security (Michael E. Brown, ed., Princeton University Press
1993); See generally William M .Evan, Dimensions of Participation in Voluntary Associations, 36
Soc. FORCES 148 (1957); See INTERGROUP RELATIONS: SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Pierre van
den Berghe, ed.,1972); See generally Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics: Notes for a The-
ory, 46 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 376 (1952); See generally THEODORE M. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGY OF
SMALL GROUPS (1967); See generally LIONEL TIGER, MEN IN GROUPS (1st Amer. ed., Random
House 1969); See generally Mynes S. McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and
Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L. L. 1 (1959); See generally Robert
Sommer, Studies in Personal Space, 22 SOCIOMETRY 247 (1959); See generally Basil G. Zimmer &
Amos H. Hawley, The Significance of Membership in Associations, 65 AM. J. Soc. 196 (1959).
13. See M. McDougal, W. M. Reisman, and A. Willard, The World Community: A Planetary
Social Process, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 807, (1988); LASSWELL & McDOUGAL, supra note 4, at
141 (on wealth, 473- 508; on skill, 525- 538); See generally HAROLD LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO
GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (1958). The classic studies on economic stratification are to be found
in the work of Marx and Engels, SELECTED WORKS, Vol. I and 11 (1962). See also KARL MARX,
SELECTED WRITINGS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, 186-209 (T.B. Bottomore and
Maximilien Rubel, eds., Penguin Books Ltd. 1956).
14. See generally McDougal, supra note 12.
15. For a detailed analysis of these themes, see generally LASSWELL, supra note 4, Vol. I and
II. See also POWER AND POLICY IN QUEST OF LAW (M. McDougal and W.M. Reisman, eds.,
Martinus Mijhoff Publishers 1985).
16. See MYRES McDOUGAL, HAROLD LASSWELL, AND LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN DIG-
NITY 521-560 (Yale University Press 1980).
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South Africa during the Apartheid era.17 Some problems that are invaria-
bly central problems of governance and constitutional order 18 are also key
problems of world order: threats to peace and security, 9 gross violations of
human rights,2" suppression of the right to self-determination, 2 and justifi-
cations for undemocratic forms of governance.22 In short, these problems
are denials of the central precepts of international justice that come under
the label "human dignity. 23
From the perspective of contemporary conceptions of world order, the
concerns for group rights, discriminations, deprivations, and repression of
groups and individuals based on "group" labels of identity remain central
problems for the maintenance of international peace and security, as well
as conditions that inhibit the progressive developmental agenda envisioned
in the higher purposes and objectives of the Charter system. Discrimina-
tion against "minorities" is a critical concern. Although the regime of un-
varnished dominance known as Apartheid has now been dismantled,24 the
problems of cultural dominance are still a major international concern and
have once more evolved into even more brutal measures of political
reaction.25
In a survey map provided by the Associated Press,26 mass killings,
which are essentially the outcomes of the problems of "otherness," cultural
dominance, and conflict in the 20th Century, provide a staggering specter
of genocide. As far back as 1904 and 1907, German colonial conquests of
Southwest Africa resulted in the killings of 100,000 Hereros. Similarly in
1972, between 80,000 and 130,000 Hutus were killed in Burundi. In Ethio-
pia between 1983 and 1984, one million people perished. In Iraq (1915 and
1918), 1.5 million Armenians were killed. Between 1939 and 1945, the Na-
17. See JOHN DUGARD, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 4
(Princeton University Press 1978); See generally Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Af-
rica? Constitutional Engineering in a Divided Society (University of California Press 1991).
18. See generally BROWN, supra note 11. See also McDoUGAL, ET. AL. supra note 15, at 161-
363.
19. See generally RUDOLPH RUMMEL, DEATH By GOVERNMENT (1994); See generally
BROWN, supra note 17. See also ANTONIO CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE
(S.J.K. Greenleaves, trans., Princeton University Press, 1988). For more specific examples relat-
ing to the former Yugoslavia, see CHRISTOPHER BENNETT, YUGOSLAVIA'S BLOODY COLLAPSE
(New York University Press, 1995); HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA,
(1992);HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA, Vol. 11 (1993);
See generally Alexandra Stiglmayer, The Rapes in Bosnia-Herzegovina, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR
AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 82, 126 (Alexandra Stiglmayer, ed., 1994). See also
THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA 1993-1996, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Volume
X (New York, N.Y.: United Nations, 1996).
20. THE UNITEDNATIONS AND RWANDA, supra note 19; STIGLMAYER, supra note
19.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See generally RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE NEW SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL OR-
DER (Dawid van Wyk, et. al. eds., Juta & Co., Ltd. 1994).
25. See generally RUMMEL, supra note 19; CASSESE, supra note 19; BENNETT, supra
note 19; See generally STIGLMAYER,, supra note 18; THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA
,supra note 18.
26. Arlene Levinson , For This Century's Homicide Regimes, Genocide is a Snap, THE
GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 24, 199,5 at 1G, 4G, especially the map (Mass Killings of the 20th
Century).
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zis killed approximately 11 million people. In 1992, it is estimated that one
million Muslims were killed in Bosnia. In 1965 and 1966, between 500,000
and one million people were killed in Indonesia. It is estimated that be-
tween 60 million and 100 million people died under Communist rule in
China, beginning in 1949. In Latin America between 1980 and 1984, in the
state of Guatemala, at least 100,000 people were killed.
These figures are estimated and, according to the Associated Press, the
sources include the work of scholars as well as reports by the Associated
Press.27 These estimates may be usefully compared to the figures provided
by Professor R.J. Rummel, quoted later in this Article.
The problems of constitutional order, world order, group dominance,
and subordination or extermination remain important problems for inter-
national lawyers and specialists in humanitarian and human rights law. 8
For example, the rules of international humanitarian law address a funda-
mental problem of how to humanize the "other" in the context of armed
conflict, "international" or "internal." In the context of war or armed con-
flict, the hallmark of identification is the "other" (the enemy) and the "us"
(the "we"). Thus, it may be seen that the rules of humanitarian law are
concerned not with the justification of war as such, but with the limitations
that international law and moral order require, namely, humane treatment
for the enemy, the "other." z9
The central normative point of humanitarian law is the recognition of
the "other" on the basis of a shared, common humanity. If armed conflict
is occasioned by the problem of "groups" and the problems of their power
relations, then it may be acknowledged that armed conflict often includes
the problem of "minorities," but more broadly, the struggle for dominance,
or indeed, freedom from dominance. Moreover, among the key pillars of
modern international law are (i) the rules designed to protect aliens,3" (ii)
27. See id.
28. The specific response, for example, with respect to the deprivations relating to the war in
the former Yugoslavia, was a key factor in the creation of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia, and later, for Rwanda. See generally M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND PETER
MANIKAS, THE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLA-
VIA (Transnational Publishers, Inc., 1996); See generally THE UNITED NATIONS AND RWANDA ,
supra note 19.
29. See BURNS H. WESTON, SUPPLEMENT OF BASIC DOCUMENTS TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER, 135-367(3d ed., West Group 1997); See also Theodor Meron, Towards a
Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife, 78 A.J.I.L. 859 (1984); See also THEODOR MERON,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNAL STRIFE: THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION (1987); See generally
GEORGES WILLEMIN & ROGER HEACOCK, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED
CROSS (1985); Forsythe, The Red Cross as Transnational Movement, 30 INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-
SATION, 607 (1976); Secretary-General's Report on the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Pur-
suant to para. 2 of S.C.Res. 808 (1993); Security Council Resolution 808, Security Council Doc. S/
25704 (1993).
30. See Guha Roy, Is the Law of Responsibility of States for Injuries to Aliens a Part of Uni-
versal International Law, 55 A.J.I.L. 863, 866, 888 (1961). See also Case Concerning Application
of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Her-
zegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (Provisional Measures I (Order)), ICJ Reports 3
(April 8, 1993) and (Provisional Measures II (Order)), I.C.J. Reports 325 (September 13, 1993);
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, ICJ Reports 89 (1951); Interhandel case, ICJ Reports 6 (1959); Bar-
celona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, ICJ Repports 3 (1970); Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ICJ Reports 14 (1986).
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the international law of humanitarian intervention, 31 and (iii) the interna-
tional protection of minorities or rules to protect the individual.32
The Genocide Convention, although inspired by humanitarian values,
was the first real human rights treaty.33 It predates the UN's Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).3 4 The heart of the Genocide Con-
vention in the sense of its "spirit" is that it responds not only to the prob-
lem of not simply discriminating or dominating by "others," but also
extinguishing or conspiring to extinguish them.35 In a non-technical sense,
the conceptual basis of the definition of genocide must assume certain facts
about the nature of social organization on a worldwide basis. First, it must
assume the group nature of world society. Second, it must assume that
certain enumerated categories of group identity are most intensively identi-
fied with the business of mass killings. In this latter context, the symbols of
"national," "racial," "ethnic," or "religious" identity are included. These
are indeed important culturally defined symbols of identity; and one does
not need a scientific study to indicate that "genocide," as defined in the
Genocide Convention, requires action based on some culturally accepted
symbol of race, nationality, ethnicity, and belief system. What is critical
about this legal instrument is that it must presuppose a social process of
worldwide ubiquity in which:
(i) distinctions are made which are culturally understood about race
ethnicity, religion, as well as nationalism;
(ii) these distinctions serve as the basis for providing security or insecu-
rity, entitlements or disentitlements, the weal of social organization
or the woe, and even life and death; and(iii) these distinctions, thus, incorporate the capacity of society to iden-
tify and allocate the benefits and burdens of organized social order
to culturally identifiable targets of identity.
31. Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS , at 137-211 (The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1973).
32. For a discussion on international law on the protection of minorities, see id., Chapter IV
(International Protection of Minority Rights: The League of Nations System and Post-World-
War-II Arrangements), at 213-335; See generally PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNA1IONAL LAW
AND THE RIGHTS OF MINORITIES (Clarendon Press, 1991). On the international laws protecting
the individual, see, e.g., the following:
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights Convention, Dec. 10, 1948, U.N.
GAOR, 3rd Sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, 71.
2. The U.N. Charter, June 26, 1945, arts. 1, 55-56, 59 Stat. 1031, 1 U.N.T.S. XVI, (en-
tered into force, October 24, 1945).
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Convention (I.C.C.P.R.), Dec.
16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, (entered into force March 23, 1976.)
4. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Convention, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360 (entered into force, January 3,
1976).
33. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277, (entered into force on January 12, 1951). As of January 1, 1994, 111 states were
parties to the Convention; on February 10, 1986, the United States Senate gave its advice and
consent to the ratification of the Convention.
34. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
on Dec. 10, 1948, whereas the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide was adopted December 9, 1948. See generally The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, supra note 31. Cf The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 32.
35. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
32, art. II and III.
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This leads to some troublesome, but important, points. First, "distinc-
tions" are widespread. They are endemic to society in its most universal
sense. Second, how are we to determine the how, why, which, and when of
distinctions that enhance or disparage the basic humanitarian values of
public order? When, for example, is a distinction "discrimination" that dis-
parages human values? When is discrimination "domination," and when is
"domination" simply a conspiracy to destroy a "group in whole or in part,"
or an act designed to achieve this result? These are practical questions that
strike at the core of operational law when judges, national or international,
must confront the specific prescription and application of anti-discrimina-
tion norms, anti-dominance norms, such as the suppression and punish-
ment of the crime of apartheid, or the norms that relate to the processes of
mass killings.
1. Symbols and Markers of Group Identity
To understand the relationship between genocide and discrimination
or group deprivations, we must examine the natures of the problems of
prejudice, discrimination, group deprivations, and genocide. Since these
problems depend upon a critical, culturally understood symbol of ascriptive
identity, it may be useful to provide some threshold clarity about the na-
ture of the problems of group deprivations of which such forms as racial
prejudice, anti-Semitism, cultural dominance, and genocide are significant
outcomes. Racial discrimination is a necessary, but insufficient, condition
of group dominance. Both racial discrimination and group dominance are
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions of genocide. In short, it is not sim-
ply valuable socially to punish the perpetrators of genocide. It may be vi-
tally important that we prevent the necessary conditions of genocide by
giving greater importance to the interventions and remedies we develop to
moderate, ameliorate, or cure racial discrimination and the conditions of
group dominance.
Let us start by unpacking the most obvious label of cultural identifica-
tion: ethnic affiliation. The term "ethnic" is often defined in tautologically.
One is a "Serb" because one is a "Serb."36 The Genocide Convention Im-
plementation Act of 1987 [hereinafter The Proxmire Act] provides a good
illustration of the circularity and ambiguity surrounding the legal issue of
group definitions.37 For example, the term "ethnic group" means a set of
36. Groups are the central mechanism for providing individuals with their identity;
rather than thinking about individuals "sacrificing" part of their identity when the be-
come part of a group, [we should regard] individual identity as possible only in the
context of secure group attachments.... The notion of individuals apart from groups...
is a product of western thought, not the human experience.
Marc H. Ross, The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative
Perspective (Yale Univ. Press, 1993).
37. Genocide Prevention Implementation Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2003).
(a) Basic Offense. - Whoever, whether in time of peace or in time of war, in a circum-
stance described in subsection (d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or
in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such
(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the mental faculties of members of the
group through drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
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individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common cul-
tural traditions of heritage.3" The term "national group" means a set of
individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical charac-
teristics or biological descent.3 9 The term "racial group" means a set of
individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of physical charac-
teristics or biological descent.4° The term "religious group" means a set of
individuals whose identity as such is distinctive in terms of common relig-
ious creed, beliefs, doctrines, practices, or rituals.41
The semantic ambiguity illustrated above is also a component of the
issue of race in American constitutional history. Race issues have impli-
cated interpretations of the First Amendment (sit-ins and public demon-
strations), the rights of the criminally accused (death penalty, picking
jurors), democratization (voting rights, reapportionment), the problems of
slavery, and various manifestations of racial discrimination (family law,
housing, employment, education and remedies, including affirmative ac-
tion). Indeed, one may fairly misuse the Holmesian insight about the
brooding omnipresence of natural law by suggesting that race is another
kind of brooding omnipresence over American public order, its constitu-
tive processes, as well as its civil society arenas.
To further illustrate the complexity of these juristic labels of group
identity, it may simply be suggested that the terms ethnic and national are
often used interchangeably; the term racial is often absorbed into the term
ethnic. Religious identifications are sometimes collapsed into the notion of
ethnic or the notion of the national or indeed, the notion of the racial. As a
social psychological datum, culturally generated labels of group identity
cover far more than what is indicated by the Genocide Convention. Thus,
alienage, language, political affiliation, class affiliation, clan affiliation, cast
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are intended to cause the physical
destruction of the group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births within the group in whole or in
part; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to another group; or attempts to do so,
shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b) Punishment for Basic Offense. - The punishment for an offense under subsection (a)
is -
(1) in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1), where death results, by death
or imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than $1,000,000, or both; and
(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or imprisonment for not more than twenty
years, or both, in any other case.
(c) Incitement Offense. - Whoever in a circumstance described in subsection (d) di-
rectly and publicly incites another to violate subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
(d) Required Circumstance for Offenses. - The circumstance referred to in subsections
(a) and (c) is that
(1) the offense is committed within the United States; or
(2) the alleged offender is a national of the United States (as defined in section 101
of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101)).
(e) Nonapplicability of Certain Limitations. - Notwithstanding section 3282 of this title,
in the case of an offense under subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be found, or
information instituted, at any time without limitation.
38. See id. § 1093.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
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affiliation, skill affiliation, and indeed just about any symbol that is cultur-
ally understood to differentiate in practical terms between the "we" and
the "other" generate an essential predicate for the diversity of forms of
group deprivation.
B. Racial and Group Discrimination in National and Transnational
Perspective
The problem of race and group prejudice is also global. It is a serious,
near universal problem for human rights and world order. From a global,
cross-cultural perspective, culturally defined symbols of group identity may
vary, but the political results have comparable patterns. A group is "identi-
fied." The group is part of a community process of effective power. How
the power process actually works indicates who benefits and who does not,
as well as who gets what, when, and how from the trough of public and
private goods and honors. Law and lawyers are often deeply implicated in
both the process and outcomes of race relations. The law can be a mixed
blessing.4" It can be an instrument of both oppression and of its legitimacy
as witnessed in the United States prior to Brown,4 3 and in South Africa
42. See generally Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (an example of the law support-
ing the indignity of slavery); See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (an example of
law supporting Jim Crow); See generally Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (Brown 1), 347
U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954) (an example of the law supporting essential dignity and freedom
from invidious discrimination).
43. Brown v. Board of Education, 47 U.S. at 494-95 (overruling the "separate but equal"
doctrine in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. at 550-52 and holding that "separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal" and that "such segration is a denial of the equal protection of the laws").
However, law can be an instrument of both oppression and of oppression's legitimacy.
In Dred Scott, for example, Justice Taney wrote for Court reasoning that Blacks should be
denied citizenship, based upon a variety of sources including the Declaration of Independence
("it is too clear for dispute, that the enslaved African race were not intended to be included, and
formed no part of the people who framed and adopted this declaration" (Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at
410)), the U.S. Constitution ("there are two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and
specifically to the negro race as a separate class of persons, and show clearly that they were not
regarded as a portion of the people or citizens of the Government then formed" (Id. at 411)), the
Articles of Confederation ("notwithstanding the generality of the words free inhabitants, it is
clear that, according to their accepted meaning in that day, they did not include the African race"
(Id. at 418)), and the naturalization law passed by the second session of the first Congress March
26, 1790 (which confined the right to citizenship "to aliens being free white persons"(Id. at 419)).
The case Hudgins v. Wright, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.)134 (Sup. Ct. App. 1806), also emphasized
the role of law in solidifying racial identities.
By embalming in the form of legal presumptions and evidentiary burdens the prejudices
society attached to vestiges of African ancestry, Hudgkins demonstrates that the law
serves not only to reflect but to solidify social prejudice, making law a prime instrument
in the construction and reinforcement of racial subordination.
Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,
and Choice, HARVARD CIVIL RIGHTs-CIvIL LIBERTIES L.REV., Vol. 29, at 1, 3 (1994). In Hudg-
ins v. Wright, three generations of enslaved women had sued for freedom in Virginia on the
ground that they descended from a free maternal ancestor. Hudgins, 11 Va. at 134. Hudgins had
planned to remove these slaves from Virginia when they had sued for freedom. See id. In the
lower court (the Richmond District Court of Chancery), Chancellor Wythe examined the slaves
and could find no visible Negro features in them. See id. Therefore, in the lower court, Hudgins
had to overcome the presumption of proving that one of the women's female ancestors had been
a slave, which Hudgins failed to do. See id.
Virginia law, at the time, held the presumption that Blacks were slaves, and thus, had the
burden of proving a free ancestor. L6PEZ, supra note 38, at 2. On the other hand, Whites and
Indians were presumed free; thus, the burden of proving their descent fell on those alleging slave
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during Apartheid.44
In the present day, fashionable conservative theorists such as Dinesh
d'Souza join in an assault on the integrity and moral foundations of minor-
ity claims to operational equality.45 Ultimately, these emerge as attacks on
the ideas of cultural tolerance and mutual, reciprocal understanding that
we associate with multiculturalism and pluralism.46 However, the larger
ethnographic world community presents a mosaic that is not significantly
different from the domestic demographic context. It is a world of diversity.
The rules of international law have made enormous advances in the com-
status. See id. On appeal, Justice Tucker formulated a test for race based on physical characteris-
tics (facial complexion, hair texture, and width of the nose) to determine whether the women
were Black or Indian (presumptively slaves or presumptively free, respectively). Hudgins, 11 Va.
at 139-40. In formulating such a test, the Hudgins case reified the racial stereotypes and
prejudices into the law.
Another example of law as an instrument of both oppression and of its legitimacy which
highlights social prejudices quickly becoming legal prejudices and which emphasizes the close ties
between race and law is the "Greaser Act." In 1855, the California Legislature formulated the
so-called "Greaser Act" which targeted Mexicans as a racial group. LOPEZ, supra note 38, at 29.
The "Greaser Act" intended to discourage vagrancy, but specifically applied to "all persons who
are commonly known as Greasers or the issue of Spanish and Indian blood ... and who go armed
and are not peaceable and quiet persons." Cal. Stat. 175 (1855).
See also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 65 S. Ct. 193, 89 L.Ed. 194 (1944). In
Korematsu, the petitioner, an American citizen of Japanese descent, was convicted in a federal
district court for remaining in a military area contrary to an exclusion order. See id. at 215-16.
Korematsu was apparently the first Supreme Court case to articulate the concept that a classifica-
tion that curtail the rights of racial groups is "suspect" and must be subjected to the "most rigid
scutiny," justified only if there is a "pressing public necessity." NORMAN REDLICH, BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, AND ATrANASIO, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 396 (3d ed. 1996). Korematsu may also
have been the only case in which this test was applied in a case involving discrimination against a
minority race, for which the law (Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34) was upheld. See id. The Civil
Exclusion Order No. 34 of the Commanding General of the Western Command, U.S. Army, was
one of a number of military orders promulgated during World War II pursuant to Executive
Order 9066 and prohibited persons of Japanese ancestry from a military area. REDLICH, ET. AL.
supra note 38, at 690. Consider, Larry G. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A
Motivation Theory of the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 San Diego L.Rev.
1041, 1074 (1978):
The Japanese exclusion cases [are] most troubling not because the Court found that the
challenged rules would have been promulgated even apart from prejudice, but because
it refused seriously to consider whether maintaining the exclusionary system and contin-
uing its enforcement as of the time the cases reached the Court could be explained on
grounds other than racial prejudice.
44. During apartheid, law was used as an instrument of oppression and also legitimized those
policies of racial segregation. The following laws of South Africa provide supporting examples:
Population Registration Act (1950), which assigned every person to a racial category; the Aboli-
tion of Passes and Coordination of Documents (1952), which required all Africans (blacks) to
carry identification papers; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953), which provided
for segregation in public facilities; the Native Laws Amendment Act (1952) and the Natives Re-
settlement Act (1954), which both limited the rights of Africans (blacks) to live in urban areas
and allowed authorities to relocate those not allowed to be where they were living; and the
Group Areas Act (1950), which segregated every South African locality by race). See
HOROWITZ, supra note 7, at 11; See generally THE OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA 111870-
1966, at 409-16 (Monica Wilson & Leonard Thompson eds., Clarendon Press 1971). Other laws
pertaining to racial segregation in education were the Bantu Education Act (separate education)
and the Extension of University Education Act (1959), which provided for separate higher educa-
tional facilities. See id. at 410. See also DUGARD, supra note 7, at 53-106.
45. See generally DINESH D'SOUZA, THE END OF RACISM: PRINCIPLES FOR A MULTIRACIAL
SOCIETY (Free Press, 1995) and ILLBERAL EDUCATION: THE POLITICS OF RACE AND SEX ON
CAMPUS (Vintage Books, 1992).
46. See id.
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plex world of multiple group identities. This is clearly indicated in the de-
velopment of, among other precepts, the right to self-determination.
Although conservative theorists like Henry Kissinger question the legiti-
macy of self-determination claims arising from countries like Bosnia, South
Africa, and Tibet, the concept of self-determination is more than simply
freedom from colonialism, alien rule, or the empowerment of national in-
dependence or community autonomy.47 Self-determination represents a
broader idea of both liberation and redemption. It is a vehicle of both
individual and collective self-expression, respect, and coherent identity. In
its many manifestations, racial discrimination and allied group prejudices
are indeed the antithesis of a respect-informed precept of self-determina-
tion at any level of social organization.
C. Race Relations Law and the Foundations for Basic Respect
It is a principal objective of this Article to show that genocide is a
process and is often preceded by less lethal aspects of group deprivation.
One of the most important of these aspects of group deprivation is repre-
sented in the process of race relations and more specifically the problems
of racial prejudice. Because understanding race relations and the specific
problems of racial prejudice are important to understanding such forms of
group deprivations as cultural dominance as manifested through slavery,
caste, apartheid and genocide, it is important that we provide a clearer pic-
ture of the legal theories that inform the problems of racial prejudice.
It is helpful to examine American jurisprudence as it has continuously
grappled with the proper interaction between law and race relations. For
the past 30 years, American courts have changed their definition of what
constitutes racial discrimination. They have shifted from an approach that
looks at history and context in determining when a race-based injury has
occurred and how it should be remedied, to a much more formalistic ap-
proach that makes it difficult for a State to "discriminate" or make distinc-
tions of group identity on any basis, irrespective of the context. The
following section will be devoted to studying these two well-defended posi-
tions. We will argue that the tests and terminologies used in a contextual
approach are much better suited to properly identifying and combating ra-
cial prejudice because they meet the tests of social realism, relevancy, and
better inform legal and constitutional doctrine regarding the scope and
reach of equalitarian promise under law.
After the Civil War and the enactment of the 14th Amendment, the
Court retreated from crass realism to formalism in the so-called separate
but equal doctrine as outlined in the infamous Plessy v. Ferguson.as The
Court was not prepared to accept the realism of Plessy nor turn it on its
head. If society had required dominance in fact and now required equality
in fact, the Court would have had a consistent theory recognizing the
change in the prescriptive force of the 14th Amendment.
47. For an example of Kissinger's questioning of the legitimacy of self-determination claims
of Bosnia, see Henry Kissinger, Limits to What the U.S. Can Do in Bosnia, WASH. POST, Septem-
ber 22, 1997, at A19.
48. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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The formalistic construction of the 14th Amendment largely held sway
until the Court once more had recourse to a form of race relations realized
in Brown v. Board of Education.49 Separation, however equal in form,
could never be equal in fact in any realistic system of race relations. With
the advent of Nixonian conservatism and the plethora of attacks on the
Supreme Court for its race relations and activism, the Court began to cut
away at the realism of Brown and move in a formalistic direction well illus-
trated in the affirmative action cases. Although affirmative action has not
been held to be completely unconstitutional, a significant number of judges
have held that affirmative action violates equal protection because it dis-
criminates against whites on the basis of race.
These latter cases demonstrate that the Supreme Court has virtually
no conception of racial prejudice as a legal construct. This is illustrated by
the way in which the method and theory of the Court focuses upon a classi-
fication system without regard to the context. The word "race" triggers
"strict scrutiny," and strict scrutiny as a form of review is decoupled from
the idea of race and prejudice. Thus, strict scrutiny is not a review of racial
prejudice as a conjunctive construction, but rather the terms are read dis-
junctively, and then married into a strictly formalistic conception of the
principal of equality which is now divorced from the relevant social and
political context.
The formalistic approach of recent Supreme Court decisions miss the
fact that, lexically, the term "race," viewed outside of any particular social
context, is basically neutral. For example, the race may describe the
"badge" or marker that culturally distinguishes one human group from an-
other.5" Its meaning for law and public order deepens only when we attach
certain practical consequences to the symbol of "race." Thus, when the
symbol of race is used as the key marker to extinguish a human group, we
have a condition of legal intervention of universal import: the crime of ge-
nocide. When race becomes the identifying marker of extreme cultural
dominance, we have the crime of slavery. When race becomes the marker
of political domination and subjugation, we have the crime of apartheid.
When race becomes the marker for policies and practices that intention-
ally, or as a consequence of structurally conditioned policies of prior inten-
tional racism, constitute either specific acts of racial discrimination or
structurally assured practices of enduring racial discrimination, we have a
legislative or constitutionally prohibited precept. Thus, in either domestic
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
50. According to The Social Science Encyclopedia, race is essentially a biological concept,
and "[r]aces are recognized by a combination of geographic, ecological and morphological factors
and, since the 1970s, by analyses of the distribution of gene frequencies for numbers of essentially
non-morphological, biochemical components." THE SOCIAL SCIENCE ENCYCLOPEDIA 712(Adam
Kuper & Jessica Kuper eds., Routledge, 2d ed. 1996). However, progressive insights of the field
of genetics and the interbreeding of races has blurred the outlines of each race and attenuated the
concept of race itself. See id. at 712-13. The term "race," in vernacular contexts, has been applied
along a variety of principles including nation-states (e.g., German, English, French); language
families (Slavic, Latin, Semitic); minorities (e.g., Jews, gypsies, Puerto Ricans); "and phenotypi-
cally distinct but genetically hybrid aggregates such as whites, Negroes, yellows..." THE INTER-
NATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 263(David L. Sills ed., The Macmillan
Company 1968). See also generally MARGARET WETHERELL & JONATHAN POTTER, MAPPING
THE LANGUAGE OF RACISM: DISCOURSE AND THE LEGITIMATION OF EXPLOITATION (Columbia
University Press 1992).
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or international law, the dominant forms, and sometimes the continuing
effects, of racial discrimination are proscribed.
What is important is that the meaning of the term "race" is or must be
understood juridically with some deference to problem and context. Thus,
race in the context of genocide often involves the problems of the physical
and cultural extermination of groups. Race in the context of apartheid
presents a systematic pattern of domination and subjugation using the full
apparatus of state power. In the context of discrimination, the term "race"
is neutral outside the references included in the term "discrimination." In
other words, the label "race," from an observer's perspective, is not inher-
ently "suspect." It is or should be "suspect" only in the context of certain
sociopolitical or demographic conditions that entail genocide, apartheid,
racial discrimination, or other forms of arbitrary and invidious
discrimination.
The focus on the neutral designative term "race" as a label or indicator
of group identity is a short-hand version of a larger, more ubiquitous, but
deeply important, psycho-social phenomenon: cultural identity. As the Ge-
nocide Convention indicates, there are multiple labels of identity that serve
as cultural, as well as psychological, markers of group identity and/or group
affiliation.5 If the marker includes a personal psychological reality in the
self's conception of the self or a sociological reality in the ascription of
identity by non-self others, one Establishes an essential condition for the
prospects of both the beneficence of white South Africa or the deprivation,
repression, or murder of black South Africa. Identification, then, is not a
good or a bad thing as such.52
However, the Supreme Court's identification of race as an abstract,
perhaps formalistic, marker misses the context within which race or any
other symbol of identification serves as the vehicle of operational depriva-
tions. The term "race", by itself, is virtually meaningless unless its operative
meaning derives from some relevant context. Hence, the composite phrase
"racial discrimination" is indeed much more descriptive-designative of
what values are, for example, encapsulated in the invocation of strict scru-
tiny as a racial, gender, or alien problem. There is a world of difference
between the term "race" and the phrase "racial discrimination." The dis-
tinction effectually removes race from the relevant social process and con-
text, and therefore, obscures the social process of racial discrimination that
triggers heightened judicial inquiry.
In United States v. Carolene Products Co. ," Justice Stone makes a spe-
cific reference to the category "racial minorities" when the Court asks in
footnote four "[w]hether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities
may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
51. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
33, art. II.
52. It is good when personal identity and cultural identity are politically seen as valued in
and of themselves if they affirm, for example, individual identity, collective identity, cultural di-
versity, and vigorous, energizing pluralism. When identification (whatever symbolic marker is
culturally operative) is used to identify persons as appropriate targets of discrimination or worse,
then, legal and political interventions are justified if human dignity is valued as a legal and politi-
cal priority.
53. 304 U.S. 144 , 152-53, n. 4.
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those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a corresponding more searching judicial inquiry."54
Stone was a well-educated lawyer in his time, and his singling out of
racial minorities would have been influenced both by the pluralistic charac-
ter of the United States' ethnographic landscape in which African-Ameri-
cans, Jews, Italians, Irish, Eastern Europeans, Asians, and other
identifiable ethnic groups often experienced some level of discrimination.
Even more importantly, he would have been aware that the protection of
minorities, especially through the peace settlements of World War I and the
regime of the League of Nations, was the critical issue of the day in interna-
tional law. In other words, the term "racial minorities" bears both a se-
mantic and syntactic meaning. Conceptually, the meaning of the term
"minority" ultimately derives from the larger social process problem of
group identity, stratification, and the exercise of effective power. It would,
of course, have required no great insight of social or political science to
understand this latter point.
Footnote four continues, "whether prejudice against discrete and insu-
lar minorities may be a special condition" which effectually undermines the
"operation" of the normal (democratic?) political process, which may also
require "more searching judicial inquiry."55 The phrase "racial minorities"
is qualified by the terms "prejudice" and "discrete and insular." It is to be
noted that the term "discrimination" is not used. "Prejudice" is a stronger
term and bears a scientific, as well as a common sense meaning. The term
prejudice provokes deprivation and more. Discrimination is more "neu-
tral." It can carry a meaning close to "prejudice," but seem softer. It can
term discrimination as making thoughtful distinctions. It can mean people
being treated "unequally and unfairly" as in conceptions of "racial discrim-
ination," discrimination against others, women or identifiable non-self
others, however culturally recognized or defined.
The terms "discrete and insular," when conjunctively expressed, are
not altogether clear. Perhaps they hide more than they disclose. The term
"discrete" is perhaps meant to designate an empirical datum. Those minor-
54. Id. (citing Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73).
55. Id.
56. Gordon Allport provides the classic definition of prejudice, stating that "pre-judgments
become prejudices only if they are not reversible when exposed to new knowledge." GORDON W.
ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 9 (Addison-Wesley 1954). Prejudice, literally, means pre-
judgment. See generally KUPER, supra note 50 at 663. Although it is logically possible to be
prejudiced in favor of a particular group or person, social psychologists reserve the term
"prejudice" to refer to pre-judgments that are unreasonably negative against a social group. See
id. The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines "prejudice" as referring "prima-
rily to a prejudgment or preconcept reached before the relevant information has been collected or
examined and therefore based on inadequate or even imaginary evidence." SILLS, supra note 50,
Vol. 12, at 439.
The term "ethnic group" is preferred over the term "race" as the object of prejudice. See id.
This preference for the term "ethnic group" is twofold: (1.) "because of the difficulty of ade-
quately defining [race] so that it may safely be applied to human populations," and (2.) because
... the populations against whom prejudice may be directed do not usually satisfy the criteria of
"race" proposed by physical anthropologists and geneticists. See id.
For more on the concepts of prejudice, see PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM (John F.
Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., Academic Press 1986). See also generally WETHERELL &
POTTER, supra note 50.
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ities "groups" are distinguishable from the rest of a demographically and
ethnographically conceived social process. The term "insular" could be re-
dundant in the sense that if it is close to a synonym for discrete, suggesting
perhaps something more than discrete. We think not. The reference to
insular, if it is to have meaning, indicates a meaning close to being isolated
from something else. It implies "barriers." It implies something contextu-
ally related to the normal political process that insulates by political, legal,
and/or cultural barriers the discrete group from normal democratic
participation.
The basis of footnote four,57 in our view, responds to a classic theme of
modern positivism: the separation of law from morality. Stone's presump-
tion of validity to political judgment in constitutional terms goes a long way
towards meeting this objective. What is more problematic is giving it jurid-
ical meaning that brings both jurisprudential coherence and constitutional
legitimacy to the "inquiry" aspects of review which makes basic law more
responsive to concretely specified Bill of Rights values. We are uncertain
whether, at least, it is genuinely implicit in Stone's formulation to assume
that the notion of more searching inquiry touches on the panorama of
moral-political understandings that are implicit in ordered liberty or equal
respect. A more modest construction suggests that in the racial minorities
context, the inquiry test is more practical and responds to sociopolitical or
contextual components of the American community: the melting pot of un-
melted lumps. "Racial minority" is a factual reference. "Special condi-
tion" is a reference to the conditions of social process in which the
prejudice is a common sense and ubiquitous outcome. The phrase "opera-
tions of those political processes" virtually mandates some kind of more
searching inquiry about the larger context of specific problems of racial
prejudice. "More searching judicial inquiry" requires that we give
credence to the terms "searching" and "inquiry." Here, we would suggest
the constraints and boundaries for judicial techniques of the condition to
be the relevant context. This, we suggest, squares with the notion that the
special conditions of race are rooted more in "fact," than in larger abstract
"moral" considerations.
It is by no means clear that the strict scrutiny test the Court has used
to appraise the validity of affirmative action programs in contemporary ad-
judication is consistent with this interpretation of Justice Stone's famous
footnote. In fact, the term "race" is used as a triggering device that pre-
sumptively suggests that it is "suspect" and must meet a compelling public
objective if a regulation that indicates the label "race" is to be valid. The
term "race" is used disjunctively with either the notion of prejudice or the
notion of discrimination. The term "racial" is decoupled from the notion of
"minority." The systemic test of political process dysfunctions is radically
narrowed to a non-systemic demand of specific acts of specific deprivation.
In short, the Supreme Court has nowhere since Carolene Products articu-
lated a coherent concept of either racial prejudice or racial discrimination
as the essential factual predicate for which the use of the technique of more
searching inquiry is appropriate. It nowhere adequately grapples with the
problem of racial minorities as deprived outcomes of the larger American
57. See Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. at 152-53, n. 4.
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social and power process, which sustains, statistically, strong patterns of
deprivation regarding all major social, economic, and political values:
wealth, power, respect, rectitude, well-being, health, skill and, very impor-
tantly, enlightenment for African-Americans and other power-deprived
groups. What must be very clear here is that law and lawyers are often
deeply implicated in the process and the outcomes of race relations. Law
indeed, is both a condition and, in some degree, a consequence of the
processes of group stratification of which race relations are a very impor-
tant example.
This analysis of Carolene Products must be understood at two different
levels. First, it must be understood in the context of the history of the
Supreme Court's effort to grapple with the problem of how to define an
appropriate juridical role for itself in the control and regulation of Ameri-
can race relations. Second, it must also be seen as a vehicle for establishing
an appropriate theory of judicial review of race relations. Hopefully, the
theory will bring a sense of realism and professional responsibility to the
task of constitutional interpretation in the race relations context, focusing
especially on the treatment of minorities.58 The problem we are teasing out
58. It may be useful to be reminded of the background of footnote four of Carolene Products
in mind, let us briefly review some of the leading decisions of the United States Supreme Court
dealing with the legal supervision of race relations. Prior to the Civil War, the Court also decided
an important race-relations case, Dred Scott. In this case, the Court accepted the notion of dis-
crimination - even domination implicit in the institution of legally-sanctioned slavery. Dred
Scott, a slave, sued for his freedom after being taken to a free state (to Illinois, in particular, but
also to several other free states and territories) and returned to a slave state (Missouri), where he
was sold to Sandford. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 431-32. Scott claimed that his having been taken
into free states made him free. See id. at 400. However, Justice Taney, in his opinion for the
Court, reasoned that while a state may confer rights as it sees fit upon individuals living in it, a
state cannot confer rights of U.S. citizenship by virtue of state law. See id. at 405. Although in
Illinois Scott could not be a slave, the ability of the State of Illinois to make Scott a free man
extends no further than its state borders and does not confer the rights and privileges of U.S.
citizenship on Scott. See id. The Court held that individuals of the Negro race were not citizens
in the constitutional sense (i.e., not citizens as the word was understood by the Framers of the
U.S. Constitution). See id. at 454. Therefore, Scott, was not a citizen of a State in the U.S.
Constitutional sense and was not entitled to sue in U.S. Courts. See id. at 454. For more on Dred
Scott, see VINCENT C. HOPKINS, S.J., DRED SCOTT'S CASE, (Antheneum: New York 1967).
In Dred Scott, the Court stated,
One of [the two clauses in the Constitution which point directly and specifically to the
African race as a separate class of persons] reserves to each of the thirteen States the
right to import slaves until ... 1808, if it thinks proper .... [T]he other provision [is a
pledge by the States] to each other to maintain the right of property of the master, by
delivering up to him any slave who may have escaped from his service, and be found
within their respective territories .... [T]hese two provisions show, conclusively, that
[slaves and their descendants were not] embraced in any of the other provisions in the
Constitution ... [and did not intend] to confer on them or their posterity the blessings of
liberty, or any of the personal rights so carefully provided for the citizen.
60 U.S. at 411-12.
The badge of "inferiority" inherent in racial domination, racial discrimination and slavery,
the Court held, was a social fact immune to the prescriptive promise of a constitutional rule of
law requiring equal justice. See, e.g., id. at 427, where the Court stated as follows:
[T]he State in which [a person] resides may then, unquestionably, determine his status or
condition, and place him among the class of persons who are not recognised as citizens,
but belong to an inferior and subject race; and may deny him the privileges and immuni-
ties enjoyed by its citizens.
Plessy was decided after the enactment of the 14th Amendment. The prescriptive force of
the "equal protection" provision was insufficient to address the fact of social realism recognized
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here, more generally, is how to map the social realism of discrimination or
dominance indicated in Carolene Products onto the prescriptive force of
the promise of equal justice under law. "Under law" literally means that
there must also be a legal or juridical theory of discrimination or domi-
nance to inform equal protection analysis for the prescription and applica-
tion of legal equality. Dred Scott59 gives us a theory of social realism and
Plessy6° gives us a formal analysis that closes the door on social realism.
Brown returns to a vestige of social realism, but with the exact opposite
result of Dred Scott: separate but equal is inherently discriminatory and
prohibited by the 14th Amendment.61 However, the social realism of
Brown seems to amount to more of a judgment of moral realism rather
than a firmly articulated theory of discrimination in general or, more nar-
rowly, a theory of racial discrimination.
in Dred Scott. In Plessy v. Ferguson, the United States Supreme Court ruled that a state could
lawfully distinguish between blacks and whites, so long as the distinction, on its face, treated each
group "equally." Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the Court in Plessy, stated that:
[t]he object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute
equality of the two races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have
been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distin-
guished from political equality, or a commingling of the races upon terms unsatisfactory
to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in places where they are
liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to
the other, and have been generally, if not universally, recognized as within the compe-
tency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their police power.
Id. at 544. The Supreme Court noted that a state rule requiring separate accommodations for
black and white Americans did not violate the 14th Amendment of the Constitution so long as
the separation, on its face, applied to each "group" equally. The state legislation in question in
Plessy mandated "that all railway companies carrying passengers in their coaches in this State,
shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white, and coloured races, by providing
two or more passenger coaches for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger coaches by
a partition so as to secure separate accommodations." See id. at 540 (citing Acts 1890, No. 111 of
the General Assembly of the State of Louisiana, at 152). The Plessy Court, then stated, that as to
a conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment, the case reduced itself to the question of whether the
statute in question was a reasonable regulation. See id. at 550. The Court, in using a standard of
reasonableness, indicated that it "cannot say that a law which authorizes or even requires the
separation of the races in public conveyances is unreasonable, or more obnoxious to the Four-
teenth Amendment" than similar acts of Congress or state legislatures whose "constitutionality
... does not seem to have been questioned." Id. at 550-51.
From the perspective of social realism, it can hardly be denied that the coerced separation of
"black" group parties in the context of public transportation is an indication that the black "tar-
get" group was meant to be the object of discriminatory treatment. Nor can it be denied that the
dominant "white" group or elite components of that group in Louisiana intended to discriminate
in a negative sense against members of the black groups. It took over 50 years before the United
States Supreme Court would retreat from the Plessy ruling in the leading case, Brown v. Board of
Education of Topeka. Plessy is most commonly known as the case that formulated the doctrine of
"separate but equal." See Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 490-91, where the Court stated that "the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' did not make its appearance in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v.
Ferguson." However, the Court concluded that "in the field of public education the doctrine of
'separate but equal' has no place. Id. at 495. Separate educational facilities are inherently une-
qual." Id. Thus, the Court ruled that on the issue of the constitutionality of segregation in public
schools, "such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws." Id. "Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Id. at 494-95.
59. See generally Dred Scott, 60 U.S. 393.
60. See generally Plessy, 163 U.S. 537.
61. See generally Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483. The Court in Brown I concluded that "in the field of
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' [from Plessy v. Ferguson] has no place."
Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495. "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal." Id. (emphasis
added).
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The lack of a legal theory of racial discrimination that has some close
correspondence with social reality has of course become the central prob-
lem of race-relations law as American courts have grappled with the prob-
lem of so-called "reverse discrimination." The plurality opinion of Justice
Powell in the Bakke decision suggested that affirmative action which bene-
fits blacks and other functional minorities could not be justified on the ba-
sis of providing a more equalitarian context for higher education, but
rather, it was predicated on an ostensible educational justification that
posits diversity as an education-enhancing fact.6 2 This weakens the idea
that affirmative action is justified not simply by a prior legacy of discrimi-
nation and dominance, but by an effort to ameliorate the conditions of
American power that constrain a citizen's access to the valued goods, ser-
vices, and honors of a modern democratic, rule-of-law governed State be-
cause of race or related symbols of identity which enhance the prospect of
exclusion rather than inclusion.
This is not to disparage the value of education, or more generally, cul-
tural diversity. However, the diversity rationale takes us far afield from the
problems of racial discrimination, its cause, and its cure. Moreover, it oblit-
erates any notion of cultural dominance, a social fact that ultimately must
be validated by a map of the American social and power process, under-
lining the key indicators of inclusion and exclusion as rough measures of
citizen-based equity. In addition, the analysis accepts without explanation
the idea of reverse discrimination as the functional equivalent of racial dis-
crimination with virtually no analysis of either the idea of racial discrimina-
tion or the empirical bases of so-called reverse discrimination.
If the legal problem is discrimination against racial minorities, there
needs to be an explicit formulation in juridical terms, or more explicitly, in
constitutional terms, of what the elements of racial discrimination encom-
62. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
Bakke in relevant part provides:
[T]he purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School
perceived as victims of "societal discrimination" does not justify a classification that
imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who bear no responsibility for
whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions program are thought to have
suffered. To hold otherwise would be to convert a remedy heretofore reserved for viola-
tions of legal rights into a privilege that all institutions throughout the Nation could
grant at their pleasure for whatever groups are perceived as victims of societal discrimi-
nation. That is a step we have never approved.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 310 (opinion of Powell, J. for the Court). However, "the attainment of a
diverse student body ... clearly is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education." Id. at 311-12. "The atmosphere of speculation, experiment and creation C so essen-
tial to the quality of higher education C is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
body." Id. at 312. Thus, the Court reasoned that in arguing for universities' rights to select stu-
dents who contribute the most to the "robust exchange of ideas," Bakke involved a counter-
vailing constitutional interest (i.e., academic freedom, which has "long been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment"). Id. at 312-13.
In this case, Bakke, a white male applied to the Davis Medical School and was rejected, despite a
strong benchmark score. See id. at 276. He brought suit, challenging the legality of the school's
special admissions program which reserved 16 of the 100 seats in the class for "disadvantaged"
minority students. See id. at 279. The Supreme Court held that the special admissions program
was illegal, but race could be one of a number of factors which a school may consider in accepting
applicants. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318-20. In addition, because the school could not prove that Bakke
would not have been admitted if there were no special admissions program, Bakke was entitled to
be admitted. See id. at 320.
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pass. Similarly, if prescribing legislative or administrative policies to ame-
liorate the conditions of racial discrimination, it would be important to
know why distinctions made in the furtherance of this kind of governmen-
tal objective is actionable "reverse" racial discrimination.63 The difficulty
lies in the judicially crafted techniques invented by the United States Su-
preme Court as criteria to interpret the 14th Amendment. The test used is
the test of classification: racial classifications generate strict scrutiny stan-
dards of review. The terms of analysis have incorporated the undefined
notions of reverse discrimination or more moderately benign discrimina-
tion. In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., Justice O'Connor's plurality
opinion sweepingly suggested that any racial classification must trigger
strict scrutiny review.64 O'Connor added further justification that "unless
[classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for remedial settings,
they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics
of racial hostility. 65
As Professor Duncan has aptly observed, the legacy of strict scrutiny
has generated great uncertainty in U.S. race relations.66 Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Croson illustrates this. The most absurd analytical consequence
63. Before analyzing reverse discrimination, one must first know what discrimination is. Dis-
crimination is the behavioral aspect of prejudice; discrimination refers to the actions that result
from the rejection of others due to the negative prejudgment or preconception that is prejudice.
See SILLS, supra note 43, Vol. 12, at 439.
Cases which have been brought on the grounds of reverse discrimination include
Bakke,(where plaintiff, a white male student sued the University of California at Davis, challeng-
ing that university's affirmative action admissions policy after he had been denied admission in
favor of minority students) and Wittmer v. Peters, , 904 F. Supp. 845, 848-49 (C.D. Ill. 1995), 87
F.3d 916 (7th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Nov. 22, 1996) (No. 96-852)
(where three white correctional officers brought suit against the director of the Illinois Depart-
ment of Corrections and Warden Stephen McEvers, alleging that the promotion of an African
American, Hilliard, to a lieutenant position was a violation of their equal protection rights).
In Wittmer, the three plaintiffs were candidates for promotion, ranked third, sixth, and eighth
on the basis of their performance on a written exam and an oral review. See id. at 848-49. Hil-
liard was ranked 42nd, but was promoted to the last available lieutenant position by McEvers.
See id. at 849. McEvers officially noted that Hilliard was "promoted because he [was] an African
American." Id.
Although the lower court held that the warden's use of race in the selection process violated the
plaintiffs' rights to equal protection, the court refused to grant them monetary or injunctive relief
because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and were protected from any liability
in their official capacities under the 11th Amendment. See id. at 854-55. On appeal, the Seventh
Circuit Court affirmed the denial of relief; however, it disagreed with the central constitutional
holding of the court below. See Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 918. Although recognizing that the Supreme
Court had recently rejected the strict scrutiny standard as "strict in theory, fatal in fact," Chief
Judge Posner agreed with a unanimous panel that the proper standard of review was strict scru-
tiny. Id. at 918 (citing Adarand v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. at 2117). Judge Posner stated the Court's
current position as one in which "reverse discrimination is not illegal per se." Id. at 918. Posner
also concluded that racial classifications for any reason other than "rectifying past discrimination
... by the discriminating institution" remained unclear. Id. at 918.
64. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989). For a critique of
Justice O'Connor's decision in Croson, see PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE OBLIGING SHELL: AN
INFORMAL ESSAY ON FORMAL EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 7 MICH. L.REV. 2128 (1989).
65. Id. at 493 (citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of
Powell, J.) ("[P]referential programs may only reinforce common stereotypes holding that certain
groups are unable to achieve success without special protection based on a factor having no rela-
tion to individual worth")).
66. Nicole Duncan, Croson Revisited: A Legacy of Uncertainty in the Application of Strict
Scrutiny, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 679, 679 (1995).
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of Croson is that only remedial racial discrimination can survive "strict
scrutiny." We use the term "absurd" because the test of any racial classifi-
cation assumes that the term "race" is sufficiently broad so as to include
the term "discrimination." It is clear that the Court must move beyond
Brown's intuitive social realism to provide more explicit juridical construc-
tion of "racial discrimination" in general. Instead, the Court has strenu-
ously avoided such an endeavor, and we are left with a curious result: a
legal conclusion about race and discrimination, but no articulate theory to
determine when litigation involves racial discrimination for constitutional
review purposes. Indeed, it does seem odd that trial courts are to make
factual determinations about racial discrimination before they trigger con-
stitutional analysis or interpret statutes, while the constitutional test is trig-
gered by the invocation of the word, "race." To put the matter succinctly,
we have a law of "racial discrimination" or a law of race and discrimination
without a theory of or about racial discrimination. We suspect that the
terms "racial discrimination" read conjunctively add up to a meaning about
the scope of discrimination that is different from the terms "race" and "dis-
crimination" read disjunctively. In effect, this is exactly what Justice
O'Connor has done in Croson. It was, in our view, implicitly done in
Bakke. While social realism and common sense intuitions might well have
been sensible in the past, they do not provide principled guidance if the
decision-makers are charged with making fundamental law. The classifica-
tion system is a meaningless, arbitrary technique not calculated to deepen
the court's understanding of when it should intervene, why it should inter-
vene, and when interventions should be terminated.
Perhaps it may be useful to place the Croson case itself into the con-
text of three other cases that have sought to refine the law of affirmative
action in the United States.67 In Fullilove v. Klutznick, the Federal Public
67. The cases are the following: Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Metro Broadcast-
ing Inc. v. FCC, 479 U.S. 547 (1990); Adarand Construction Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); and
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996). In Hopwood v.
Texas, Plaintiff-Appellants, challenged the University of Texas' Law School's admissions proce-
dures as unconstitutional racial discrimination against whites after being denied admission. Hop-
wood v. State of Texas (Hopwood 1), 78 F.3d 932, 938 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580.
The plaintiff-appellants were considered as discretionary zone candidates. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at
938 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551, 564-67 (W.D. Tex. 1994), where the district court
had discussed in detail the plaintiffs' qualifications and rejections). After a bench trial, the dis-
trict court held that the law school had violated the plaintiffs' equal protection rights, but refused
to enjoin the law school from continuing to impose racial preferences in its admissions policies or
to grant damages beyond a one-dollar nominal award to each plaintiff. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 938
(citing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. at 579. The district court's judgment also included an
order allowing the plaintiffs to reapply to the law school without charge. Hopwood, 78 F.3d at
938 (citing Hopwood v. Texas, 861 F. Supp. at 582-83).
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal used a strict scrutiny standard of review:
Discrimination based upon race is highly suspect.... [T]he Supreme Court recently has
required that any government action that expressly distinguishes between persons on
the basis of race be held to the most exacting scrutiny. Furthermore, there is now abso-
lutely no doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classi-
fications, including those characterized by their proponents as "benign" or "remedial."
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 940 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted) (citing Adarand v. Pefia, 115
S. Ct. At 2112-13 (overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547 (1990), insofar as it
applied intermediate scrutiny to congressionally mandated "benign" racial classifications); City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 448 U.S. 469, 495 (1989) (plurality opinion) (the standard of review
under the Equal Protection Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted
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Works Employment Act of 1977 prescribed that local public works projects
set aside ten percent of the federal funds they received for contracts with
minority business enterprises.68 The Act contained a provision that made
the ten percent prescription subject to waiver under certain circum-
stances.69 The fact that the court was divided, as it was in Bakke, is well
illustrated by the fact that the opinion of the Court was a plurality opin-
ion.70 The plurality opinion required only that a "searching" or "careful"
constitutional appraisal be employed to determine the lawfulness of the
set-aside part of the Act.71 The plurality recognized that the Congress had
by a particular classification); id. at 520 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he level of scrutiny does not
change merely because the challenged classification operates against a group that historically has
not been subject to government discrimination."). The Fifth Circuit Court reversed and re-
manded the district court's decision, concluding that the Fourteenth Amendment does not permit
the law school to discriminate "in favor of minority applicants by giving substantial racial prefer-
ences in its admissions program." Hopwood , 78 U.S. at 934, 62. The Fifth Circuit Court held
that the law school
may not use race as a factor in deciding which applicants to admit in order to achieve a
diverse student body, to combat the perceived effects of a hostile environment at the
law school, to alleviate the law school's poor reputation in the minority community, or
to eliminate any present effects of past discrimination by actors other than the law
school. Because the law school has proffered these justifications for its use of race in
admissions, the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of showing that they were scruti-
nized under an unconstitutional admissions system. The plaintiffs are entitled to reapply
under an admissions system that invokes none of these serious constitutional infirmities.
Id. at 962.
68. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980) (citing the Federal Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977, 91 Stat. 116, 42 U.S.C. '6705(f)(2) (Supp. 11 1976).
69. See id. at 454 (citing the Federal Public Works Act: "Except to the extent that the Secre-
tary determines otherwise, no grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works
project unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that at least 10% of the
amount of each grant shall be expended for minority business enterprises"). This administrative
waiver was included to express the intent for the federal administrator (i.e., the Secretary of
Commerce) to waive the 10% requirement where its application was not feasible. See id. at 453,
460. A waiver or partial waiver is also available.
[A] waiver or partial waiver is justified (and will be granted) to avoid subcontracting
with a minority business enterprise at an "unreasonable" price, i.e., a price above com-
petitive levels which cannot be attributed to the minority firm's attempt to cover costs
inflated by the present effects of disadvantage or discrimination.
Id. at 470-471.
70. Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Fullilove Court and delivered an
opinion, joined by Justices White and Powell. See id. at 453-94. Justice Powell filed a concurring
opinion. See id. at 495-97. Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Blackmun joined,
filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. See id. at 517-22. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Rehnquist, dissented. See id. at 522-32. Justice Stewart also filed a separate dissenting opinion.
See id. at 532-54.
71. Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion for the Fullilove Court, stated as follows:
Any preference based on racial or ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most search-
ing examination to make sure that it does not conflict with constitutional guarantees.
This case is one which requires, and which has received that kind of examination.
(opinion of Burger, C.J., for the Court, joined by White and Powell, JJ.) Id. at 491-92 (emphasis
added). See also id. at 519 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in judgment).
However, Justice Powell filed a separate opinion in which he concurred with the judgment of
the Court, but disagreed with the standard of review, preferring a strict scrutiny standard. See id.
at 496 (citing, e.g., Bakke, 458 U.S. at 299) ("Section 103(f)(2) employs a racial classification that
is constitutionally prohibited unless it is a necessary means of advancing a compelling govern-
mental interest"). Powell also stated, "I consider adherence to this standard as important and
consistent with precedent." Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 496.
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"comprehensive remedial power" to enforce "equal protection guaran-
tees."72 Recognizing that there were several possible constitutionally rele-
vant tests from the plethora of opinions in Bakke, the court simply
suggested that the legislation in question would "survive judicial review
under either test articulated in the Bakke opinion.17 3 The plurality uses the
concept of racial classification not as a synonym for racial discrimination,
but rather as a criterion." The court also stressed the fact that, in this con-
text, Congress had "a more comprehensive remedial power" to enforce the
promise of equal protection. 7
5
This opinion may be sharply contrasted with both the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Blackmun, and the
concurring opinion of Justices Stewart and Rehnquist. With regard to Jus-
tices Rehnquist and Stewart, the terms "racial" and "ethnic" classification
are synonymous with the terms "racial discrimination," regardless of any
level of contextual reference.76 Thus, a policy to remedy past racial or eth-
nic discrimination is, in the least, logically prohibited or, possibly, prohib-
ited racial discrimination.77
72. Id. at 483-84 (opinion of Burger, C.J. for the Court, joined by Powell and White, JJ.). See
id. at 510 (opinion of Powell, J., concurring); id. at 519-22 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by
Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 492, where the Fullilove Court stated,
This opinion does not adopt, either expressly or implicitly the formulas of analysis ar-
ticulated in such cases as University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
However, our analysis demonstrates that the MBE [minority business enterprises] pro-
vision should survive judicial review under either 'test' articulated in the several Bakke
opinions.
74. The Fullilove Court stated,
Congress may employ racial or ethnic classifications in exercising its Spending or other
legislative powers only if those classifications do not violate the Equal Protection com-
ponent of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. We recognize the need for
careful judicial evaluation to assure that any congressional program that employs racial
or ethnic criteria to accomplish the objective of remedying the present effects of past
discrimination is narrowly tailored to the achievement of that goal.
Id. at 480.
75. Id. at 483 ("In no organ of government, state or federal, does there repose a more com-
prehensive remedial power than in the Congress expressly charged by the Constitution with com-
petence and authority to enforce equal protection guarantees") (emphasis added).
76. In his dissent, which Justice Rehnquist joins, Justice Stewart states that the minority busi-
ness enterprise provision at issue in this case, which classifies contracting firms based on the racial
and ethnic attributes of their owners, is the kind of law prohibited by the equal protection guar-
antee. See id. at 527. In this dissent, Stewart seems to associate racial classifications with racial
discrimination.
Laws that operate on the basis of race require definitions of race. Because of the
Court's decision today, over statute books will once again have to contain laws that
reflect the odious practice of delineating the qualities that make one person Negro and
make another white. Moreover, racial discrimination, even "good faith" discrimination,
is inevitably a two-edged sword. "[P]referential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes holding that certain groups are unable to achieve success without special
protection based on a factor having no relationship to individual worth."
Id. at 531 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing University of California Regents
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
77. Stewart indicates that remedying past racial or ethnic discrimination is prohibited (or
possibly prohibited) racial discrimination, when he stated as follows:
The Court's attempt to characterize the law as a proper remedial measure to counteract
the effects of past or present racial discrimination is remarkably unconvincing. The Leg-
islative Branch of government is not a court of equity. It has neither the dispassionate
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Justice Marshall's opinion is on the other end of the contextual spec-
trum. It recontextualizes the notion of racial discrimination.7 8 For exam-
ple, Marshall reasons that a strict scrutiny standard should never apply to
"racial classifications that provide benefits to minorities for the purpose of
remedying the present effects of past discrimination."79 In short, this is not
racial discrimination. The underlying rationale of Marshall's view, when
pressed to its contextual limits, simply suggests that when the in-group
changes its policies and seeks to include the out-group in the benefits en-
joyed by the in-group, such actions can hardly be a matter of racial domi-
nance and subjugation of the in-group. On the contrary, it is a legitimate
social policy to achieve a roughly equalitarian promise frustrated by years
of exploitation, expropriation, and prejudice. It is this latter dissenting
view, with roots in the social processes of group deprivation, which pro-
vides the coherent rationale for programs of social justice in allocating the
weal and the woe of social organization.
In Croson, the City of Richmond adopted a minority business enter-
prise regulation that was more rigid than the federal statute in Fullilove.8 °
The city population was about 50 percent black.8' The city ordinance relied
on evidence of poor representation regarding minority contracts, as well as
patterns of social discrimination.82 Justice O'Connor's opinion correctly
maintains that there appears to be no rational way of determining whether
objectivity nor the flexibility that are needed to mold a race-conscious remedy around
the single objective of eliminating the effects of past or present discrimination.
But even assuming that Congress has the power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or some other constitutional provision, to remedy previous illegal racial discrimi-
nation, there is no evidence that Congress has in the past engaged in racial
discrimination in its disbursement of federal contracting funds.
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 527-28 (Stewart, J., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. See id. at 517-22 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concur-
ring in the judgment).
79. Id. at 519 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
the opinion).
80. In City of Richmond v. Croson, the City of Richmond enacted the Minority Business
Utilization Plan, which required non-minority prime contractors who were awarded city construc-
tion contracts to subcontract 30% of the dollar amount of the contract to one or more Minority
Business Enterprises. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477 (citing Ordinance No. 83-69-59, codified in Rich-
mond, Va, City Code, '12-156(a) (1985)). No specific findings of discriminatory practices in Rich-
mond's construction industry were made. See id. at 480. Instead, the proponents of the
ordinance had relied on a study that only 0.67% of the city's prime construction contracts had
been awarded to minority businesses in the five-year period from 1978-1983. Id. at 479-80.
J.A. Croson Co. challenged the constitutionality of the ordinance. See id. at 483. The district
court upheld the ordinance; however, the court of appeals on remand (after the Supreme Court
had previously vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case) "struck down the
set-aside program as violating both prongs of strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 483-85 (citing J.A. Croson Co. v. Richmond, 822 F. 2d 1355
(CA 4 1987) (Croson I)). The Supreme Court, on the second appeal, held that a city may not
enact "affirmative action" programs without demonstrating need for such remedial action or
demonstrating specific discriminatory practices to be ameliorated by such programs. Croson, 488
U.S. at 509-11.
Whereas the Richmond ordinance in Croson required 30% of the city's contracts to be awarded
to minority businesses, the federal statute in Fullilove was less rigid, requiring a 10% set-aside of
the city construction contracts to be used by the grant recipient to obtain services or supplies
from minority business enterprises. Cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 454-59.
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 479.
82. Id. at 479-80 (citing Brief for Appellant 22 (chart listing minority membership of six local
construction industry associations)), where the Croson Court stated that:
NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL 161
a classification is benign, remedial, or motivated by racial politics.83 She,
therefore, sees in the strict scrutiny standard a "smoke-out" principle.84
She is correct in this sense - that without an adequate theory of racial
discrimination, and it is indeed impossible to know what any form of ac-
tionable discrimination is without an adequate delineation of the relevant
context of social deprivation. The further point in her analysis is rather
undeveloped. The learned Justice holds as follows:
[a] generalized assertion that there has been past discrimination in an
entire industry provides no guidance for a legislative body to determine
the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy. It 'has no logical stop-
ping point'(citation omitted) ... It is sheer speculation how many minor-
ity firms there would be in Richmond absent past social discrimination
... Defining these sorts of injuries as 'identified discrimination' would
give local governments license to create a patchwork of racial preferences
based on statistical generalizations about any particular field of
endeavor.85
The insistence on contextual appraisal was, once more, vigorously as-
serted by the dissenting justices. Thus, the dissenters objected as follows:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different standard
of review under the Constitution than the most brute and repugnant
forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court signals that it
regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past, and
that government bodies need no longer preoccupy themselves with recti-
fying racial injustice. I, however, do not believe this Nation is anywhere
close to eradicating racial discrimination or its vestiges ......
Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC concerned the issue of new broadcast
licenses designed to enhance minority ownership and management.87 The
majority upheld the FCC minority policy over the strenuous objections of
Justice O'Connor, the Chief Justice, as well as Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy.88 This time, the dissenting justices attacked the policy of diversity as
Proponents of the set-aside provision relied on a study which indicated that while the
general population of Richmond was 50% black, only 0.67% of the city's prime con-
struction contracts had been awarded to minority businesses in the 5-year period from
1978-1983. It was also established that a variety of contractors' associations, whose rep-
resentatives appeared in opposition to the ordinance had virtually no minority busi-
nesses within their membership.
83. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.
84. Justice O'Connor states that "the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses of race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant
use of a highly suspect tool." Id.
85. Id. at 498-99.
86. Id. at 552 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
87. Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, at 556-58, 110 S. Ct. 2997, at 3004-05.
88. 88Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 566 (opinion of Brennan, J., for the Court, joined by
White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ. ("We hold that the FCC minority ownership policies
pass muster under the test we announce today. First, we find that they serve the important gov-
ernmental objective of broadcast diversity. Second, we conclude that they are substantially re-
lated the achievement of that objective").
Compare the strenuous objects in the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and Kennedy, which follows:
At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple com-
mand that the Government must treat citizens "as individuals, not 'as simply compo-
nents of a racial, religious, sexual or national class"' ... [T]he Constitution provides that
the government may not allocate benefits and burdens among individuals based on the
assumption that race or ethnicity determines how they act or think. To uphold the chal-
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"clearly not a compelling interest."89 The policy was viewed as "amor-
phous," "insubstantial," and "unrelated to any legitimate basis for employ-
ing racial classifications."90 The confusion between the standards of
review, the idea of racial discrimination, and the idea of race disconnected
from the social context had generated the illusion that formal equality in
law should be rigorously insulated from actual equality in fact and actual
diversity in practice.
The final case is Adarand Construction, Inc. v. Pena, which concerned
federal regulations designed to assist disadvantaged business enterprises. 91
Adarand challenged the lawfulness of the Department of Transportation's
affirmative action program as violative of the Fifth Amendment. 9 This
case provides a tortuous analysis of the standard of review problem. 93 The
Court takes the position, essentially, that once the word "race" is invoked,
regardless of the context, it triggers a strict scrutiny form of analysis be-
cause of the assumption that whether the action is remedial or invidious, it
is still discrimination.94 This, of course, is an astonishing assumption, how-
ever veiled, about the nature of discrimination and the nature of the legis-
lator's role as an instrument of remedial justice or as an instrument of
social justice. The test seems to be a far cry from anything envisioned in
lenged programs, the Court departs from these fundamental principles and from our
traditional requirement that racial classifications are permissible only if necessary and
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest. This departure marks a renewed
toleration of racial classifications and a repudiation of our recent affirmation that the
Constitution's equal protection guarantees extend equally to all citizens. The Court's
application of a lessened equal protection standard to congressional actions finds no
support in our cases or in the Constitution.
Id. at 602-03 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia and Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
89. Id. at 612.
90. Id.
91. The federal regulation in Adarand was the Small Business Act, 72 Stat. 384, as amended
15 U.S.C. §631 et seq., which declares it to be
the policy of the United States that small business concerns, [and] small business con-
cerns owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals...
shall have maximum practicable opportunity to participate in the performance of con-
tracts let by any Federal agency.
Adarand v. Pefia, 115 S. Ct. at 2102 (citing §8(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. §637(d)(1). Programs under §8(a)
and §8(d) of the Act give benefits to participating businesses relating to subcontracting, such as
automatic eligibility for subcontractor compensation provisions. See id. at 2102.
92. Id. at 2101.
93. In Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court in Adarand, O'Connor states,
[W]e hold today that all racial classifications, imposed for whatever federal, state, or
local government actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored
measures that further compelling governmental interests.
Id. at 2113. The Court justified its adherence to strict scrutiny review by stating that "despite the
surface appeal of holding 'benign' racial classifications to a lower standard . . . 'it is not always
clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign."' Id. at 2112 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298(opinion of Powell, J.)). The similarity of the Adarand Court's to a tortious analysis is shown in
the following statement by the Court,
[W]henever the government treats any person inequally because of his or her race, that
person has suffered an injury that falls squarely within the language and spirit of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection .... The application of strict scrutiny ...
determines whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the infliction of that
injury.
Adarand, 115 S. Ct. at 2114.
94. Id. at 2113.
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footnote four of Carolene Products, as our earlier analysis sought to
demonstrate. According to Justice Scalia, "We are just one race here. It is
American. ... "95 This statement is an astonishing example of unrestrained
idealism.
The affirmative action jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court seems to have moved very far from the kind of intuitive realism of
Brown, and indeed, seems to abstract the analysis of race relations from the
conditions of social organization. The approach seems to hearken to an
age when formalism was a dominant form of legal and constitutional inter-
pretation. The consequences of this view are that there are no contextually
grounded criteria that can tell us when a distinction is tantamount to a form
of discrimination and when discrimination is actually a form of group
prejudice and stigmatization. The deeper consequence of such an approach
is more problematic in the sense that it now also seeks to undermine efforts
to prevent the institutionalization of the effects of prejudice and discrimi-
nation. In short, if a theory of social justice is produced for the purpose of
ameliorating discriminations which provide a legacy of social injustice, the
mere use of an identifying label to determine the target of deprivation is
now tantamount to "reverse discrimination" - a conclusion, which is logi-
cally true if the word "discrimination" is a synonym for "distinction," but
empirically false if words and phrases find their meaning in part from the
social contexts within which they are used. If we do not know what racial
discrimination is, we are not very likely to know what to do to prevent it. If
we cannot prevent racial discrimination, we may lay the seeds for more
intense patterns of deprivation such as overt anti-Semitism, prejudice,
apartheid, and possibly even genocide.
We are, of course, not implying that genocide is an imminent expecta-
tion in the American political and social landscape. What we do suggest is
that the inability of the highest court of the land to adequately evolve a
legal construction of racism and prejudice that is in accord with social real-
ity may, by default, permit, if not encourage, deeper social cleavages that
might result in accelerating patterns of group deprivation or the perception
thereof. These accelerating patterns may predispose American society to
levels of social conflict of such intensity that, , if hate groups, with the
temptation existing within them, should acquire effective and/or formal ac-
cess to the instruments of power, they may resort to the practice of geno-
cide. The lessons drawn from U.S. practice may be very useful when seen
in a cross-cultural, comparative and global human rights context.
It is, therefore, obvious that the purpose of this description of the
problem is not simply to make a better case for affirmative action in Amer-
ican jurisprudence. Rather, the description of the problem is meant to
show the extent to which legal interventions have obscured rather than illu-
minated the nature of racial discrimination and racial prejudice, and in a
larger sense, race or inter-group relations. We may underscore the point
that, without discrimination, there can be no "dominance"; without domi-
nance, there can be no genocide. To understand genocide, we must under-
stand cultural dominance; to understand cultural dominance, we must
understand discrimination; to understand affirmative action, we must also
95. Id. at 2119.
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understand that discrimination is, especially in the American context, racial
discrimination. The linkages between affirmative action, racial discrimina-
tion, apartheid-like practices and genocide are not obvious ones, but the
ubiquity of all of these phenomena in social operations on a global basis
requires us to understand their inner workings, structures, operations, and
interrelations. The link, for example, between racial discrimination and ge-
nocide may be attenuated, but genocide against German Jews was pre-
ceded by the racial discrimination and the prejudice of anti-Semitism.96 In
short, the most effective strategy for preventing genocide is to intervene
before it happens - at the "conspiracy to commit" stage. This intervention
at the racial discrimination, prejudice, and cultural dominance phases of
the social process of genocide. When efforts to eradicate racial discrimina-
tion are made through convoluted legal construction twisted to mean the
victim or potential victim is the victimizer, a dangerous myth is created
with the imprimatur of law.
1. Transnational Race Relations Law
We may wish to briefly compare and contrast the experience of Amer-
ican constitutionally-determined race-relations law with developments in
international law.97 One of the major contributions to the development of
international law and the concept of international obligation is the effort
on the part of the world community to create a regime for the protection of
minorities98 as a central component of the establishment of a durable
peace. It was acknowledged that the suppression of minorities and the de-
nial of their basic rights frequently served as the germ of social conflict and
even a cause of the condition of war. The regime of minorities predates the
UDHR.99 This regime experienced no problem in understanding the princi-
ple of legal equality and minority rights.
96. See generally MARTIN, supra note 8. See FRANK CHALK AND KURT JONAHSSON, THE
HISTORY AND SOCIOLOGY OF GENOCIDE: ANALYSES AND CASE STUDIES 324-25 (Yale University
Press, 1990).See generally RAPHAEL LEMKIN, AXIS RULE IN OCCUPIED EUROPE (Carnegie En-
dowment for International Peace, Division of International Law, 1944); RUMMEL, supra note 18,
Part II at 111-22 (20,946,000 Murdered: The Nazi Genocide State).
97. For a third world perspective on race and equality, see C. G. WEERAMANTRY, EQUALITY
AND FREEDOM: SOME THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVES (Colombo 3, Sri Lanka: Hansa Publishers
Limited; Mawatha, Colombo 2, Sri Lanka: Lake House Printers and Publishers, Ltd., 1976).
98. See generally THORNBERRY, supra note 31.
99. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly on December 10, 1948. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31. In
contrast, the regime for the protection of minorities existed as early as the 1600s in the form of
treaty law. An early example is the Treaty of Oliva (1660) "by which Poland and the Great
Elector ceded Pomerania and Livonia to Sweden, guaranteeing the inhabitants of the ceded terri-
tories the enjoyment of their existing religious liberties." THORNBERRY, supra note 31, at 25 (cit-
ing FOQUES-DUPARC, LA PROTECTION DES MINORITIS DE RACE, DE LANGUE ET DE RELIGION,
at 75-76). Another example is the Convention of 1881 for the Settlement of the Frontier between
Greece and Turkey, whose Article III provides that:
[t]he lives, property, honour, religion, and customs of those of the localities ceded to
Greece who shall remain under the Hellenic administration will be scrupulously
respected. They will enjoy exactly the same civil and political rights as Hellenic subjects
of origin.
HURST, KEY TREATIES OF THE GREAT POWERS, Vol. 2 592(David & Charles, 1972). A third
example is the Treaty of Vienna (1607) between the King of Hungary and the Prince of Transyl-
vania, granting the Protestant minority in Transylvania the freedom to exercise their religion.
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It would be useful to simply start with the law that developed in the
context of the minority regimes created after World War I. Several impor-
tant decisions emerged in the aftermath of the minority regimes. Among
the most important and relevant for an understanding of the concept of
equality and the concept of a remedial conception of equality is found in
the Minority Schools in Albania case. 1°° In this case, the Permanent Court
of International Justice1° ' was asked to render an advisory opinion by the
Council of the League of Nations on an issue which involved the interpre-
tation of a declaration, which had been ratified by Albania, concerning the
equal treatment of its minorities.1" 2 Article 5 of the declaration provided
the following:
Albanian nationals who belong to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities
will enjoy the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other
Albanian nationals. In particular they shall have an equal right to main-
tain, manage and control at their own expense or to establish the future,
charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other educational
establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise
their religion freely therein.
103
The Albanian government made all private schools in Albania subject
to government regulation. In pertinent part, the regulation held that "[t]he
instruction and education of Albanian subjects are reserved to the State
and will be given in State schools. Primary education is compulsory for all
Albanian nationals and will be given free of charge. Private schools of all
categories at present in operation will be closed."'
10 4
The face of the regulation appears to be ostensibly non-discriminatory.
From the point of view of the Albanian Greek minority, it was viewed as,
in effect, being discriminatory and a violation of Article 5 of the declara-
tion.105 The Court agreed that the regulation was indeed a violation of the
declaration. 106 The Court noted that the drafters had inserted the terms
"the same treatment ... in law and in fact . .. "107 The Court determined
that equality in fact supplements the meaning of equality in law.'0 8 The
BALOGH, LA PROTECTION INTERNATIONALE DES MINORITP-S 23 (Les editions internationales
1930).
The protection of racial and other minorities was extended after World War I under the League
of Nations system, including the following instruments which contain provisions protecting group
members resident or born in the States concerned against the loss of nationality resulting from
post-war territorial settlement and granting inhabitants the right to freely exercise any religion or
belief whose practices were not inconsistent with public order: Minorities in Poland (June 1919);
Minorities in the Free City of Danzig (November 1920); and Minorities in Turkey and Greece (July
1923). See also Protection of Linguistic, Racial, and Religious Minorities by the League of Na-
tions, Provisions Contained in the Various International Instruments at Present in Force (Geneva,
August 1927), LEAGUE OF NATIONS PUBLICATIONS IB MINORIT8 1927, IB 2. For a discussion on
the rise of nationalism, the international protection of minorities up until 1914, and the protection
of minorities under the League of Nations, see C.A. MACARTNEY, NATIONAL STATES AND NA-
TIONAL MINORITIES (Russell & Russell, 1968)(1934).
100. Minority Schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 64, 4-36 (1935).
101. This court was the predecessor to the current International Court of Justice.
102. See id. at 6.
103. Id. at 5.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 15-16.
106. See id. at 22-23.
107. Minority Schools in Albania,, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 64, at 18-19.
108. See id. at 19.
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Court pointed out that "[a]ll Albanians and nationals enjoy equality in law
stipulated in Article 4; on the other hand, the equality between members of
the majority and of the minority must, according to the terms of Article 5,
be an equality in law and in fact."' 9
The Court further noted that the declaration was designed to exclude
the idea of a "merely formal equality."11 Quoting from an earlier advisory
opinion, The German Settlers in Poland, the Court restated, "[t]here must
be equality in fact as well as ostensible legal equality in the sense of the
absence of discrimination in the words of the law." ' 1 The Court explained
the distinction further by indicating that while equality in law "precludes
discrimination of any kind," equality in fact "may involve the necessity of
different treatment in order to attain a result which establishes equilibrium
between the different situations." '112 Indeed, the Court opined that "[i]t is
easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment of the majority and of
the minority, whose situation and requirements are different, would result
in inequality in fact."1 1 3 The Court concluded that the provision meant
that "[t]he equality between members of the majority and of the minority
must be effective, genuine equality."' 14 Finally, the Court went on to say
that the rationale for giving the specific privilege to the minority merely
assures that the majority is not given a privileged situation as compared to
the minority. 15 It will be apparent that the juridical analysis of equality
given by the Permanent Court of International Justice shows a far greater
understanding of the contextual reality and moral realism of the situation
of a minority compared to the majority and of the central importance of
supplementing, from a juridical point of view, the arid conceptualism of a
purely formal equalitarian prescription. This decision stands in sharp con-
trast to the evisceration of either contextual sensitivity or moral realism, an
important message from Brown and a promise of equal justice under the
law. In Brown, the Supreme Court penetrated the veil @f what appeared to
be equality with the foresight that lawyers would have to look at social
reality, namely, that separate institutions of education are inherently infer-
ior when viewed in the context of U.S. race relations. This suggests contex-
tual sensitivity as well as moral realism.
We may briefly make reference to other instruments of the post World
War II period which carry on the tradition established in cases like the
Minority Schools in Albania case. For example, Article 2 of the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) prohibits distinc-
tions based on race with regard to the human rights recognized in the
instrument.1 16 Article 26 of the ICCPR stipulates that "all persons are
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. (quoting German Settlers in Poland, Advisory Opinion, P.C.I.J. (ser. B), No. 6, at 24
(1923); World Court Reports, Vol. I, 218-ED)).
112. Minority Schools in Albania, P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B), No. 64 at 19.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id. at 20.
116. Article 2, paragraph 1, states:
[e]ach State Party to the present covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the
present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
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equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to the
equal protection of the law." '117 The Article also prescribes a right to
"equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such
as race ..... "I1 Racial discrimination is, therefore, prohibited by the inter-
national covenant.
The language of Article 2 and Article 26, in which the former uses the
term "distinction" and the latter uses the term "discrimination," suggests
that they could conceivably be different forms of interpretation of the rele-
vant provisions. The term "distinction" is something of a synonym for the
term "classification," which the Supreme Court uses disjunctively to sever
the link between the terms "race" and "discrimination." On the other
hand, the latter provision is explicit in the reference to racial discrimina-
tion. The question, of course, is whether the language of the ICCPR would
prohibit or limit affirmative action as understood in American practice. It
is generally believed that the ICCPR and practice under it supports affirm-
ative action.119
The other principal Convention dealing with race relations is the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (CERD). 12° This instrument is much more explicit in its support for
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), supra note 15, at art. 2, para. 1.
117. Id., art. 26.
118. Id.
119. See Jordan J. Paust, Race-Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18 MICH. J.
INT'L. LAW 659, 659-64 (1997). The Human Rights Committee created by the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has interpreted the ICCPR as allowing certain
forms of "differentiation."
[T]he principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action
in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimi-
nation prohibited by the [ICCPR] .... Such action may involve granting for a time...
certain preferential treatment in specific matters .... [A]s long as such action is needed
to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the
[ICCPR].
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights
Treaty Bodies, HUM. RTS. COMM., General Comment 18, para. 10, at 27, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1
(1992) (hereinafter Human Rights Comments).
Not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for
such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose
which is legitimate under the [ICCPR].
Human Rights Comments, supra note 111, General Comment 18, para. 13, at 27.
120. See generally International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (CERD), December 21,1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, (entered into force, January 4, 1969).
The United States signed the Convention on November 20, 1994. As of 1997, the State parties
are as follows:
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia,
Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium,
Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, C6te d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cy-
prus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador,
Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ga-
bon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti,
Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Korea (Republic of), Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Repub-
lic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Luxembourg, Madagas-
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affirmative action programs. The CERD contains general measures for
outlawing racial discrimination, but it also has a specific provision that sup-
ports affirmative action, and therefore, does not regard the form of affirm-
ative action it sanctions as being a form of prohibitive racial
discrimination. 121
When the jurisprudence establishing the norm of non-discrimination in
international law is understood in the context that social justice may re-
quire benign distinctions that are socially beneficial to giving equalitarian
values substantive application, we see that there is much to learn from the
international law of human rights. Specifically, the idea of affirmative ac-
tion is a strategy of preventive obligation. One cannot do away with racial
discrimination unless one is able to improve the value position of those
who continue to be disadvantaged by it, notwithstanding the formal code of
equality often reflected in the formal law of nations. International law
teases out the operational code of inequality, the specific indicators of ine-
quality, the transgenerational context of inequality, and seeks to prescribe
a framework of interventions to improve the condition of race relations in
society. Reference may be made, also, to the fact that the CERD realisti-
cally seeks to place limits on the freedom to communicate group hate and
stigmatization. 22 This is simply recognition that racial discrimination is in
part a process of communication of the negative symbols, which disparage
the target group. These changes in prescription at the international level
stand in sharp contrast to the decontextualization of the race relations
problems by recent Supreme Court decisions.
The development of the idea that contextualizes group deprivations
and seeks to socially construct them finds textual support in the primary
human rights documents concerning racial and other forms of discrimina-
tion. Articles 2(1), 4(1), and 26 of the ICCPR provide an authoritative
overview. For example, Articles 2(1) and 26 contain very broad anti-dis-
crimination provisions, prohibiting discrimination not simply on the basis
of "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
car, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova (Republic
of), Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda,
Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swa-
ziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Tanzania (United Re-
public of), Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda,
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay,
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
121. The relevant paragraph reads as follows:
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of cer-
tain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary
in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human
rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination, provided,
however, that such measures do not, as a consequence, lead to the maintenance of sepa-
rate rights for different racial groups and that they shall not be continued after the
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved.
Id., art I, para. 4.
122. See id., at art. 4.
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or social origin, property, [and] birth," but also on the grounds of any
"other status.' 1 23
This means that a multitude of markers are authoritatively recognized
in the text of the ICCPR, but additionally, there is the realistic recognition
implicit that a socially constructed conception of discrimination is neces-
sary if the prohibition of unlawful discrimination is to be firmly established
at law. The terms "any other status" are consistent with the theory that any
culturally received and grounded symbol of identity that differentiates one
group from another is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition of discrimi-
nation that the ICCPR seeks to prohibit. It should be noted that the
United States has indicated "an understanding" with respect to these arti-
cles, which suggests that there is no inclination in U.S. law to provide a
realistic social reconstruction of the terms "other status" to achieve the ma-
jor purposes of the instrument. 124
This understanding is meant to both qualify and restrict the reach of
racial discrimination in the CERD to exclude other status groups from its
protections.
Another aspect of our theory more consistent with the textual basis of
international law relating to the prohibition of discrimination lies in the
fact that the nature of discrimination involves a pattern of communication
conjoined with the operational dynamics of deprivation and conflict. Arti-
cle 4 of the CERD and Article 20 of the ICCPR provide for States Parties
to "condemn all propaganda.., based on ideas or theories of superiority of
one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin... ,12s "All
dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to
racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence" against such a race or
group is a punishable offense. 126 Article 1 of the CERD defines racial dis-
crimination as any distinction based on "race, colour, descent, or national
or ethnic origin" that has the purpose or effect of impairing equal enjoy-
ment of rights "in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field
of public life.' 27
These provisions reflect the international perspective that hate-speech
is an essential condition of the persecution of racial groups and minorities,
as well as persons with identifiable "other status[es]." Our theory proposes
that it is impossible to understand racial discrimination, prejudice, anti-
Semitism, apartheid, genocide, or the mass extermination of "others" with-
out understanding the communications aspect by which "others" are
targeted as candidates for group deprivation. These forms of communica-
tion are often deeply imbedded in culture and require considerable social
effort, political investment, and legal intervention to ensure that the equal
protection of the law works in form and in fact. This runs afoul of those
who would see the freedom of communication in its fullest expression as
123. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), supra note 31, at art.
2.
124. See Proposals by Bush Administration of Reservations to International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, Rep. of S. Comm. For. Rel. to Accompany Exec. E, 95-2 (1992) at 12.
125. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
[hereinafter CERD], art. 4. See also ICCPR, supra note 32, at art. 20.
126. See CERD, supra note 125, art. 4(a).
127. Id. art. 1.
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the foundation of human liberty. We would respectfully suggest that a
more rigorous distinction needs to be made between "freedom" and "li-
cense." We would suggest that the latter term indicates the point where
one person's "freedom" or "license" may lead to deprivations tantamount
to the extinction of the victim. The third aspect of our theory that finds
support in the text of international legal instruments relating to the prohi-
bition of racial and related discriminations is found in the CERD's Article
2(1), which seeks to prohibit so-called private discrimination.
(1) States Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pur-
sue by all appropriate means ... a policy of eliminating racial dis-
crimination in all its forms ... and, to this end:...
(d) Each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all ap-
propriate means, including legislation . . . racial discrimination
by any persons, group or organization. 2 8
Article 5 provides the following:
States Parties undertake to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimina-
tion in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without dis-
tinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before
the law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights: . ..
(e) Economic, social, and cultural rights, in particular: ...
(iii) The right to housing;...
(f) The right of access to any place or service intended for use by
the general public, such as transport, hotels, restaurants, caf6s, thea-
tres and parks.1 29
At the back of public discrimination are the social forces that influence or
shape the policies of discrimination and deprivation. Those forces may be
loosely described as "private," but in fact, the line between the public and
the private is impossible to draw as a purely abstract exercise. Only in
specific instances can we clearly demarcate when communication is an ex-
pression of personal freedom and self-determination and when it is license,
which under certain conditions can lead to the operation of group depriva-
tion. Thus, U.S. practice, in fact, prohibits certain kinds of obvious private
deprivation, but is uneasy about how, in the abstract, the demarcations can
effectively be made between privacy interests on the one hand and depriva-
tions on the other.130 What we can say with confidence is that the erosion
of the public/private distinction in both national and international law is an
important concession to socially constructing, in a realistic sense, the law of
group deprivations.
128. Id., art. 2(1).
129. Id., art. 5.
130. While this is, of course, a central and difficult matter in the sense that the freedom to
communicate, the right to privacy, the degree of civil society space for self-determined develop-
ment may result in the denial of precisely these rights to vulnerable "others," it becomes apparent
that the role of law is critical in seeking to make realistic, contextually informed interventions to
secure the dignity of all human beings. This involves the rejection of the jurisprudence of abstract
formalism (the notion of autonomous law operating mechanically apart from the human agents of
claim and decision) joined with exercises in logical, syntactical derivations divorced from the
context of human conditions. It requires the deepest understanding of the social construction of
both civil society values, as well as the values of liberty, equality, respect, and human dignity.
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2. The International Legal Aspect of the Control and Regulation of
Group Dominance: Apartheid
We now turn our attention to the issue of apartheid. Like the
problems of racial discrimination, there is a loosely formulated socio-his-
toric concept of apartheid. It is a more comprehensive, coercive regime of
"discrimination" based on racial or ethnic identity. There is also a nar-
rower meaning of apartheid as indicated in the International Convention
on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (Apartheid
Convention) that seeks to suppress and punish."' Our exploration of the
problem of racial discrimination in the law leaves us with a basic question
that law leaves unresolved: What, after all, is racial discrimination? Is
there an articulate theory of racial discrimination that can be effectively
mapped to the legal-decision process? The relevance of a theory of racial
discrimination permits us to appreciate more explicitly how racial discrimi-,
nation differs from apartheid and genocide and how critical it is to an un-
derstanding of the theory behind these two systems. If we understand the
conditions of racial discrimination as a species of group deprivation, we
also begin to better understand some of the key conditions of apartheid
and genocide and might better appreciate how to prevent it.
Apartheid was the policy and practice of the ruling party of South Af-
rica prior to the establishment of a government of reconciliation.132 South
Africa had historically been subject to both colonial and imperial domi-
nance, and the ethnographic picture of South Africa that emerged after
World War II represented the ascendancy of the dominant Afrikaner
elite. 33 When the National Party won the elections of 1948, it began a
program of systematic racial discrimination designed to cover every facet of
human intercourse for which there might be transgroup contact or
interaction.1 3 4
131. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, Nov. 30,1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 243 (entered into force July 18, 1976). The broad mean-
ing of apartheid refers to the entire process of political, economic, social and cultural dominance.
This is, in effect, a sociological meaning. The meaning, as indicated in the Convention, is nar-
rower, emphasizing the extent to which apartheid is a grave violation of human rights and human-
itarian law.
132. Apartheid has been the policy of the Afrikaner-based National Party since the party was
elected into power in 1948 and began a program of racial segregation in Africa. Wilson & Thomp-
son eds., supra note 44, Vol. II: South Africa 1870-1966, at 374. In December 1993, the white-
controlled parliament of South Africa adopted an Interim Constitution for South Africa that
ended 300 years of white minority rule. ZIHAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEM-
OCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 245 (Howard University Press, 1994).
The Interim Constitution was to be in effect for five years during which time a permanent consti-
tution was to be negotiated after the 1994 elections. See id. That new permanent constitution
was ratified in 1993. Van Wyk, et. al. eds., supra note 26, at 132 (citing the Constitution of the
Republic of South Africa (1993), Act 200 of 1993 as amended.) For more on the development of
the 1993 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, see generally id.
133. HOROWITZ, supra note 17, at 9-11. The term "Afrikaner" refers to descendants of the
first Dutch and other European settlers of South Africa.
134. After coming into power in 1948, the Afrikaner-based National Party began a program of
racial dominance through a system of racial segregation. Id., at 10; Wilson & Thompson eds.,
supra note 44, at 374, 402-16. During the 1950s, the South African government put in place a
network of statutes to geographically and socially segregate the races. Id. at 402-16; HOROWITZ,
supra note 17, at 11. These statutes included the Population Registration Act (1950), assigning
every person to a racial category; the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act
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The justification for apartheid was founded upon the philosophy of so-
called Christian nationalism and was further rationalized under a neo-He-
gelian formula known euphemistically as "separate development. " 135 The
edifice of apartheid was constructed along the lines of two legislative and
administrative pillars. The first pillar was the creation of legislative pre-
scription covering every phase of social organization, such as power and
economic exclusion, lack of fundamental respect, employment and profes-
sional relations, exclusion from health and social services, family and affec-
tive relations, educational rights, and freedom of conscience and belief.
This comprehensive scheme of prescription covering every value process in
social order was unique for its breadth and the detail of human interaction
it sought to control, regulate, and ultimately disparage. Such a system
could not endure, except for a further framework of legislative and admin-
istrative prescription designed to repress resistance to the application of
these prescriptions and to severely punish and proscribe alternative or in-
ternationally sensitive values for the prospect of an alternative to
apartheid.
The administrative pillar of apartheid involved a creation of a vast bu-
reaucratic structure to insure that the legislative dictates would be given
operational efficacy on the ground. Thus, the educational bureaucracy was
completely reorganized and structured along hierarchical ethnic lines. For
example, there was a Bantu education department, a coloured education
department, an Indian education department and a department that fo-
cused on white education. With regard to racial classifications, there was a
board whose specialization was to classify, especially marginal classes, ac-
cording to race. In the context of effective ties and family relations there
was a bureaucracy within the framework of police practices which sought
to vigorously enforce the so-called Immorality Act which prohibited sex
across racial lines. Even the framework of national security was collapsed
into an apartheid condition security management system.136 Indeed, the
political "management" of black South Africans was reduced to the con-
cept of Bantu administration. These examples illustrate the importance of
the administrative components of the apartheid state.
The international system kept apartheid on its agenda of concern for a
very long time and proceeded to document in detail the extent to which
apartheid was incompatible with international rule of law and with the ex-
pectations of human dignity built into the Charter. 137 In order to proscribe
(1952), requiring all Africans (blacks) to carry identifying papers; the Reservation of Separate
Amenities Act (1953), providing for segregation in public facilities; and the Group Areas Act
(1950), segregating every locality by race. Id. at 11; Wilson & Thompson eds., supra note 44, at
402-16. For a discussion on the law of apartheid, see DUGARD, supra note 17, at 53-106.
135. H. F. Verwoerd, the Prime Minister of South Africa from 1958 until 1966, propounded
the ideology of "separate development" for Africa. HOROWITZ, supra note 17, at 11; DUGARD,
supra note 17, at 53-54 and 102-104.
136. Under the regime of Prime Minister Botha, a complex legislative and administrative
scheme was established to enhance the capacity of the State to repress resistance. It was, in part,
influenced by a security doctrine advanced by the South African military called the Total On-
slaught Policy. For a detailed analysis of the South African security management system, see
ANTHONY MATHEWS, FREEDOM, STATE SECURITY, AND THE RULE OF LAW: DILEM-
MAS OF THE APARTHEID SOCIETY, 1986.
137. On December 5, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly established the Commis-
sion on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. G.A. Res. 616A (VII) U.N. GAOR,
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apartheid as a crime against humanity, the international system borrowed
from the tradition of the Nuremberg Charter. Thus, the Nuremberg and
international law principles of individual responsibility for crimes against
humanity were codified in the Apartheid Convention. 138 Article I (1) of
the Convention declared that "apartheid is a crime against humanity'
1 39
and "that inhuman acts resulting from the policies and practices of
apartheid .. .are crimes violating the principles of international law, in
particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions, and constitut[e] a serious threat to international peace and
security.'
140
Article I (2) declared "criminal those organizations, institutions and
individuals committing the crime of apartheid.' 41 Additionally, Article IV
(b) requires the adoption of measures to "prosecute, bring to trial and pun-
ish.., persons responsible for or accused of" acts constituting crimes under
the Apartheid Convention.1 42
The inclusion of the Nuremberg principles in the Apartheid Conven-
tion extended those principles to human rights violations caused by the
apartheid regime authorities. It is probable that, if these principles were
not drafted into the Apartheid Convention, their currency as general inter-
national law would have still made them relevant. The principles would
have likely remained relevant since the international community had in-
creasingly recognized the South African struggle against the illegitimacy of
the apartheid regime and its massive human rights violations, as well as the
applicability of the principles of decolonization, self-determination, and in-
dependence.143 This legal-political characterization of the South African
problem made the Nuremberg principles concerning crimes against human-
ity and personal responsibility under international law directly applicable
to South Africa in appropriate circumstances.
The international community increasingly recognized that the policies
and practices of apartheid constituted a crime against humanity. Beyond
the Apartheid Convention, this recognition found documentary and textual
expression in the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations; Articles 1
and 55, in the Universal Declaration; the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights.
7TH Sess., U.N. Doc. A/2183 (1952). The Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of South Africa was formed on November 6, 1962. G.A. Res. 1761 (XVII). The
Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa was renamed
"the Special Committee on Apartheid" and expanded to a maximum of 18 members in 1970.
G.A. Res. 2671 A (XXV).
138. See generally International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime
of Apartheid, supra note 131.
139. Id., art. I(1).
140. Id.
141. Id., art. 1(2).
142. Id., art. IV(b).
143. See Christos Theodoropoulos, The Decolonization Approach to the Eradication of
Apartheid, 18 N.Y.u.. J. INT'L L. & POL, p. 899 (1986).
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Article II (a) of the Apartheid Convention enumerates some of the
crimes against humanity implicated in the apartheid scheme and criminal-
ized by the Apartheid Convention and by customary international law:
(a) Denial to a member or members of a racial group or groups of the
right to life and liberty of person:
(i) By murder of members of a racial group or groups;
(ii) By the infliction upon members of a racial group or groups of
serious bodily or mental harm, by the infringement of their
freedom or dignity, or by subjecting them to torture or to cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;
(iii) By arbitrary arrest and illegal imprisonment of members of a
racial group or groups.144
Thus, we see that Apartheid, as a form of group dominance, was pro-
scribed as criminal under international law, in both the Apartheid Conven-
tion and general international law.
The essential condition in racial discrimination is a pattern of identifi-
cation that distinguishes the target of discrimination from the dominant
group. In Apartheid, the systematics of domination as official governmen-
tal policy, edict, and practice rather dramatically sharpen the distinction
between the "in-group," or the dominator, and the "out-group," or the
dominated. The domination is so ubiquitous and all-encompassing that the
pre-conditions of widespread atrocity targeted at the "out" victim group
are significantly enhanced. The prospect of conflict becoming genocidal in
character by threat and counter-threat becomes more ominous. Of course,
genocide can occur without the systematics of apartheid, but an apartheid
state reinforces the conditions that make genocide a realistic expecta-
tion.145 This is because Apartheid radically stresses the construction of ra-
cially or ethnically distinct group identities; it reinforces the principle that
the dominant group has the right to subordinate indefinitely the dominated
group. The social tensions generated by the imposition of apartheid can
lead to genocide if the predisposition to exterminate emerges as a critical
part of the principle of group dominance. Similarly, racial discrimination
does not ineluctably lead to apartheid or genocide, but a tolerance of wide-
spread racial discrimination may, in circumstances of conflict and insecu-
rity, unleash pathologies in decision-makers that point to the imminence of
genocide as a realistic outcome or expectation. What apartheid adds to the
understanding of racial discrimination is that in the context of racial dis-
crimination the overt legalistic framework or the overt pattern of informal,
or unconscious, discrimination may be somewhat concealed, except for the
outcomes. In the context of apartheid, what is implicit and unconscious is
in fact explicit and brutally overt. The explicit and brutally overt nature of
144. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,
supra note 131, art. 11(a).
145. In a technical sense, South Africa is the only State that has had a formal regime of
apartheid. The systematics of apartheid provoked major conflicts during the past three decades.
These conflicts, without intervention, may have led to a South African-style Holocaust. How-
ever, South African conflicts have today been muted by political interventions and initiatives,
which have led to the rejection of apartheid and the construction of a government of national
reconciliation. We may, however, view apartheid in functional terms and hold that the regimes,
which express themselves in extreme forms of cultural dominance, such as the policies and prac-
tices of Nazi anti-Semitism prior to World War II, reinforced conditions which eventually made
genocide an actual outcome of Nazi policy and practice.
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a system like apartheid provides us with a deeper understanding of the
social processes that sustain the ubiquity of racial discrimination and the
probability of genocide. Apartheid's brutally overt nature and its proxim-
ity to genocide makes apartheid a crime against humanity.
III. PROSCRIBING GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLINGS By LAW
A. The Historical Context
It would be useful to ensure that we have an adequate historical gloss
on the ubiquity of genocide. Such a background would help us appreciate
the need for prescriptive interventions on a global basis that seek to pre-
vent and punish genocide. Such a perspective will also more firmly ground
our understanding of the Genocide Convention and the contribution that it
has made to the global consensus that genocide is criminal in both theory
and practice.
History holds an uncomfortable relationship to the policy process.
The temptation to treat the frequency of historic incidents as having a
causal, systemic character may undermine the element of creative choice in
policy process. History in the sense of "trend" is of value insofar as the
enlightened policy maker needs to know what to confirm and what to avoid
in the relevant historical epoch or period. The danger of an historic over-
view of genocide is that ubiquity may breed fatalism and a willingness to
accept genocide as the inevitable dark side of the being and becoming of
humanity. This Article seeks to avoid that conclusion. History also teaches
us to view the conditions of genocide through the warning lens of historical
perspective. The historic evidence indicates that genocide is no respecter
of culture, class, confessional orientation, racial, ethnological, political or
other pattern of identification. All have in some way been victims or perpe-
trators of genocide and mass killings.
The history of antiquity is replete with records of sociological genoci-
dal practices. During 7th and 8th centuries B.C., the Assyrian empire
achieved its imperial ambitions through genocide.146 Whole cities were
routinely razed, and entire populations were either carried off or were
physically exterminated. The destruction of the legendary Greek city of
Troy involved the wholesale destruction of the city and its male inhabitants,
while the women were carried off into slavery.14 7 The Roman destruction
of the ancient African city of Carthage involved the extermination of all
the men, women, and children and the site of the destroyed city was sown
with salt as a self-justifying symbol of its utter cultural and biological
desolation. 48
The influence of the great religious revelations and confessionals, es-
pecially Christianity and Islam, did not apparently provide effective levels
of moral restraint on the impulse to exterminate, but tragically, often fur-
146. See FRANK CHALK & KURT JONAHSSON, supra note 96, at 59-61.
147. See id. at 58.
148. See LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 11 (Yale
University Press 1981). But Cf HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON
THE BANALITY OF EVIL 288 (Viking Press 1964) (indicating that wholesale massacres of enemy
peoples in antiquity was the "order of the day," implying that genocide was more the rule than
the exception.)
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nished a comfortable justification.14 9 The Crusades against the Muslim
"unbelievers" started with pogroms targeting the Jews. 150 The Crusaders
killed Jews, Muslims, and even Christians in the name of God. European
religious conflicts often included Jews as legitimate side targets of genoci-
dal policy and practice. The suppression of the Albigensian Christian sect
in the South of France included a license to slaughter the non-Christian
Jews as well.151 The destruction of the Hussite Christian sect witnessed a
claim by the German Crusaders that they intended to "wipe the Jewish
people from the face of the earth.' 1 52 The Eurasian conflicts between
Christianity and Islam were often genocidal as were conflicts between dif-
ferent Christian sects, such as Protestant and Catholic, and sometimes even
between the Islamic sects of Sunni and Shiite. The more recent clashes of
Hinduism and Islam also were genocidal in character.
In the European context, Jews were often included as a legitimate tar-
get for annihilation, even when the primary target of the killing process was
another religious group or sect. An even greater historic insight is the
ascription of "blame" to Jews for some sort of catastrophe such as the
Plague or the Black Death.153 Indeed, as Kuper and others have indicated
from the Crusades to the Nazi period and beyond, the following indicia of a
ubiquitous Eurocentric anti-Semitism may be observed: (i) laws and regula-
tions that identified Jews as a discrete group; (ii) distinguishing "badges" of
identification; (iii) the idea of a mysterious Semitic conspiracy; (iv) the ap-
pointment of killing centers; (v) some level of systematic organization on
the Jewish question; (vi) the amenability of gentile experts on the "Jew";
and (vii) bureaucratization of the anti-Semitic process of which genocide is
one outcome. 54
Apart from European-centered genocide, the history of colonial con-
quest is another unremitting veil of tears. Indeed, the plight of the remains
of the indigenous peoples of the Americas continues to this day as they
fight for cultural and material survival in some contexts, and for their right
to physically exist in others. 155 In South Africa, the Khoi San peoples
barely survive today, but in the 17th and 18th centuries they were legisla-
tively labeled "vermin," thus legally sanctioning their extermination. At
the turn of the century, Germany sought to extinguish the Herero peoples
of Namibia as a reprisal for having the gall to rebel against Herrenvolk
colonial rule.1 56 The Turkish genocide against the Armenians during World
War I still provokes an intense demand for an acknowledgment of respon-
sibility and a strenuous denial by the Turkish elites that the extermination
149. For a religious justification of genocide, one need look no further than the Bible itself.
See, e.g., Deut. 2:31-35; Deut. 3:6; Deut. 7:1-2; Jos. 10:2-40; and 1 Sam. 15:3.
150. See KUPER, supra note 139, at 12.
151. See Id. at 13.
152. Id.
153. See, e.g., Matt. 27:25 ("His blood be upon us and our children"), which provided histori-
cal justification for blaming Jews for Christ's death.
154. See Kuper, supra note 139, at 14.
155. Two examples are Guatemala and Peru. See CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89, at
176-80.
156. See Id. at 231.
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happened.157 The Nazi genocide against the Jews is almost the millennial
paradigm of the genocide process at its most effective, as it taps into the
historical memory of an entire continent's mistrust and abuse of certain
"others." It was a systematic operational practice of various forms of anti-
Semitism, of which genocide as represented in the Holocaust was and re-
mains the most lethal result. There is much that is distinctive about the
Holocaust experience. 158 It is at once a crisis of survival for the Jewish
people, regardless of citizenship or national affiliation. This crisis is also a
universal problem as the post-war and post cold-war experience abun-
dantly demonstrates. Taking a long view of history, "never again" is a
warning to the Jewish people and to any other human aggregate, necessary
to show that they too can be victims and candidates for extinction. The post
war experience with genocide has underlined the notion that "never again"
is aspirational, not empirical nor prescriptive. The genocide in the sub-
continent of India, a zone somewhat outside of the European sphere of
concern, generated exasperation and concern, but little in the way of ac-
countability. The 1948 genocide against the Indians in Natal by the Zulu
Impis of Chief Buthelezi's forebears was reduced in terms of raw numbers
not by the action of the South African government, but by the presence of
a British warship and British marines in Durban. 159 To this melancholy
specter we may add the genocide in Indonesia against the Communist Chi-
nese and the East Timor peoples, the genocide in Cambodia, the genocide
in Nigeria against the Ibo, in Rwanda-Burundi against the Hutu-Tutsi, the
Arabs in Zanzibar, and more recently the genocide against the Croatians
and Muslim Bosnians in the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzego-
vina.160 This broad overview of the history of sociological genocide is dif-
ferent from the formal history of genocide, as defined by the Genocide
Convention. To complete the picture, it may be important to square socio-
logical and legal reality.
157. See Arlene Levinson, For This Century's Homicide Regimes, Genocide is a Snap, THE
GAINESVILLE SUN, Sept. 4, 1995, at 1G and 4G; see also, CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, ARME-
NIA: THE SURVIVAL OF A NATION 217 (St. Martin's Press 1980).
158. Prior to the Holocaust, Germany's demonstrated scientific, industrial and administrative
expertise was popularly regarded as evidence of an enlightened, highly developed culture. In
reality, however, such expertise merely facilitated Hitler's implementation of the Final Solution
in that Nazi's Germany's remarkable bureaucratic efficiency in effect provided n air of respecta-
bility to mass killing. See CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89, at 324. According to Chalk and
Jonahsson, "[N]o people in history had ever been attacked by such an array of scientific, indus-
trial and administrative weapons in a program specifically designed to insure its complete and
immediate biological destruction." Id. at 325.
159. See CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89 at 223-29. The history of Zulu genocidal policy
can be traced to King Shaka, who ruled the Zulus in South Africa from 1818 until 1828. Accord-
ing to the account of one Englishman forced to accompany Shaka's Impis (warriors):
"[Shaka] commanded them not to leave even a child, but exterminate the whole tribe.
We remonstrated against the barbarity of destroying women and children, who were not
capable and could do no injury."
Id. at 227.
160. See id.at 381-84; 408-11; 402-07; for an in-depth analysis of Nigerian genocide, see gener-
ally OLA BALOGUN, THE TRAGIC YEARS: NIGERIA IN CRISIS, 1966-1970 (1973).
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B. The Statistical Context
Between 1900 and 1987, states, quasi states, and stateless groups have
killed some 170,000,000 people.16' These killings include what legally
would be labeled genocide, but include massacres, extra juridical execu-
tions, and the like. 6
Table L 20th Century Democide
Regimes
Megamurderers
Deka-megamurderers
USSR
China(PRC)
Germany
China (KMT)
Lesser megamurders
Japan
China (Mao Soviets)c
Cambodia
Turkey
Vietnam
Poland
Pakistan
Yugoslavia (Tito)
Suspected
Megamurderers
North Korea
Mexico
Russia
Centi-kilomurderers
Top 5
China (Warlords)
Turkey (Atatfirk)
United Kingdom
Portugal
(Dictatorship)
Indonesia
Lesser Murderers
World Total
lC
15
19
19
19
19
Democide (000)'
Years Total Domestic Genocide Annual
Rate %b
900-87 151,491 116,380 33,476 0.92 d
900-87 128,168 100,842 26,690 0.18 d
917-87 61,911 54,769 10,000 0.42
949-87 35,236 35,236 375 0.12
933-45 20,946 762 16,315 0.09
928-49 10,075 10,075 Nil 0.07e
)00-87 19,178 12,237 6,184 1.63 d
)36-45 5,964 Nil Nil Nil
)23-49 3,466 3,466 Nil 0.05e
)75-79 2,035 2,000 541 8.16
)09-18 1,883 1,752 1,883 0.96
945-87 1,678 944 Nil 0.10
945-48 1,585 1,585 1,585 1.99
)58-87 1,503 1,503 1,500 0.06
944-87 1,072 987 675 0.12
1900-87 4,145
1948-87
1900-20
1900-17
1900-87
1900-87
1917-49
1919-23
1900-87
1926-82
1,663
1,417
1,066
14,918
4,074
910
878
816
741
1965-87 729
1900-87 2,792
3,301
1,293
1,417
591
10,812
2,192
910
703
Nil
Nil
579
2,355
Nil
100
502
4,071
1,078
Nil
878
Nil
Nil
200
1,019
0.25
0.45
0.020.26 ad
0.89d
0.02
2.64
Nil
Nil
0.020.13 d
0.09,1900-87 169,202 129,547 38,566
161. See R.J. RUMMEL, THE HOLOCAUST IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE,
Conference on The "Other" as Threat-Demonization and Antisemitism, at the Hebrew Univer-
sity of Jerusalem, at 8-9 (June 12-15, 1995).
162. See id. at 9. See also Rudolph Rummel, Power, Genocide and Mass Murder, 31 J. OF
PEACE RES. 1,3 (1994) especially the Table I. 20th Century Democide. Rummel also included
this Table in RUMMEL, DEATH BY GOVERNMENT, supra note 18, Table 1.2 at 4.
a Includes genocide, politicide, and mass murder; excludes war dead. These are most
probable mid-estimates in low to high ranges. Figures may not sum due to rounding.
b The percent of a population killed in democide per year of the regime
c Guerilla period
d Average
e The rate is the average of that for three successive periods.
f The world annual rate is calculated for the 1944 global population.
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According to Professor Rummel, case studies and quantitative analysis
show that ethnicity, race, religion, economic development, level of educa-
tion, and cultural differences do not account for this killing.'63 The statisti-
cal profile is indeed a staggering one. Rummel's research indicates that
"democide," which is inclusive of legal genocide, is best explained, first, by
the degree to which a regime is empowered along a democratic or totalitar-
ian dimension and, second, by the extent to which the regime is characteris-
tically involved in war or rebellion.
1 64
We would suggest that Rummel's work is path-breaking; in particular,
it vindicates the early ABA position on political genocide. 165 However, we
do not believe that the precise way he has formulated his statistical and
analytical insight is altogether adequate. We will illustrate this by drawing
attention to the extraordinarily large number of "ethnic" conflicts in the
world, whereby the ethnically homogenous nation state is a very rare thing.
In this world, there are approximately 132 states with more than one mil-
lion inhabitants in each, and of these, twelve are ethnically homogene-
ous.1 66 A compelling and unsettling statistical conclusion is reached when
considering claims made that states be ethnically homogeneous: the ethni-
cally homogeneous state is exceptional.
167
There are limitations to the scope of Rummel's work. The most im-
portant, in our view, is that his work seems to collapse the structural condi-
tions of conflict in which mass murder is an outcome into the particular
circumstances that occasion mass murder. In doing this, Rummel obscures
a central issue: the ubiquity of choice-making in mass murder or the busi-
ness of preventing or deterring it. A central factor in genocide and mass
killings is decision-making and decision responsibility. Rummel is correct
by targeting totalitarian regimes as potentially the most lethal with regard
to mass killings. However, inside totalitarian states are finite decision-mak-
ers who prescribe, apply, and enforce decisions about mass murder, geno-
cide, extra-judicial executions, etc. These decision-makers will invariably
be involved in every phase and function of decision relating to the targeting
163. RUMMEL, supra note 162 at 19.
164. See id. at 25.
165. See RUMMEL, supra note 19, at 1-2. Rummel writes, "Power kills; absolute Power kills
absolutely."
166. Ethnic compositions of others vary. In 25 states, one ethnic group comprises 90% of the
population; in another 25, one group comprises about 75% of the people; in 31 states one group is
about 50%; and in 39 states no single group accounts for more than half of the population. Win-
ston Nagan, Towards Unpacking the War in Former Yugoslavia: An International Lawyer's Per-
spective, COSP NEWS JOURNAL, Vol. 10, No. 2, at 3-4.
167. See Ethnic groups in the United States, 1990 Census data.
Claimed identity Millions of people
Whites, German ancestry 57.9
Whites, Irish ancestry 38.7
Whites, English ancestry 32.6
Blacks 30.0
Asians and Pacific Islanders 7.3
American Indians, Eskimos, and 1.9
Hispanics (any "race")
Hispanics (any "race") 22.3
Others 58.0
Total population 248.7
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and disposition of victims. We would suggest that the democracy/totalitar-
ian distinction made by Rummel is perhaps an excessively abstract way to
talk about governance and decision-making. Adding the decision-making
gloss to Rummel's analysis provides a sharper basis for deepening our un-
derstanding of the magnitude of genocide and mass murder and the practi-
cal issue of how to provide rational sanctions and appropriately ascribe
responsibility.
A further and important gloss on the Rummel model of conflict, mass
murder, and the democratic/totalitarian formula is that it be made more
realistic and usable by deepening our understanding of the context of con-
flict in world order where there are diverse public orders that operate con-
tinuously between the totalitarian and democratic axes. These political
orders are frequently differentiated by cultures, holding to different levels
of stratification, through which groups within them are identified and by
the identification of critical elites whose personalities may be predisposed
to democratic or totalitarian behaviors. In other words, we must deepen
our understanding of the community process at every level within which
there are conflicts about the dynamic of governance, and we must similarly
deepen our understanding of the processes of effective power and the na-
ture of elites, whose conduct may be benign or lethal. Combining these
results with those that show democracies do not make war on each other
(for example, the more democratic two nations are, the less foreign vio-
lence between them, and the more democratic a regime, the less internal
violence) strongly suggests that democracy is a general method of nonvi-
olence. 168 We, therefore, move to the next section of this Article, where we
168. Indeed, democratic regimes do not make war on each other, while warfare between total-
itarian regimes, such as the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, are the most deadly of all. See
RUMMEL, supra note 162, at 18. See also High-Intensity Conflicts Table: Estimated Number of
Deaths in 1997, in World Conflict Map 1997. PIOOM NEWSLETTER, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1997).
Cf. RUMMEL, supra note 162, at 3, which is reproduced as follows:
High-Intensity Conflicts - Estimated Number of Deaths in 1997:
1. Congo-Z. (ADFL) >50,000 2. Afghanistan (Taleban) >10,000
3. Algeria (GIA) >10,000 4. Congo-B (Cobras) >10,000
5. Rwanda (Hutu, Tutsi) >10,000 6. Sudan (SPLA) >10,000
7. Sri Lanka (LTTE) >4,000 8. Turkey (PKK) >4,000
9. Colombia (FARC) >2,000 10. Albania (Armed Gangs) >2000
11. India-Pakistan (Kashmir) >1,500 12. Burma (Karen) >1,000
13. Burundi (Hutu, Tutsi) >1,000 14. Iraq (KDP, PUK) >1,000
15. India (Assam) >1,000 16. India (Bihar) >1,000
17. Tajikistan (War Lords) >1,000
See also High-Intensity Conflicts Table: Estimated Cumulative Number of Deaths, in World Con-
flict Map 1997. PIOOM NEWSLETTER, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Winter 1997). Cf. RUMMEL, supra note 162,
at 3, which follows:
High-Intensity Conflicts: Estimated Cumulative Number of Deaths
Afghanistan (1978 -) >1,500,000 Congo - Z. (1990 - ) 30 - 100,000
Sudan (1983 - ) >1,500,000 Sri Lanka (1983 - ) 48 - 60,000
Rwanda (1994 - ) >810,000 India-Pakistan (1989 - ) 30 - 50,000
Iraq (1987 - ) >200,000 Turkey (1983 - ) 25 - 30,000
Burundi (1993 - ) 170 - 200,000 Congo - B. (1993 - ) >12,000
Burma (1948 - ) 130 - 500,000 India (Assam) (1979 - ) >5,000
Colombia (1964 - ) 120 - 160,000 India (Bihar) (1970 - ) >3,000
Algeria (1992 - ) 80 - 100,000 Albania (1997) >2,000
Tajikistan (1992 - ) 50 - 100,000
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seek to more radically contextualize the community processes of inter-
group conflict
C. The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide16
9
In this section of the Article, we shall describe the outlines of the Ge-
nocide Convention and related decision-making initiatives, as well as the
legal and political issues that have attended prescription, application, and
Any political demand that there must be a clear fit as to the identity of the "group" -either ethnic
or national - encased in the boundaries of the primary political legal institute, the nation-state,
presents a claim that provokes the prospect of conflict that may generate all the classic problems
of international juridical concern - threats to peace and security, potential for gross human rights
violations, challenges to the principles of humanitarianism and the possibility of mass displace-
ment and forced migration of peoples. Looking at the killings, a large proportion of which are so-
called "ethnic" or "national" or "racial" or "religious" conflicts, is an important indicator that we
need a tighter explanation of inter-group conflict, its cause and its cure.
169. Genocide is an aspect of the human rights protection of the right to life in international
law. The textual basis of the contemporary law relating to the right to life includes the following:
1. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32. Forty-eight states voted
in favor, none against, and eight abstained (including Saudi Arabia, South Africa,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Yugoslavia).
2. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), supra note 32.
3. The American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention"), Nov. 22,
1969, 1114 U.N.T.S. 123, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (entered into force, July 18, 1978).
4. The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter"), June 26,
1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 59 (entered into
force, October 21, 1986).
5. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms ("The European Convention"), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221(entered
into force, September 3, 1953).
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ICCPR, the American Convention, the
Banjul Charter, and the European Convention each specify that no individual shall be "arbitrar-
ily" deprived of his or her life. See The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31,
art. 3 ("Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person"); ICCPR, supra note 15,
art. 6, para. 1 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life"); the American Convention, supra
note 160, art. 4, para. 1 ("No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life"); the Banjul Charter,
supra note 160, art. 4 ("Human beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be entitled to
respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived of this
right."); and the European Convention, supra note 160, art. 2, para. 1. The European Convention
states that "[n]o one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence
of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law." Id. The
ICCPR, the American Convention, and the European Convention each provide that the right to
life "shall be protected by law." See ICCPR, supra note 31, art. 6, para. 1; the American Conven-
tion, supra note 160, art. 4, para. 1; and the European Convention supra note 160, art. 2, para. 1.
Thus, these basic international law instruments indicate that a government may deprive an indi-
vidual of the right to life only by a process which is "legal" and not arbitrary.
The ICCPR and the American Convention both establish rules to be applied in death pen-
alty cases, stating that the death penalty may be imposed only for the most serious crimes and
that the death penalty can only be imposed if the law, which prescribed the death penalty as
punishment for that crime, was in force before the crime was committed. See ICCPR, supra note
31, art. 6, para. 2; the American Convention, supra note 160, art. 4, para. 2. Both instruments
provide the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence for an individual sentenced to
death. See ICCPR; supra note 31, art. 6, para. 4; the American Convention, supra note 160, art. 4,
para. 6.
All the main human rights instruments also outline standards for a fair trial, and other standards
relating to the due process of law that governments must follow when prosecuting an individual
for a crime. If the government has formally imposed the death penalty, but failed to comply with
the procedural safeguards prescribed in international law, that government has violated interna-
tional law and has illegally and arbitrarily deprived a person of his or her life.
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enforcement in instances of specific concern. However, it will be apparent
that the issue of "prevention" is both deeper and more complex than might
be expected. To move toward a public order of effective prevention and
eradication of genocide, we suggest: (i) a social construction of genocide as
a process; (ii) a social construction of the processes of international deci-
sion-making, especially their competence; (iii) potential capacity for effec-
tive sanctioning strategies of prevention; and (iv) a deeper, more
anthropomorphic sense of the dynamics, as well as the structure, of social
conflict as a triggering, early-warning intelligence predicate for pre-crimi-
nal intervention strategies to more effectively prevent genocide.
Legal reality is reflected at two levels. First, the legal perspective of
genocide as codified in the Genocide Convention; and second, the efficacy
of legal operations of the prevention and punishment of genocide that fol-
low the formal codification of the universal crime of genocide. As the span
of history indicates, the legal prohibition of genocide is a recent phenome-
non. The Genocide Convention was not initiated by any discernible gov-
erning elite. It was the inspiration of an individual, a depreciated object of
traditional international law. Raphael Lemkin not only inspired action as a
reaction to the Holocaust, he even named the malady. 7 ' With important
exceptions, the ratification or other form of acceptance of the Genocide
Convention has been an unproblematic exercise. However, its application
and enforcement of the Convention has been largely rhetorical and sym-
bolic. There is strong prescriptive perspective but little in the way of oper-
ating practice. 17'
As earlier indicated, the term "genocide" was first proposed by
Raphael Lemkin.172 According to Lemkin, the concept of a crime of geno-
cide required a systematic plan to destroy the core or "essential founda-
tions" upon which group life was founded. 73 In Lemkin's words:
The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and
social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the
economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the per-
sonal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individualsbelonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the nationalgroup as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individu-
170. See RAPHAEL LEMKIN, supra note 89, at 79. The term "genocide" first appeared in Axis
Rule in Occupied Europe by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-born law professor. See Levinson, supra
note 148 at 1G and 4G. Lemkin was Jewish. See id. He lost 49 family members in the Holo-
caust. See id. He taught at Duke, Yale, and Princeton. See id. Lemkin devoted his life to the
criminalization and proscription of genocide. See id. Presently 120 countries have ratified the
Genocide Convention. See id.
171. Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1986, at 12:
[L]ike so many of the fine words issued from the U.N., these are worse than toothless.
The convention actually manages to exempt every contemporary act of geno-
cide .... Stalin's men insisted that "political genocide" be struck off the list of outlawed
practices. Under the treaty, the Kremlin can send political dissidents to Siberia without
having committed genocide. Likewise, Ethiopia's Mengistu can starve and relocate
Tigreans and Eritreans. Nicaragua's Ortega can decimate Miskito Indians, Cambodia's
Pol Pot could kill a third of his countrymen, and Uganda's Amin could butcher his oppo-
nents. Even where the victims are of one ethnic or religious group, the tormentors can
claim that this is merely political genocide.
172. See LEMKIN, supra note 89, at 79.
173. See id.
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als, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national
group.'
74
In Lemkin's work, genocide is essentially descriptive of a certain kind of
group or national atrocity, which also normatively ought to be prohibited.
In the sense of group atrocity, it may be noted that the Charter of Nurem-
berg defined crimes against humanity as covering many of the circum-
stances that today would fall under the legal label of genocide.
17 5
In 1946, the U.N. General Assembly passed a resolution affirming that
genocide was a crime under international law.1 76 General Assembly reso-
lutions are not binding, but such a resolution is not without some prescrip-
tive force. This resolution set in motion the process for the drafting of the
Genocide Convention itself. The Convention came into force in January
1951. The central contributions of the Convention are as follows:
(1) the establishment of the principle of personal criminal responsibility
under international law;
(2) international legal protection of groups vulnerable to genocide;
(3) principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights;
(4) the principle that there be both an individual and collective respon-
sibility for enforcement and sanction;
(5) to the extent that human rights is incorporated into the framework
of humanitarian law, genocide extends the principle of humanitari-
anism as fundamental human rights in peace and war; and
(6) establishes, in line with Nuremberg, a prescriptive and applicative
prospect for making fundamental human rights a component of
world order in war or peace.
The focus of the Genocide Convention on simplified crime, punish-
ment, and universality clearly does not give us an effective notion of deter-
rence if deterrence is dependent on detection, apprehension, effective and
fair prosecution, and punishment in the form of severe sanction in a highly
decentralized world order. If deterrence in this sense is a weak sanction,
what about the modern sanctioning idea of retribution in distribution?
Clearly one cannot have an eye-for-an-eye form of punishment, for this
may be tantamount to reproducing the very malady one wishes to eradi-
cate. If the principle of retribution is one that brings proportionality to the
nature of the crime, i.e., the punishment is made to "fit" the crime, we
begin to see the essential weakness of this widely held moral justification
for punishment. The crime of genocide cannot make any punishment fit
any rational model of "distribution. 177
174. See id.
175. See Mathew Lippman, The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide: Forty-Five Years Later, 8 TEMP. INT'L. & COMP. L. J. 1, 7-9 (1994).
176. G.A. Res. 96(1), U.N. Doc. A/64/Add 1, at 188-89 (1946).
177. In short, the imposition of the criminal sanction (punishment) sustains the sense of jus-
tice in a relatively remote way; perhaps, even only symbolic or ritualistic in its essential message.
In other words, the criminalizing of genocide in a universal sense strives, through the precision
and narrowness of drafting, to secure import universal enough to be acceptable to the largest
number of potentially ratifying states. However, the narrow "legalistic" approach to the preven-
tion and punishment of genocide must perforce sacrifice the element of social realism as well as a
social construction of the conditions of genocide and the conditions for effectively preventing and
punishing it. In other words, the focus on the universality of the crime seems to have had the
unintended consequence of emphasizing the aspect of punishment dealing with apprehension and
legal accountability. This has proved to be notoriously difficult as the absence of genocidal con-
victions, in general, indicates. Although this is a necessary aspect of the Convention, it seems to
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In broad outline, Article I of the Genocide Convention makes geno-
cide an international crime (Article I) whether committed in time of war or
peace. The contemporary precepts of human rights build on this principle
since human rights standards operate in time of war or peace. Articles II
and III compose the core of the Genocide Convention, defining the crime
of genocide and articulating the "acts" that are punishable as genocide.
Article IV focuses upon the issue of responsibility for genocide, stressing
the issue of individual responsibility and clearly indicating that governmen-
tal officials may be potential defendants. Article V reflects the reality of
criminal justice in the international arena through the reality of decentral-
ized competence in a world order still largely organized around sovereign
nation-states. The Genocide Convention assumes that the primary vehicle
for enforcement will be the nation-state. Hence, there is an obligation
under Article V for states to enact legislation to give efficacy to the Con-
vention. Articles VI and VII clarify the issues of jurisdiction as well as the
circumstances of extradition policy. Articles VIII and IX permit state par-
ties to have recourse to the U.N. and for the I.C.J. to resolve disputes be-
tween parties. A central criticism of this definition is that the term
"following acts" implies that the list of acts is exhaustive rather than illus-
trative. 178 This may depend on how restrictively or expansively acts (a) to
(e) are interpreted. For example, one may consider that "ethnic cleansing,"
defined as forced migration,179 or mass rape may be construed as being
included in the phrase, "serious bodily or mental harm" or "group condi-
tions calculated to bring about ... physical destruction .... 180
A second major concern is the phrase "intent to destroy." Clearly, the
forms of genocide involving governmental complicity or the complicity of
highly organized "hate" groups are not going to leave an evidence trail like
that of the self-righteous and meticulously bureaucratic Nazis. The plan to
implement a campaign of genocide, in the usual situation, will be institu-
tionalized in areas of security-sensitive personnel, the least transparent of
organized structures of coercion. Indeed, given the predisposition to "de-
nial" about the occasion of genocide, the power of the myth of "ethnic
conflicts" as inexplicable events of historically-conditioned blood-letting
have the effect of weakening the most central component of the Convention, viz., how to prevent
genocide by generating a comprehensive conception of sanctions (as a process of intervention) at
every level of social organization as a necessary component of a prescription whose major pur-
pose is to prevent potential victims from becoming victims of this most odious of crimes. For a
comprehensive conception of sanctions, see infra.
178. The Sixth Committee rejected an amendment from China that the enumeration of "acts"
not be exhaustive. U.N. GAOR 6th Comm. 3rd Sess. 78th mtg, at 142-45, U.N. Doc. A/633
(1948).
179. See FINAL REPORT COMMISSION OF EXPERTS ESTABLISHED PURSUANT TO SECURITY
COUNCIL RESOLUTION 780, at 33, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (1994). Here, ethnic cleansing is defined
as "rendering [of] an area ethnically homogeneous by using force to remove persons of given
groups from the area." Id. Cf. Application of the Genocide Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugo.) (Provisional Measures II),Sept. 13,
1993., I.C.J. 325, 431-32 In the separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, he declared that the ethnic
cleansing/forced migration practices in the former Yugoslavia constituted genocide. Id. at 435-36,
447 (separate opinion by Justice Lauterpacht). The U.N. General Assembly also declared ethnic
cleansing to be a form of genocide. G.A. Res. 47/121 UNGAOR E/CN 4/Sub. 2/1985/86.
180. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 32,
at art. II.
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and barbarism shrouded in a veil of convenient anonymity, was a powerful
factor in paralyzing appropriate levels of intervention in both the 1991-1995
tragedies of southeastern Europe and the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.
A strong intentionality requirement as opposed to, for example, a
"constructive" intentionality criterion might be critical for a criminal trial,
but the burden, in the special circumstances of genocide outcomes, is a very
high one.18' It is, of course, the case that although genocide aims at the
destruction of a "group," it is the individuals who are actually the specific
targets of destruction. This poses a tricky question for the application of
the "intent to destroy" requirement. This requirement, on its face, clearly
indicates that the intention to destroy must be a general intention to de-
stroy the group as a group. This seems to imply that the individual targets
that constitute the aggregate group, in a sense, are incidental to the intent
requirement. This may sound quixotic, but it is a view rationalized by the
I.L.C. as follows:
The prohibited act must be committed against an individual because of
his membership in a particular group and as an incremental step in the
overall objective of destroying the group. It is the membership of the
individual in a particular group rather than the identity of the individual
that is the decisive criterion in determining the immediate victims of the
crime of genocide. The group itself is the ultimate target or intended
victim of this type of massive criminal conduct.182
Ratner and Abrams suggest entirely plausibly that this view means
mass killings that are allegedly "random" or part of a "random campaign"
of violence will not be covered by the definition of genocide. This is not a
necessary conclusion. The issue of randomness requires us to have a more
contextually-determined process of the various levels and intensities of so-
cial conflict before such a conclusion may be objectively reached. Cer-
tainly, the intention to destroy the group by destroying its members can
only be carefully appraised, not by abstract logical syntactical analysis, as
the I.L.C. has apparently done and as Ratner and Abrams have en-
dorsed, l8 3 but by a careful assent of relevant contextual indicators. This
may be done by drawing appropriate inferences from the fact that even the
contents of consciousness are empirical and can be ascertained by intensive
procedures associated with the psychological and psychiatric sciences, as
well as indicators from external components of behavior and conduct.
A further criticism relates to the specificity required to give meaning
to the term "destroy." If the conditions of destructive intent can be clearly
specified, we may still not appreciate how the terms "destructive" and "in-
181. The notion of constructive intent has been recommended in a U.N. study prepared by B.
Whitaker, SeeU.N. Doc. E/CN 4/Sub 2/1985/6 (July 2, 1985). There it is suggested that construc-
tive intent refers to "acts or omissions of such a degree of criminal negligence or recklessness that
the defendant must reasonably be assumed to have been aware of the consequences of his con-
duct." Id. at 19. In the context of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the media messages, preparation
for mass killings, numbers of victims and other components of the process of identification of
victims created a kind of "constructive" intent to commit genocide. See Ren6 Degni-S6gui, Spe-
cial Rapporteur, Commission on Human Rights created under para. 20 Commission Res. E/CN 4/
S - 3/1, at 11-13, U.N. Doc. EC 4/1995/7 (May 25, 1994).
182. 1996 I.L.C. Report at 88.
183. STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY, 34, 36 (Clarendon
Press 1997).
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tent" can be used. Such usage is not simply to prosecute genocide after it
has happened, but also determine what kind of preventive law guidance we
can draw from this formulation. The reference to "destruction" implies,
but does not quite incorporate, the reference to social conflict occasioned
by social conditions of stratification or segmentation based on culturally
understood symbols of identity. The definition of genocide in the Geno-
cide Convention, as an instrument of understanding, does not effectively
illuminate the social process of genocide itself. It provides few clues to its
meaning, and cannot, by itself, illuminate the conditions of genocide unless
it is supplemented by a serious effort to socially construct the processes of
genocide itself. As earlier indicated, discrimination, prejudice, and domi-
nance based on group labels of identity are intrinsic parts of the social pro-
cess that may lead to genocidal outcomes. Prevention requires that we
both broaden and deepen inquiry into the pre-conditions of genocide. We
must understand racial discrimination, the prejudice of anti-Semitism, the
cultural dominance of slavery, including caste as well as apartheid-like dep-
rivations, if we are to give prevention a chance to be efficacious. The
travaux seem to support this construction because they suggest that it is the
potential act to cause the destruction of a group that must determine
whether the act is within the definition of genocide. This should be an
analysis of key contextual indicators, among other factors, that must guide
the interpreter interested in either prevention or punishment.184 Judge
Goldstone, the prosecutor for the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugosla-
via and Rwanda, said that because the charge of genocide is the most im-
portant of the crimes for which criminal responsibility may be alleged, the
charge must focus on the issue of preventing the physical destruction of a
target group or population.185 This has limited the number of indictments
where genocide is a charge.186
184. NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 63-64 (1960), ar-
gues that it is possible to specify in advance all conditions in the abstract. Only the context of
each case can serve as an adequate guide to decision.
185. See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 174, at 30-31.
186. Apart from the problems of enumerated acts in the Convention, the central issue of the
relative inclusivity, exclusivity, or indeed, the very notion of how to define and identify a group, is
also problematic. Let us illustrate some of the salient problems. The term "national" in sociolog-
ical terms drawn from the European context means "ethnic group." The term is also used with
reference to the phrase "nation-state," but clearly in practice does not mean or require a national
or ethnic "fit." In fact, the majority of states with over 1,000,000 inhabitants are pluralistic in
terms of national or ethnic identity. If the term "nation" is collapsed into the term "nationality,"
it carries a meaning of group affiliation normally associated with a sovereign body, politically
styled in international law as a "nation-state." Thus, the question would arise as to whether the
intent to destroy in whole or in part a nation-state (and its inhabitants) would qualify as a named
"nation" for the purpose of the reach of the Convention.
The term "ethnic" has a similar level of ambiguity when an effort is made to isolate the key
indicators of "ethnical," as the term is used in the Convention. The term is often vaguely defined
with reference to culture, tradition, shared historical experience which could include religious
tradition or language and artistic experience. The term is often also used as a synonym for "race"
or "racial."
When we assay the meaning of the term "racial," we may well agree with an early UNESCO
study which regarded the term as indefinable. Racial classification in the United States sought to
ground itself on degrees of pre-existing biological pedigree. In apartheid South Africa, the now
extinct Population Registration Act defined races in part with reference to habit and appearance.
A white person was white in appearance and habitually accepted as white . Using race as a label
to ascribe the disabilities of prejudice, discrimination or domination was often seen as a thor-
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D. Genocide in the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Reservations to the Genocide Convention) was an
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), rendered in
May 1951.187 This case was the first real statement of juridical perspective
on the nature of the Genocide Convention. In fact, the problem presented
to the Court was one that went to the foundational policy questions about
how law should respond on an international basis to the prevention and
punishment of genocide. 188 The response of the ICJ represented a strongly
divided court. Seven justices joined in the majority opinion, and five jus-
tices joined in the minority opinion. 189 The central legal question was what
effect certain reservations would have upon a state's obligation under the
Genocide Convention, assuming that the state ratified it with
reservations.1 90
The majority of the Court took the position that so long as the reserva-
tion was consistent or compatible with the object and purpose of the Geno-
cide Convention, a state would be able to become a party. 191 This
provided, essentially, a flexible standard rather than a strict construction of
the basis for compatibility or non-compatibility with the Genocide Conven-
tion.192 The policy behind the majority's opinion seems to be transparent
oughly arbitrary indicator of identity. Using race as an indicator for a protected group may sim-
ply be arbitrary if the term "race" cannot be objectively assayed for the purpose of the
assumption of the protection of the law. Finally, it should be remembered that the term "ethnic"
derives from the Greek word, "ethnos," which translated means "people." Again, if we have
difficulty in a priori classifying the groups to be protected, we may be in the insidious position of
arbitrary exclusion.
The idea put forward by Robinson regarding acts constituting genocide, viz., that they be
contingent, and in part, dependent, on the context for precise indicators of group destruction, can
be applied to the identification of protected groups. In short, what is again needed to give mean-
ing to the prevention objective of the Convention is a socially constructed conception of group
identity. Such a framework may not cover all groups that should be covered, but it would provide
an analytical tool of dexterity and precision to interpretatively broaden, when required by social
reality, the class of protected groups. As a practical matter, the level of under-inclusiveness of
the protected "groups" was in part dictated by ideological considerations having little to do with
the essentially humanitarian purpose of the Convention. The exclusion of political, professional
and economic classes (capital and labour) or groups is clearly indefensible. In fact, it may be that
two of the most important groups (at least, in time of political turmoil or conflict) - political and
economic classes or groups - may be the most susceptible to extermination or destruction.
A final point regarding the definition of protected groups is that it cannot be assumed that all
ethnic, national, racial or religious groups are encased in ethnically impermeable boundaries. For
the purpose of the Hutu directed genocide campaign in Rwanda, a Tutsi - for the purpose of
extermination - was often a moderate Hutu, a Hutu married to a Tutsi, the children of such a
union, a Hutu democrat, and more. Clearly, the conduct of those who planned and/or executed
these mass murders is still within the reach of the Convention and gives greater cogency to the
idea of socially constructing group identity for purposes of both prevention and punishment.
187. See generally Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Reservations to the Genocide Convention), I.C.J. Reports 15 (1951).
188. See id. at 16.
189. See id. at 29-30.
190. See id. at 16.
191. See id. at 24, 29.
192. In the Reservations to the Genocide Convention case, the majority stated:
It follows that it is the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the
Convention that must furnish the criterion for the attitude of a State in making the
reservation on accession as well as for the appraisal by a State in objecting to the reser-
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enough. The Genocide Convention was a special convention. 193 Its pre-
scriptive force was meant to be universal.1 94 In effect, the prevention and
the punishment of genocide is an obligation erga omnes, and because of the
nature of this instrument and the malady it seeks to control and regulate as
well as prohibit, a relaxed view of the standard of international interpreta-
tion is virtually mandated by the context. The policy behind this context is
one that seeks to secure the most universal level of accession to the treaty
so long as the object and the purpose of the treaty was defensible, reserva-
tions notwithstanding. This, of course, means that if states are able to ap-
pend reservations, declarations, or understandings to the treaty, there will
be an incentive to become parties to it since they can give the treaty their
own specific credence, so long as that credence is consistent or compatible
with the object and purpose of the treaty.
Such a judicial policy would obviously have the effect of encouraging
the adoption of the treaty, thus, securing an expeditious level of universal
or near-universal acceptance. We would suggest that the subtext of this
majority view is reflected in a legal policy that favors the prescriptive force
inherent in the convention as a critical legal symbol sending a message that
the proscription of the crime of genocide lies most effectively in preventing
it. A universal adoption of the Genocide Convention would send a power-
ful, prescriptive signal that gives the policy of prevention universal
credence.
The view of the majority may be fruitfully compared to the view of the
minority. The minority favored a more legalistic, and therefore, restrictive
view of Reservations to the Genocide Convention.195 The minority saw the
important legal policy as a search to ensure a stringent level of technical
vation. Such a rule of conduct which must guide every State in the appraisal which it
must make, individually and from its own standpoint, on the admissibility of any
reservation.
Any other view would lead either to the acceptance of reservations which frustrate the
purposes which the General Assembly and the contracting parties had in mind, or to
recognition that the parties to the Convention have the power of excluding from it the
author of a reservation, even a minor one, which may be quite compatible with those
purposes.
It has nevertheless been argued that any State entitled to become a party to the Geno-
cide Convention may do so while making any reservation it chooses by virtue of its
sovereignty. The Court cannot share this view. It is obvious that so extreme an applica-
tion of the idea of State sovereignty could lead to a complete disregard of the object and
purpose of the Convention.
Id. at 24.
193. See id. at 23 ("The solution of these problems must be found in the special characteristics
of the Genocide Convention.").
194. On the issue of the universality of the Genocide Convention, the majority in the Reserva-
tions to the Genocide Convention stated that
A second consequence [of the conception that the United Nations, in adopting the Ge-
nocide Convention, intended to condemn and punish genocide] is the universal charac-
ter both of the condemnation of genocide and of the co-operation required 'in order to
liberate mankind from such an odious scourge' (Preamble to the Convention). The Ge-
nocide Convention was therefore intended by the General Assembly and by the con-
tracting parties to be definitely universal in scope. It was in fact approved on December
9th, 1948, by a resolution which was unanimously adopted by fifty-six States.
Id. at 23.
195. See id. at 42-43.
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compliance to a technically concrete international obligation.196 In sum,
from this point of view, the Genocide Convention was an instrument vested
with an international, criminal character. If punishment is a major purpose
of the instrument, then a plethora of multifarious exceptions to the Geno-
cide Convention by the ratifying parties will have the effect of undermining
the clarity of the content of the legal obligation for which criminal punish-
ment is envisioned. The minority justified its position as follows:
We believe that the integrity of the terms of the Convention is of greater
importance than mere universality in its acceptance. While it is undoubt-
edly true that the representatives of the governments, in drafting and
adopting the Genocide Convention, wished to see as many States become
parties to it as possible, it was certainly not their intention to achieve
universality at any price. There is no evidence to show that they desired
to secure wide acceptance of the Convention even at the expense of the
integrity or uniformity of its terms, irrespective of the wishes of those
States that have accepted all the obligations under it.
197
It also added,
It is an undeniable fact that the tendency of all international activities in
recent times has been towards the promotion of the common welfare of
the international community with a corresponding restriction of the sov-
ereign power of individual States. So, when a common effort is made to
promote a great humanitarian object, as in the case of the Genocide Con-
vention, every interested State naturally expects every other interested
State not to seek any individual advantage of convenience, but to carry
out the measures resolved upon by common accord. Hence, each party
must be given the right to judge the acceptability of a reservation and to
decide whether or not to exclude the reserving State from the Conven-
tion, and we are not aware of any case in which this right has been
abused. It is therefore not universality at any price that forms the first
consideration. It is rather the acceptance of common obligations keeping
step with like-minded States - in order to attain a high objective for all
humanity, that is of paramount importance. Such being the case, the con-
clusion is irresistible that it is necessary to apply to the Genocide Conven-
tion with even greater exactitude than ever the existing rule that requires
the consent of all parties to any reservation to a multilateral convention.
In the interests of the international community, it would be better to lose
as a party to the Convention a State which insists in the face of objections
on a modification of the terms of the Convention, than to permit it to
become a party against the wishes of a State or States which have irrevo-
cably and unconditionally accepted all the obligations of the
Convention.198
The minority's "greater exactitude" standard is an important revelation of
its thinking about the juridical nature of the criminal obligation engen-
dered by the Genocide Convention. Although the operative language is
couched in the form that the international system must be explicit and un-
ambiguous about obligations imposed on State parties, the subtext seems
to be that the imposition of an international criminal law obligation of uni-
versal import must meet an even greater standard of linguistic exactitude if
the object is criminal law punishment. In this sense, the minority view dif-
fers from the majority view on the respective emphases given to the princi-
196. See generally id. (Joint dissenting opinion).
197. Id. at 46(Dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo).
198. Id. at 46-47(Dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read, Hsu Mo).
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pie of prevention that should meet the standard of consistency with the
object and purpose of the instrument and the principle of punishment that
must meet exacting standards of precision for the imposition of internation-
ally sanctioned criminal responsibility. This is indeed an important and vi-
tal discourse about the nature of the Genocide Convention. It is obvious
that the majority view of universalization under a relaxed standard is one
that stresses the prescriptive force of prevention and underplays, to some
degree, the prescriptive force of punishment.
The minority takes the reverse position. Perhaps history will recall
that the United States' belated ratification came hedged with reservations,
declarations, and understandings that came treacherously close to under-
mining the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention. It was proba-
bly the case with the United States that belated ratification was more a
matter of symbolic commitment to prescriptive universality and the policy
of prevention than a serious commitment to the policy of punishment.
It is possible that the majority of the Court in the Reservations to the
Genocide Convention had a sense that State parties would, in the long
term, be more juridically partial to the Genocide Convention if it were a
symbol that stressed preventing more than punishing the crime. Perhaps
this was borne of the Court's sense of realism rather than abstract humani-
tarian idealism. That realism may simply mean that it is cheaper, in terms
of human suffering, to prevent genocide from happening than to attempt to
punish it after the fact.
In the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Preven-
tion and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, a request was made for an
indication of interim measures concerning the probability of genocide oc-
curring in the former Yugoslavia, more specifically in the states of Bosnia
and Herzegovina. 199 The Court noted that under Article I of the Genocide
Convention the contracting parties to the Convention had confirmed that
"genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime
under international law which they undertake to prevent to and punish."2 0
The Court held that Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina "are under a clear
obligation to do all in their power to prevent the commission of any such
acts in the future."2 1 The Court, pending a final decision, gave the follow-
ing provisional measures:
(i) First, the government of Yugoslavia should immediately honor its un-
dertakings under the Convention and "take all measures within its
power to prevent the commission of the crime of genocide"; 20 2
(ii) Second, the Court's specific reference was made that the government
of Yugoslavia ensure that military, paramilitary, or irregular forces
directed or supported by it, as well as other organizations and per-
sons subject to its "control, direction, and influence do not commit
any acts of genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and pub-
lic incitement to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide
",203
199. See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 3, 3-4 (April 8).
200. Id. at 22.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 24.
203. Id.
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In the Provisional Measures II case, the Court reaffirmed the essence
of the interim measures order given in the first decision.2 °4 An important
discussion ensued with respect to the exact binding character of "binding
provisional measures" before the Court. In a persuasive separate opinion,
Judge Weeramantry, in a detailed analysis of the jurisprudence of interim
measures, concluded that if an interim order was viewed as a less than
binding obligation, it "would weaken the regime of international law in the
very circumstance in which its restraining influence is most needed."20 5
Weeramantry concluded:
For the reasons set out, the provisional measures ordered by the Court on
8 April 1993 imposed a binding legal obligation on the Respondent. Non-
compliance with that Order endangers the very subject of the dispute
before the Court and can cause irreparable harm to the Applicant. This
irreparable harm is not in regard to rights and duties such as are often the
subject of litigation, for we are here dealing with matters under the Geno-
cide Convention, touching the very existence of a people. An interpreta-
tion that imposes anything short of a binding legal obligation upon the
Respondent is out of tune with the letter and spirit of the Charter and the
Statute.206
It is both interesting and obvious that the way in which the ICJ responded
to the problems of genocide has, in fact, been in the area of grounding the
preventive obligation component of the instrument. The international
community has, of course, considered on a multigenerational basis, the
prospect of an international criminal court, which would have jurisdiction
over genocide. If it becomes an institutional reality, this court's role will be
to punish international criminal defendants. This means detection, appre-
hension, prosecution, and punishment. These are powers that sovereign
states grudgingly concede to the international community, and hence, the
difficulties of establishing a permanent international criminal court. On
the other hand, the problems of genocide and gross humanitarian atrocity,
especially in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, virtually compelled the
Security Council to prescribe the ad hoc tribunals for those nations. While
progress has been made with respect to detection, apprehension, prosecu-
tion, and punishment, it is obvious that the ad hoc tribunals are not a pan-
acea. In fact, the central issue remains on how to prevent genocide and
gross violations of human rights and humanitarianism from actually hap-
pening. This, it seems, is the wisdom bequeathed us in the jurisprudence of
the ICJ.
IV. GENOCIDE AND MASS KILLINGS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL THEORY
A. The Relevance of Many Fields of Study to the Issue of Genocide
The theoretical problem of genocide is very basic and poses a superfi-
cially simple question: What after all do we mean by "genocide" from a
contextually sensitive, policy-oriented perspective? Is the dominant "le-
gal" meaning given to the mass extinction of human beings adequate for
policy purposes? The legal meaning of genocide is, of course, a conven-
204. See Application to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), 1993 I.C.J. 325, 349 (September 13).
205. Id. at 389 (Separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry).
206. Id.
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tional disciplinary, legal meaning. This meaning derives from a legal instru-
ment: the Genocide Convention.2 °7 The term genocide is a neologism.
The inventor of this term, Raphael Lemkin, promoted the idea that certain
kinds of group killings or species killings were sufficiently horrific and
therefore should be universally suppressed and punished. Is the Genocide
Convention's definition inclusive enough? Does it enhance or deepen the
understanding of what genocide is, what conditions conspire to make it
happen and how it might be cured? Does the legal meaning of genocide
have a sufficiently empirical basis so as to be rooted in the actual social
processes of "genocide"?
Is the conception of genocide a sufficiently socially constructed con-
cept to meet the needs of law and social science? This brings us to a second
problem, namely, the vigorous non-legal conversation about the meaning
and effects of genocide as an historic and social process outcome of human
interaction on a global basis. Since World War II there has been a vigorous
non-legal literature about genocide that cuts across disciplinary lines in-
volving history, sociology, anthropology, political science, human rights,
psychology, psychoanalysis, and more. These disciplines have sought to
clarify the meaning of genocide by contributing insights from their own
perspectives. The meaning of genocide that emerges from this conversa-
tion is not necessarily clearer than the attempt at legal definition. How-
ever, it does suggest that the genocide problem is both deeper and broader
than the formulation that permeates the legal conversation. But how do
these multi-disciplinary insights specifically improve our understanding of
genocide as a policy problem in terms of a policy prescription and applica-
tion, and in terms of a problem of sanctions for the prescription and appli-
cation of genocide proscribing policy in practice?
The problems that we address focus on whether there are intellectual
procedures which may more effectively integrate the various perspectives
of science into a framework for inquiry that sharpens our understanding of
the genocide problem and permits us to develop strategies of intervention
that are based on keener and more finely honed intelligence estimates
about genocide, and that also shape levels of policy interventions that per-
mit us to:
(1) use the intelligence function necessary for gathering, processing, and
distributing the data necessary for rational interventions to prevent
genocide and mass murder;
(2) invoke that is, provisionally characterize the genocide problem and
demand appropriate strategies to contain and eliminate genocide; 20 8
207. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note 32,
at art. II.
The Convention's famous definition of genocide is as follows:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group such as
(a) killing members of the group;
(b) conspiring serious bodily injury or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physi-
cal destruction in whole or in part;
(d) imposing measures to prevent births within the group;
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
208. The invocation decision function is very critical to the study of genocide and to the practi-
cal processes of intervening to prevent it. Invocation essentially is an opportunity presented to all
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(3) prescribe more explicit particular standards for normative guidance
about the proscription of genocide on a universal basis;
20 9
(4) apply standards to specific facts and situations and particular perpe-
trators of the crime of genocide;
(5) promote the strategies to prevent genocide;
(6) secure the termination of decision-making interventions when the
suppression and punishment of genocide have been secured; and
2 10
(7) appraise the efficacy of decisional intervention that seeks to sup-
press and punish acts of genocide.
The threshold issue, from a policy-sensitive perspective, in genocide
discourse (i) is insufficiently policy directed and (ii) does not adequately
take into account the empirical and normative implications of different pol-
icy-decision functions in the suppression and punishment of the crime of
genocide.
To get beyond the boundaries of the threshold intellectual problem of
various disciplines and how these insights might be better integrated into a
coherent intellectual frame for understanding, suppressing, and punishing
genocide requires an explicit understanding of the importance of certain
key background components of policy-making. These include the following
matters of contextual salience: (i) an evolving globally comprehensive map
of genocide as an outcome of the global social and power process; (ii) a
specific commitment to understanding not simply the problem of genocide,
but all the specific problems concerning the who, what, where, when, and
how of the genocide process, as well as the problems of the prescription
and application of sanctioning policies; and (iii) amenability to multiple
methods for theory, inquiry, intervention and evaluation of the interrelated
processes of genocide and its eradication.211
members of the world community to invoke as a threshold matter whatever level of decision
making processes to intervene before genocide happens. Its invocation after the fact is
problematic.
209. Prescription in this context is the projection of universal authoritative rules, principles,
and standards incorporating the policy of prohibiting genocide, universal expectations of control
and authority to support the prescription. The most important function of prescription in the
genocide context is in fact to explicitly clarify the normative standards that prohibit and seek to
criminalize on a global basis the use of genocide as an instrument of power.
210. On the anatomy and functional dynamism of the decision policy process in general, see
Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 4, Vol. I, at 162-167.
211. These three background features underline the importance of context and contextual
mapping, problem articulation and problem-solving, multiple methods and all levels of analysis
for inquiry and intervention. This leads us to the specific intellectual framework through which
rational inquiry and responsible interventions might be secured to prevent, suppress and punish
genocide. These include the following intellectual cross/interdisciplinary procedures:
(i) Clarification of normative understanding about genocide
(ii) Description of trends in both perspectives and operations about genocide
(iii) Conditioning factors influencing trends toward or away from genocidal outcomes
(iv) Projection or retreat from genocidal outcomes
(v) Alternative prospects for securing a genocide free public order, or alternative tech-
niques for preventing and/or punishing genocide
The intellectual procedures outlined here, which are in effect problem-oriented, goal-guided,
context-sensitive, multi-disciplinary, and decision-focused are abstracted from the framework of
policy thinking, also sometimes styled "configurative thinking," in Lasswell and McDougal, supra
note 4, Vol. II, at 725-1118. Although we have labeled these tasks as "procedures", they are in
effect complementary methods and procedures for the integration of multiple forms of thinking
for policy purposes. Thus, goal thinking, trend thinking, scientific or conditions thinking, predic-
tive thinking, and alternative thinking are intrinsic components of a broader framework of analy-
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The second concern is not a problem of either empirical understanding
or normative clarification of procedures for understanding genocide as a
question for inquiry and analysis. This is the problem of the actual practi-
cal ubiquity of genocide as an outcome of the larger world community and
power process, namely, that mass extinction of human aggregates occurs
with alarming frequency. Here there are two sub-problems. First, there
are direct and indirect practices that probably meet the legal definition of
genocide. Second, there clearly are mass killings and extinction of human
groups that occur, but are not covered by the Genocide Convention.
B. Multiple Conceptions of Genocide: A Critique
Doubtlessly influenced by the paradigm of modern science and its de-
mand for precision in the formation of concepts for research and inquiry,
an effort has been made to "name" the malady."' 2 Indeed, the specific
tragedy of the Holocaust gave the utmost urgency to this enterprise, in
terms of both scientific understanding, as well as prescription, application,
and enforcement. Also implicated in genocide research are questions con-
cerning conditioning variables sustaining these trends, and how to effec-
tively appraise operational practice and divergent perspectives against the
defensible common interest in preventing or minimizing the phenomenon.
Additionally, there is urgency about prediction. The prognosis, or warning
systems, of an enhanced or diminished capacity within the global power
and constitutive processes determining when, where, and who the next
round of victims will be. Finally, the task of the construction of an alterna-
tive future, visualizes a world that effectively and continuously controls the
impulse to genocide and mass murder as well as mass extinction of whole
aggregates of human beings. In other words, a world that reduces in real
terms the raw number of victims or potential victims.
Naming the malady has been a very successful intellectual contribution
to understanding the problem. Genocide was and remains a powerful sym-
bol of a vile process. What has been more troubling is the scope and char-
sis styled "configurative thinking." What we are recommending is that configurative thinking,
which is in effect thinking that is both holistic and problem-specific, is a much needed addendum
to the focus and insights that multiple disciplines generate about genocide's conditions, causes,
and proscription.
212. John Dewey, in his book, STUDIES IN LOGICAL THEORY (1903) and William James,
in PRAGMATISM (1975) both maintained that the traditional correspondence theory of truth,
according to which the true idea is one that agrees or corresponds to reality, only begs the ques-
tion of what the "agreement" or "correspondence" of idea with reality is. Dewey and James
argued that an idea agrees with reality, and is therefore true, if and only if it is successfully
employed in human action in pursuit of human goals and interests, that is, if it leads to the resolu-
tion of a problematic situation in Dewey's terms.
Dewey made further inroads in the application of the principles of instrumentalism to the
traditional conceptions and formal apparatus of logical theory in LOGIC: THE THEORY OF
INQUIRY (1938), where he proposed the distinctiveness about intelligent inquiry is that it is
facilitated by the use of language: "Logical forms accrue to subject-matter when the latter is
subjected to controlled inquiry." JOHN DEWEY, LOGIC: THE THEORY OF INQUIRY 101 (1938).
[Language] has its own distinctive structure which is capable of abstraction as a form.
This structure, when abstracted as a form, had a decisive influence historically upon the
formulation of logical theory; the symbols which are appropriate to the form of language
as an agency of inquiry (as distinct from its original function as a medium of communica-
tion) are still peculiarly relevant to logical theory.
Id. at 45.
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acter of the effort to define what genocide is and what it is not. The legal
definition of genocide is more a product of the policy political process
rather than exacting legal draftsmanship. The United States accepted the
Genocide Convention as defined with an emphasis on ethnicity and race,
notwithstanding the fact that racial discrimination and segregation were
still a significant part of the American social process13 On the other hand,
the Russians were very happy to accept indicators such as race and ethnic-
ity, but they would not permit the inclusion of the extinction of social, po-
litical, and/or economic classes within the reach of legal genocide.214 Thus
the legal definition of genocide does not account for a good deal of "histor-
ical" genocide, and scholars who seek to take historical trend into account
simply use a more flexible designation of group killings and assume this is
included in the symbol.
The legal definition of genocide, confined to an exhaustive list of cate-
gories, confronts the practical problem that, empirically, in both social and
psychological terms, does not adequately include large classes of mass-mur-
der victims who may be identified by other culturally accepted labels like
political identification, economic identification, or perhaps a skill or profes-
sional identification. It is, therefore, sometimes suggested that perhaps the
categories themselves should be given a generous and broad interpretation
so as to achieve their major purpose of prevention and/or punishment for
mass murder or conspiracy to commit mass murder. Others have suggested
that perhaps the classes of victims unaccounted for in legal genocide should
be subject to extended prescriptive standards of politicide,215 or more gen-
erally, domicide.216 The principle point here is that the legal conception of
genocide simply does not measure up to the problem of the form of group
deprivations that involves the conspiracy or fact of group extinction. There
seems to be a fair degree of confusion about what constitutes genocide for
the purposes of history, psychology, sociology, political science, and law.
These disciplinary problems of understanding have profound practical con-
sequences for the degree to which the human right to be free from group
extinction is secured.
The distinguished genocide scholar, the late Leo Kuper, wrote the
opening chapter of George Andreopoulos' anthology titled, Genocide.217
His discussion covers: (i) the legal definition of genocide; (ii) war crimes
and genocide; (iii) "Uses and Abuses" of the United Nations; (iv) theory
and practice of human rights; and (v) "Domestic Jurisdiction" and preven-
tion.21 8 It is obvious that "law," "social science," and "policy" are impli-
cated in this exercise, yet the exposition is curiously unintegrated. Taken
separately we seem to stumble into multiple theoretical universes without a
clear guide to their causal connections or their normative interrelations.
The Kuper presentation seems anecdotal rather than one that aspires
to theoretical coherence. In short, there is no clear map and no rational
213. See Congressional Records, Hearings on Genocide Convention.
214. Id.
215. Defined as those killed because of their ostensible political identity.
216. Defined as mass killings of people who belong to groups identified by any appropriate
label such as citizen or refugee.
217. See GEORGE ANDREOPOULOS, GENOCIDE (1994), Chapter 1 by Leo Kuper.
218. See id.
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way to bridge the ought component of "law," the is component of "science"
and the choice component of "policy," so that the reader clearly under-
stands the genocide "problem" in realistic context. Additionally this ap-
proach does not permit the reader to systematically assay the intellectual
framework that might aid in clarifying the different components of world
order and human rights conditioned "goals." Moreover, systematically un-
derstanding the trends in the operations and perspectives of genocide and
its control is done in an anecdotal and occasional manner. This technique
makes it difficult to understand both the conditioning variables that en-
hance genocide and those seeking to regulate and minimize its socio-politi-
cal ubiquity. The realistic systematic appraisal of where we are regarding
genocide is as crucial as the predictive task of what we might realistically
aspire to in terms of control and regulation.
Finally, the design of a genocide inquiry system for policy purposes
would be incomplete were we not to insist on imaginative alternatives asso-
ciated with early warning interventions as well as sanctioning devices that
may reduce the occasion of genocide and enhance a more benign vista of
inter-group tolerance on a universal basis. This is not to depreciate the
important work that Professor Kuper has done in this area. But this Arti-
cle suggests that when historians or social scientists stumble into law and
the policy process, formidable methodological problems await them. Ac-
cess to procedures that more systematically integrate science into decision-
making processes, intellectual tools, and procedures that rationally eluci-
date the diverse components of choice, policy, and social process must be
employed in a systematic and disciplined manner. Here we would submit
that the policy sciences have a distinctive contribution to make.
Frank Chalk's impressive essay Redefining Genocide219 suffers from a
roughly similar drawback. It is short on the systematics of a social and
power process background to genocide. The conception of law as an instru-
ment of community intervention seems to focus more on the techniques of
logical syntactical derivation than the emphasis on decision-making that is
authoritative and controlling in a decentralized world order context. More-
over the "research" definition given by Chalk incorporates both too much
and too little.
According to Chalk, "[g]enocide is a form of one-sided mass killing in
which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group
and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator."22 This definition is
more consistent with social reality than the law, but it contains major draw-
backs. First the reference to "one-sided mass killings" seems to assume
that if there is "retaliation," there is no genocide. Obviously this is not
what is intended, but the formulation is unclear. The ambiguity lies in the
inability to understand that a systemic precondition for a good deal of ge-
nocide is the existence of "groups" and the power relationships within and
between them, which is often triggered by "elite" behavior. These behav-
iors are power-conditioned and often reflect the relationships of domina-
tion and subordination. This requires a richer and more systematic
designation of two crucial procedures: first, a procedure to map the social
219. FRANK CHALK, Redefining Genocide, in ANDREOPOULOS, supra note 217.
220. CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89, at 23.
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processes of interactions in which "groups" are critical, but not the exclu-
sive participants; second, a procedure to map the central condition of the
processes of domination, subjugation, and mass killings through the
processes of effective power. If these tasks are done both comprehen-
sively221 and selectively with specific components of the community and
power processes, we will have approached the problem of characterizing
and prescribing "genocide" in a way that make more sense in "scientific"
terms.
The second aspect of the Chalk definition that is problematic is the
notion of attribution to "the state or other authority." '222 The definition of
the "state" is fraught with complexity and ambiguity. For this reason pol-
icy-scientists have used such terms as "territorially organized body politic."
The term "state" like the term "sovereign," obscures more than it illumi-
nates. The functional approach to endemic confusion here is to focus on
the different kinds of choice-making processes and to ensure that such
ideas as state and sovereign can be adequately and accurately mapped. In
other words, the reference to state and other authority is meaningless with-
out some reference to the global constitutive process.
223
Third, there is the familiar reference in Chalks' definition to the inten-
tionality criterion: "intends to destroy a group. ' 224 This has been a most
troublesome component of the definition of genocide and the effort to pro-
scribe it. In the best of legal and scientific worlds, there will be controversy
about this because we can only indirectly infer intention. We cannot put a
mini-camera recorder into a person's brain to directly know whether what
is expressed or done is indeed a person's authentic intention. What is pos-
sible is that we can be clearer about psychological predispositions and envi-
ronmental conditions as explicit variables in understanding the occasion
within which decision-making functions are exercised to promote or exe-
cute policies of mass killing.
The concept of group definition is also problematic. 225 It is unclear to
us why only ascriptive identity must be the sole criterion of identifying a
victim group. Our own sense is that this de-emphasizes the central prob-
lem of killing and emphasizes the exacting criterion of proving ascriptive
identity. A far more realistic and flexible approach is required. After all, a
Jew or Tutsi does not carry that group label simply because a Nazi or a
Hutu extremist bestows it.
The better approach is to look at "identity" or group labels of identity
through a social process communication lens in which culturally relevant
signs and symbols of identity are part of a political cultural communication
process where those in positions of dominance solidify their patterns of
221. Two options are through World Community or Social Process or World Process of Effec-
tive Power. For an overview of the conception of a global community process, see McDougal,
Reisman, & Willard, supra note 13. See also Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 4, Vol. I, at 141
et seq.; Vol. II, Appendix 4, at 1439-88 (outline originally prepared by Mary Ellen Caldwell,
Harold Lasswell, and Myres McDougal for use in the Law, Science and Policy Seminar in the Fall
of 1962).
222. CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89, at 23.
223. This a process in continuous flux from conflicting demands and accommodations gener-
ated by the world social and power processes.
224. CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 89, at 23.
225. See id.
198 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
loyalty. It is also important to determine solidarity by symbols and opera-
tions that cement the idea of the "we" or the "us" and by a similar political
cultural process communicates symbols and signs identifying the "other,"
the "them." The inquiring lens of many different disciplinary insights is, of
course, required to make scientific sense of this socio-political outcome.
All this presupposes a better understanding of the social power process
context of genocide, as well as the context of authoritative and controlling
decisional interventions designed to minimize or prevent its occurrence.
C. Mapping the Social Context of Conflict
The map of the planetary social process has been most effectively de-
veloped in the literature of law, science, and policy.2 2 6 The participants of
that global community process include individuals as individuals and as
parts of group-formed aggregates who participate both as members and
elites in the multitude of group-value conditioned processes that constitute
the planetary social process. All values are demanded in the global plane-
tary process, expectations covering all value demands. The participants use
such strategies they deem expedient or licit in achieving their demands.
They operate in both temporal and spatial situations, and produce impor-
tant outcomes for world order.227
The two ubiquitous outcomes of the planetary social process are the
claims relating to conflict and collaboration.228 These claims may be more
generally located in the context of the global process of effective power.
Both groups and individuals are instruments of "power," defined in a
broad contextual perspective. But most often individuals are empowered
by their mobilization, control, and regulation of "group" processes. The
dominant characteristic of power in the world community is the mobiliza-
tion of groups in the last analysis, as groups are instruments of power. The
processes of effective power generate outcomes that reflect both groups as
instruments in conflict-oriented situations, as well as groups in modes of
collaborative behavior. Groups in conflict-conditioned situations may be
more predisposed to using violent strategies of social control or realize
claims for social hegemony.229 The composition of "groups" whether
within states or across state lines is an important indicator of who the oper-
ative participants are in group-conditioned power processes. Usually in
contexts where ethnicity, religion, language, status, and class position are
important indicators of important individual affiliations, the point of "ten-
sion," "conflict," "violence," and even "extermination" might incorporate
the legacy of culturally relevant signs and symbols transmitted between
226. See McDougal, Reisman, & Willard, The World Community: A Planetary Social Process,
supra note 12.
227. See generally MYRES McDOUGAL, ET AL., STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (New Ha-
ven Press 1960).
228. See id.
229. For an overview of the social psychological perspective of the in-group-out-group bias in
intergroup relations, see Walter G. Stephan, Intergroup Relations, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 599-658 (Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson, eds., Random House, 3d ed. 1985).
See also Marc Howard Ross, A Cross-Cultural Theory of Political Conflict and Violence, 427-63
Political Psychology, Vol. 7, No. 3, (1986), (discussing psychocultural and structural roots of inter-
nal and external conflict and violence).
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groups, within groups, and across group "lines, ' 3 ° where such group affili-
ation is culturally dominant and subservient. These signs and symbols con-
vey meaning in obvious or discrete terms like scapegoating. Out-groups
are often victims of communication patterns that diminish or devalue
them. 3'
The general orientation of groups in social process will sometimes in-
dicate pressures on patterns of identification. To the extent there are pres-
sures toward an assumed homogeneity, the process and dynamics of
identification may enhance the conflict-prone character of the social and
power process while the operative elites hold a degree of dissonance in
recognizing and welcoming "diversity".
232
There are circumstances where the dominant cultural pattern of self-
identification may so exaggerate the relations of dominance and subordina-
tion that a cultural change in the direction of equalitarian values becomes
psychologically distressing to members of the dominant group. This may
contribute to the psychological insecurity of this group. To the extent that
the dominant group's perception of the "other" is supported by a strong
ideological predicate justifying the power relations between groups, this
will serve to further entrench "difference" and thus provide another "con-
flict-prone" condition.2 33 Finally, the tendency of the culture to value au-
thority and be intolerant and disapproving of dissent mutes the corrective
230. These group lines can have spatial, psychological, and temporary attributes.
231. One class of explanations offered for the in-group-out-group bias that occurs focuses on
cognitive factors. Doise (L'ARTICULATION PSYCHOSOCIOLOGIQUE ET LES RELATIONS ENTRE
GROUPS (De Baeck 1976)) proposed that differentiation at the representational (cognitive), eval-
uative, or behavioral level leads to differentiation along the other dimensions. Thus, categoriza-
tion into competitive groups activates an anticipatory-justification process that results in
devaluing one's antagonists.
232. In contrast to the theories that emphasize cognitive explanations for in-group-out-group
bias, other theorists argue a social identification explanation. The motivational crux of this ap-
proach is the proposition that people with an insecure sense of social identity-virtually everyone,
according to Tajfel, (LA CATEGORISATION SOCIALE, cited in DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN SOCIAL
GROUPS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS (H. Tafjel, ed., Aca-
demic Press 1978)) will desire to make favorable social comparisons between the in-group and
the out-group. This process is instigated by categorization into groups, where the individual iden-
tifies with one of the groups. This categorization makes the individual's social identity salient and
leads to evaluations and behavior couched in terms of relations between groups rather than
individuals.
233. Fritz Heider, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS (Wiley 1958). Heider
suggested that there are five distinct bases for attributing moral responsibility: The five levels are
"association" in which people are responsible for any action that is connected with them; to
"commission" in which people are responsible for anything they cause; to "forseeability" in which
people are responsible for any result of their actions that they might have foreseen; to "intention-
ality" in which people are responsible only for the consequences of their actions that they in-
tended to produce; to "justification" in which people are not seen as responsible even for
consequences they intended to produce. "The relationship between goodness and happiness, be-
tween wickedness and punishment is so strong, that given one of these conditions, the other is
frequently assumed. Misfortune, sickness, accident are often taken as signs of badness and guilt."
Id. This argument has received empirical support from research examining people's need to be-
lieve in a just world. LERNER & SIMMONS, Observer's Reactions to the "Innocent Victim": Com-
passion or Rejection, 4 JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 203-210 (1966).
For a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of motivation on the attribution process, see
Michael Ross & Garth J. 0. Fletcher, Attribution and Social Perception, in LINDZEY & ARONSON,
supra note 215, Vol II, at 103-115.
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balance of the opposition to excesses of the dominant group and its
functionaries. 2 34
This Article essentially discusses the process of group deprivation.
The concept of deprivation, here, is generalized to include racial discrimi-
nation, anti-Semitism, prejudice, apartheid, cultural dominance, genocide,
and elements of mass murder. This process entails the following:
1. A formal systemic myth or a concealed, informal, but nonetheless,
real myth reinforcing the symbology of otherness of the target "out-
group."
2. A symbol-myth system of prejudice, fear, and hate is a crucial compo-
nent of the perspectives of the dominant group or its elite and opin-
ion leaders.
3. These subjectivities or perspectives are outcomes of complex behav-
ior patterns, which are characterized by negative sentiments and neg-
ative portrayals of the "other," such that the symbolic "other" is
reinforced as a target for negative inference and meaning.
4. There are emergent patterns that consolidate the collaborative be-
haviors of the "we" or the "in-group," vesting that group with a sense
of superiority, or "herrenvolkism," paternalism, and further, seeking
to enhance the value position of that group at the expense of the
"out-group."
5. There are further emergent, often graduated, behaviors in the domi-
nant group, which consolidate and sustain the image of the victim
group through patterns of conflict-conditioned behavior. These in-
clude the communication of discrete signs, symbols, operational
codes, myths, narratives, and reified stereotypes that touch such is-
sues as racialism, anti-Semitism, and more.
6. The process of group deprivations also involves the manipulation of
signs, symbols, codes, myths, narratives, and stories between mem-
bers of the "in-group" and also between members of the "in" and
"out-group."
7. The system of generalized group deprivations, thus, involves distinc-
tive, and often, discrete pattern of communication of relevant signs
and symbols of "in-group" loyalty and solidarity, as well as signs and
symbols that identify, disparage, or threaten members of the "out-
group." The patterns of communication are sustained or enhanced
by collaborative operations in the exercise of public or private power
that move beyond discrimination, anti-Semitism, prejudice, or hate to
the possibilities of wholesale extinction of cultures and masses of
human beings.
The framework that underlines the process and conditions of inter-
group conflict is generally consistent with the literature about conflict, mass
murder, and genocide. 35 However, the tendency is to emphasize the struc-
234. Early psychological research has shown that movies, television, and written communica-
tions designed to reduce prejudice indicates that these techniques can be successful (WILLIAMS,
THE REDUCTION OF INTERGROUP TENSIONS: A SURVEY OF RESEARCH ON PROBLEMS OF ETH-
NIC, RACIAL, AND RELIGIOUS GROUP RELATIONS (Social Science Research Council 1947).
Where a culture proscribes such communications, amelioration of "conflict-prone" conditions is
much less likely to occur spontaneously.
235. See generally JESSIE BERNARD, AMERICAN COMMUNITY BEHAVIOR (1949). Bernard may
have been the first social scientist to incorporate genocide into a coherent analysis by arguing that
competition, conflict, organization, disorganization, and control processes were prevalent in both
the international and local level, and by incorporating genocide as an ultimate weapon for con-
flict resolution. See also PIETER N. DROST, THE CRIME OF STATE: GENOCIDE (1959), (who
rejected the idea that genocide was limited to religious, racial, national, and ethnic groups and
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tural or systemic conditions of inter-group conflicts. Thus, in the societies
that are "conflict-prone" or "conflict-oriented," group alignments and
identities like class, caste, culture, race, ethnicity, religion, language, or any
other sign or symbol of identification of political, economic or cultural rele-
vance, are a condition of inter-group tension and potential "conflict."
Therefore, the critical condition of group identity genocide is distinguishing
the "us" from the "them. '2 36 These patterns of social division or stratifica-
tion are the preconditions of conflict. Since groups are instruments of so-
cial and political power, managing actual or potential conflict between
mega groups, such as alliances of states, big groups, such as states' actors,
and smaller groups, such as alliances and forms within states, represents an
ongoing concern for policy-makers concerned with the kinds of lethal con-
flicts that are destructive to the human prospect or that disparage the dig-
nity of our species. The contributions of historians and scientists well
appreciate the dangers of systemic conflict conditioned tendencies in social
processes. 237
An important variable to be added to this factor is the focus of inquiry
into the conditions of genocide. It may be presented in the form of a criti-
cal question: Why do "conflict-prone" or "conflict-oriented" social
processes become "conflict lethal" forms of social organization? Why, for
example, did the conflict in Slovenia dissolve in a relatively benign way and
remain an essentially "conflict-prone" social process, or why did the con-
flict in Czechoslovakia become a benign dissolution of association whereas
the conflicts in the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina became
"lethal" and genocidal? 238 This Article suggests there is another important
proposed that genocide be redefined as "deliberate destruction of physical life of individual
human beings by reason of their membership of any collectivity as such" (Id. at 25)); Vahakn N.
Dadrian, A Typology of Genocide, 5 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY, 201-12
(1975) (who proposed that "[G]enocide is the successful attempt by a dominant group vested with
formal authority and/or with preponderant access to the overall resources of power, to reduce by
coercion or lethal violence the number of a minority group whose ultimate extermination is held
desirable and useful and whose respective vulnerability is a major factor contributing to the deci-
sion for genocide"). See generally Helen Fein, Scenarios of Genocide: Models of Genocide and
Critical Responses, in TOWARD THE UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, at 3
(Israel W. Charny, ed., 1984) (who used a four-part typology to characterize genocide, including
one category called "ideological" genocide, which is genocide against groups portrayed as ene-
mies by the State's hegemonic myth or by the State's need to destroy victims seen as the embodi-
ment of evil); See also LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE: ITS POLITICAL USE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,
chs. 3, 5 (1981), CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 96 (especially, The Definition of Genocide (23-
27); Some Preconditions for Genocide (27-28); and A Typology of Genocide (29-32)).
236. See CHALK & JONAHSSON, supra note 96, at 18:
It is new states or new regimes attempting to impose conformity to a new ideology that
are particularly likely to practice genocide. When tensions between the traditional soci-
ety and the new regime escalate, it is the plural character of a society that is most likely
to provide the social cleavages that define the perpetrator and victim groups.
237. See generally MUZAFER SHERIF, ET AL. THE ROBBERS' CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP
CONFLICT AND COOPERATION (Wesleyan Univ. Press 1988).
238. In the context of Czechoslovakia, the critical opinion leaders and power brokers saw
little self-interest in provoking an ethnic conflict in order to retain the unity of the State. In
Czechoslovakia, the framework of differentiating between cultural and ethnically distinct Czechs
and Slovaks was present. The capacity for social conflict was also very imminent. However, the
critical players, including the intellectual leadership, refrained from the invocation of incitement
to violence based on group labels of identity. The exact opposite is the case with the break-up of
the former Yugoslavia. The entire countdown to the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia illus-
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element that must be added to this framework of inquiry in order to be
more effective in understanding, predicting, and preventing conflicts of a
"lethal" character like genocide. Being more "incident" sensitive is key.
The relevant context must be assayed in terms of the precipitating condi-
tions that may strengthen the systemic as well as psychological predisposi-
tions to lethal conflict. Second, the variable of decision-making must be
factored in.
The timing and form of an intervention in decision-making may also
be seen as a tactic and strategy in achieving certain political demands.239
Therefore, the critical decision-making participants who make the strategic
and tactical decisions to "intervene" in the political process, by using group
labels like "race," "ethnicity," and "religion" to acquire or enhance power,
must be identified. 40
What this addendum to the social process context of inter-group con-
flict represents is, effectually, the dynamics of polarization.24 ' It represents
the impact of demand as well as the interventions of choice-making. This
effectually provides a "dynamic" element of focus for inquiry into the
causes and consequences of inter-group conflict of a "lethal" character.242
It opens inquiry into the efficacy and justification of forms of intervention
to prevent or minimize polarization.
The invocation of the symbols of ethnic chauvinism, race hatred, lan-
guage-based hostility, and religious-based differences often works in the
sense of disparaging the dignity of the victim or target group of "others."
At the back of this "success" lies the important political condition of en-
demic or widespread insecurity.243 In effect, this is systemic of personal
trates that the critical players, including the intellectual elite, were willing to justify and use indis-
criminant violence targeting out-groups to secure division of a so-called "Greater Serbia."
239. For a detailed and radical explanation of the reasons why and the conditions under which
the nation-states resort to such violent strategies to do away with ethnocultural minorities, see
generally STATE VIOLENCE AND ETHNICITY (Pierre Van den Berghe, ed., 1990).
240. Albert Hirschman's theoretical model can be employed to explain how minorities may
respond to state policies aimed at them. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (Harvard Univ.
Press 1970).
241. According to Volkan, it is this psychological process that has resulted in the rise of the
tension in the relations between the Romanians and Hungarians in Romania after the overthrow
of the Ceausescu regime. The Romanians, instead of engaging themselves in the painful and
complicated work of mourning and adaptation toward the drastic changes after Ceausescu's
death, found it easier to target their "psychic energies" and all their negative feelings to the
"Hungarian threat." Volkan, Vamik, Totem and Taboo in Romania: A Psychopolitical Diagnosis,
in Mind and Human Interaction, Vol. 6 at 66-83 (1995).
242. Dimo Yagcioglu suggests an overview of Conflict Resolution, at http://www.geocities.
com/Athens/8945/.
243. The Jews of the Pale, from the time Russia conquered the eastern part of Poland up until
the 1870s, were regarded as a foreign, dirty and dangerous element that should be prevented
from spreading throughout the empire. The Jews could not travel beyond the formerly Polish
provinces; they were not allowed to engage in certain occupations, to lease land, to manage cer-
tain businesses, to employ Christian workers, to attend universities, to locally govern themselves
etc. They were forbidden even to wear their traditional clothing, and later when the government
started to instigate or organize pogroms, the Jews were forbidden to even defend themselves. See
RICHARD E. RUBENSTEIN, COMRADE VALENTINE 5-6 (1994). During the reign of Alexander II,
the government adopted a strategy to modernize Russia. That strategy, among other things, in-
cluded a partial emancipation of the Jewish community. Thus, the government's approach toward
this ethnic group changed significantly: now the Jews were encouraged, often forced to assimilate,
to "fuse" with the Russian population. Most of the restrictions mentioned above were lifted, and
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insecurity. However, the precise connection between personal insecurity
and the ability to follow orders requiring extermination, torture, genocide,
etc., leaves questions unresolved about why "normal" people can "follow"
orders,244 commit abnormal acts, and proceed to compartmentalize their
psychological lives 245 by continuing to be, either concurrently or sequen-
tially, "loving husbands" or "doting fathers." Some have even adopted and
loved the children of people they have murdered or tortured.246
It is obvious that the problem that has been set out is both politically
complex and conceptually difficult. No single discipline can come to grips
with this kind of complexity without some ability to bring the insights of
allied disciplines to the focus of inquiry.247 The lawyer aspect of policy-
some opportunities for the Jewish population to join the mainstream of the society were created.
See id. at 7-8. The assassination of Alexander II, however, led to a radical change of the status of
the Jews. First, they were held responsible of the murder, and the government encouraged a wave
of pogroms. Later, the extreme nationalist Alexander III, who succeeded Alexander II, gradually
curtailed their rights and began treating them as non-assimilable again: Jews started to be ex-
pelled from big cities, from schools and universities; they were barred from certain professions,
and many of them were forced to return to the Pale. See id. at 13-14. The status of the Jews would
change for yet another time with the Russian Revolutions (March-November 1917), after which
they would be regarded as assimilable again.
244. Stanley Milgram conducted a controversial series of experiments in order to examine the
extent to which normal people obey authority. The participants believed that they were partici-
pating in experiments concerned with learning. The procedure involved subjects administering a
series of electric shocks to other participants, these others actually being associates of Milgram.
The main dependent variable of interest was the extent to which participants obeyed the experi-
menter's instructions to deliver the electric shocks. Despite the apparent discomfort displayed by
those supposedly receiving shocks, participants followed instructions to a high degree. Around
this time (early 1960's) research was being conducted into the authoritarian traits of Germans in
an attempt to explain how the atrocities of World War II could have taken place. Milgram's study
demonstrated that these traits were not confined to Germans and were not confined to certain
types of situations (e.g., war). Stanley Milgram, The Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 JOURNAL
OF ABNORMAL AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 371 (1963).
245. Julian Rotter was one of the first psychologists to make the situation, expectations, and
value of rewards the cornerstones of a personality theory. Rotter argued that many individuals
describe the cause of their behaviors as being caused by external forces, that there is an "external
locus of control" over what they were doing. J. Rotter, Locus of Control Scale, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY, 42 (1971).
246. E.g., A "Brazilian victim was surprised to find that the men who tortured him wore their
hair long, went to the same night spots he had known, and even would occasionally come to his
cell to confide their troubles with women. He realized that they had been trained to hate him:
'You are the son of a whore!' a man would shout, while his face clenched with hatred. Then
someone would call, 'Dr. Paulo, telephone!' As he crossed the room and picked up the receiver,
his face would open up again, and he would be smiling and smoothing his hair and murmuring
endearments.' Here we can see how the face of the torturer changes when a loved one intrudes
into his world." RONALD D. CRELINSTEN & ALEX P. SCHMID, THE POLITICS OF PAIN: TORTUR-
ERS AND THEIR MASTERS, 66 (1993).
247. Briefly, Albert Bandura (1973) describes several ways that we, as aggressors, avoid blam-
ing ourselves:
A.) Emphasize the goodness of our cause. Our violence is often thought of as necessary
to stop an evil force.
B.) "I'm just following orders." This is said by soldiers. Hitler's SS Troops said it.
C.) "I just went along with the crowd ." Individual persons in a rioting crowd or a lynch
mob feel little responsibility.
D.) Degrading the victims. Jews were seen as inferior and despicable in Hitler's Ger-
many. The victim is portrayed as evil, stupid, animalistic, or greedy, and deserving to
die.
E.) Blaming the victim. This is a situation where the victim-the raped, robbed, insulted
person-is blamed for the incident, e.g. "she was asking for it dressed like that." Example:
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oriented thinking can contribute to this inquiry. It can help map more pre-
cisely the dynamics of the processes of political demand onto the processes
of effective, perhaps even authoritative, decision-making. The broad out-
lines of the map used below permit a specific focus on cases like Rwanda,
the former Yugoslavia, or even South Africa, by using the disciplined
guidelines of contextually-based inquiry policy scientists have come to
identity with through the phase analysis.
D. Social Stratification and Conflict as the Predicate of Group
Deprivations
The previous section of this Article sought to construct social process
in general, with an eye to two outcomes of human behavior: the tendency
of conflict and collaboration; and the division of society on the basis of
relatively discrete group identifications. The notion of the group is impor-
tant because, at whatever degree of institutionalization and specialization,
a group is ultimately an instrument of power. The map provided permits a
trace of the effective power community process, carefully identifying the
participants specialized in power relations and their perspectives of iden-
tity, demand and expectation, their bases of power, and the strategies they
deploy in the particular arenas of power. The outcomes and effects that
may be empirically discerned have also been indicated.248 The outcomes of
the community power process will indicate whether the prospect and actu-
ality of conflict, especially violent conflict, is "high" or "low," just as it
would indicate whether the prospect of collaboration is of the high or low
intensity variety. Additionally, such a map will indicate the nature of the
constitutive and public order of the community social process. This is im-
portant for the Rummel thesis since the constitutive and public order out-
comes may indicate a wider, continuous variety of politico-legal order than
those where power is "constitutionalized," both in form and in operation,
as compared to those that are largely informal and relatively disorga-
In My-Lai, Vietnam, American soldiers thought the villagers had cooperated with the
enemy; children in the village sometimes betrayed or were violent towards our soldiers;
"C" company had just lost 20% of its men in a minefield outside the village. All
Vietnamese were feared, hated, called "gooks," and were hard to tell from enemy
soldiers. One day, Americans herded 400 villagers-mostly women, children, and ba-
bies-into a ditch and shot them. It seemed to some of the soldiers as though the villag-
ers deserved to be shot. Similar events have happened many, many times throughout
human history.
F.) Becoming accustomed to violence. In families, a raised voice becomes a verbal at-
tack which escalates to a raised hand which leads to a shove, then a slap, and finally
increasingly severe beatings. Likewise, soldiers are gradually trained to kill: first they
see war movies and are told why they must fight, then there are many training exercises
where killing is simulated, and finally they hear horror stories about the enemy. The
more mutilated bodies one sees, the easier it is to kill. As one soldier said, "If you see
their villages bombed and shelled every night, pretty soon the people just don't seem
worth very much."
G.) Denying the harm done by our aggression. "They are probably covered by insur-
ance." "I just slapped her around a little."
A. BANDURA, AGGRESSION: A SOCIAL LEARNING ANALYSIS (Prentice-Hall, 1973).
248. See Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 4, at 141-et seq. on the global community pro-
cess. For further observation of sanctioning procedures involving community social process on a
global scale, See M. McDOUGAL & F. FELIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER:
THE LEGAL REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL COERCION 261-383 (Yale University Press).
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nized.2 49 Constitutionalism leads to outcomes where power is widely
shared and is the monopoly of the few. Constitutive processes, instead of
generating and sustaining a "living" rule-of-law based framework of gov-
erning transparency, responsibility, and accounting, become the exact op-
posite of the political elite positions in which an "above the law" group
holds a monopoly on power, truth, and accountability. In short, the out-
come is the constitutive process of a totalitarian character. Rummel's thesis
of course indicates that the combination of "totalitarian" and "conflict"
best accounts for murder by government in the twentieth century.250 This
Article does not attempt to undermine Rummel's thesis, but to strengthen
it by contextualizing its pivotal features and providing more specific con-
cern for denying its inevitability even in totalitarian order. With this back-
ground, the terms "ethnic" and "conflict" will be examined separately.
V. STRUCTURAL DETERMINISM IN SOCIAL CONFLICT AND THE
VARIABLES OF AGENCY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND CHOICE
It is in the nature of social interaction that interaction itself will be
characterized by patterns of collaboration and patterns of conflict. The no-
tion of group deprivations may be located in the context of patterns of
social interaction that are conflict-oriented. In short, a society that exhibits
evidence of racial prejudice, cultural dominance, or deprivations leading to
genocide or mass murder is clearly a society that is characterized by a rela-
tively high level of conflict. Since group deprivations are often part of a
conflict-conditioned social process, it is important that some attention be
given to the problems of inter-group conflict of which the struggle for racial
equality is one, and the characterization "ethnic conflict" is another.
There are possibly two areas where the term "conflict" in reference to
social organization becomes inflated, generating more ambiguity than illu-
mination. These are in areas of so-called "conflict resolution," which has
now become an academic industry, and with "ethnic conflict" which is rap-
idly becoming a subsidiary industry. In both instances the term conflict has
negative connotations. First, it is the case that human beings as a species
are more alike than different. This proposition connects the similarity of
our common humanity with the inherent prospects of both collaboration
and conflict, the omnipresent realities of human social and political organi-
zation. The second point concerns the ubiquity in social organization of
patterns of both collaboration and conflict.
Following this analysis, it is necessary to be cautious about distinguish-
ing human interaction as neither necessarily good nor bad. Some forms of
conflict, such as economic competition, may, in fact, be very good. Other
forms of conflict may simply be a necessary part of interpersonal growth
and maturity. Many "conflicts" are played out in harmless rituals, practices
249. That is also the conclusion of the UN Subcommission on the Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities, which proposed, in 1991, that minority rights could best be
safeguarded within a democratic framework based on the rule of law. Anita Inder Singh, Democ-
racy and Ethnic Diversity: A New International Priority?,. 52 THE WORLD TODAY 20-22 (1996).
250. RUMMEL, supra note 18, at 30-33.
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or social conventions, like exciting athletic events.25' However, other con-
flicts, such as the Holocaust, may prove to be unmitigated disasters for the
moral experience of humanity. Those who talk of the inevitability of ethnic
or group conflict cannot adequately account for those vast periods of
human collaboration across "group" territorial and cultural lines through-
out history. Those who appreciate the ubiquity of the collaborative compo-
nents of world order fail to explain adequately why at any given time, in
any given place, collaboration gives way not to "conflict," but to particular
"forms" of conflict. This produces severe deprivations of humanitarian and
human rights standards and genocide, and to use Rummel's term:
"democide." 252
Perhaps this is precisely the point where law may be of value to the
social scientist interested in these questions. The way law intervenes in
social process is not to proscribe all conflict, but only particular forms of
conflict or collaboration. Thus, categories of crime, both national and in-
ternational, are proscribed; certain forms of conflict are deemed illicit and
may be proscribed either through the invocation of private law remedies or
through the invocation of the public power of criminal justice. When con-
flict assumes a particular form, community intervention may kick in. Thus,
social dislike of group members across group lines may be accepted as tol-
erable, but targeting those "others" as candidates for discrimination,
apartheid or genocide creates a "form" of "conflict" that is controlled, reg-
ulated, and most probably proscribed by law. 3 We would therefore sug-
gest that the issue is not conflict as such, but rather the particular form the
conflict assumes. In international law terms, the forms of conflict that
come readily to mind are "aggression," "breach of the peace," "gross viola-
tions of human rights," etc. This kind of juridical-political emphasis per-
mits other questions to be asked about the who, what, where, when, why
and how of these terms. In short, the focus is on the central judicial idea of
responsibility. This assumption sheds light on the most critical element in
the social and political process we label "ethnic violence": responsibility for
decision-making. 4
251. The idea of "catharsis" is a popular notion in our society, but there is no consensus in
scientific research as to the ultimately beneficial, negative, or even neutral effects of such ritualis-
tic conflict. Aristotle originally used the term "Catharsis" in his Poetics to refer to the purging of
violent passions. Freud then co-opted the term to refer to the purging of hostile and aggressive
feelings after the affective expression of such feelings. Later theorists used the term to refer to
the reduction of aggressive behavior following the behavioral act of aggression. This type ritualis-
tic conflict may indeed reduce an individual's overall state of physical arousal for a number of
reasons, but the perception that this ritual conflict is acceptable, or even "good," may lead to an
overall desensitization to conflict in a more global sense.
252. See supra note 10.
253. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
supra note 112; the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 32; the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of
the Crime of Apartheid, supra note 122.
254. Discharging oneself from personal responsibility for negative behavior is a mechanism by
which individuals protect their conception of themselves. Abhorrent behavior, then, can be said
to be a result of the situation and not a matter of personal control. J. SABINI & MAURY SILVER,
Dispositional vs. Situational Interpretations of Milgram's Obedience Experiments: The Fundamen-
tal Attribution Error, 13 JOURNAL FOR THE THEORY OF SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR, 147-154 (1983).
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The greatest vice the composite label "ethnic conflict" generates is the
lazy assumption that there is a veil of ignorance about who orders and who
carries out the atrocities that accompany so-called "ethnic violence. 255
When law in the form of a realistic jurisprudence becomes an interdiscipli-
nary ally of an informed social science perspective, questions of decision-
making, responsibility, and accountability will additionally indicate an im-
portant level of clarity about the mystery of ethnic conflict or ethnic vio-
lence. This requires inquiry into the chain of decision-making
responsibility for ethnic violence.
A. Context, Incidents and Human Agency
These general systemic variables must not imply a static social process.
Contextually relevant "incidents" and a contextually located decision pro-
cess permit the evolution or even precipitous development of a stronger.
potential for violence that disparages human rights. South Africa is an ex-
cellent example of this process. The dispensation in the South African
Constitution prior to 1960 was the subject of significant changes promoting
higher levels of political instability. 6 This culminated in a "new" whites
only constitution in 1961.257 This event triggered incidents of sustained
protests from the black majority and their allies that culminated in a key
contextual incident: the massacre at Sharpeville 8
The dominant Afrikaner elite moved in dramatic terms after
Sharpeville to suppress civil and political rights by creating the architecture
of a modern police state.2 5 9 Such legislation as the 90-day detention law,
the 180-day detention law, and the Terrorism Act, which provided for in-
definite detention, strengthened security forces and the devalued the rem-
255. The case of Lieutenant William Calley stemming from the massacre of civilians in My Lai
in March 16, 1968 during the Vietnamese war illustrates this point. The general public rarely
hears the whole story as to who ordered the assault, and when they do, that person becomes the
scapegoat - Calley is remembered as the one who ordered the unprovoked killing of villagers. He
may have never picked up a gun, but because he was perceived as the one who was in authority,
he is responsible for the actions of his obedient soldiers. When people know this information,
they adjust their attribution and focus their blame on the authority figure. The Calley case may
be an exception in that this type of information, of who specifically did what, is not often
available.
256. See VAN WYK, ET.AL., supra note 23, at 132-36. See also TOM LODGE, BLACK POLITICS
IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1945 (Longman 1983); MOKGETHI MOTLHABI, THE THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE OF BLACK RESISTANCE TO APARTHEID: A SOCIAL-ETHICAL ANALYSIS (Skotaville Publish-
ers 1984); PAUL MAYLAM, A HISTORY OF THE AFRICAN PEOPLE OF SOUTH AFRICA: FROM THE
EARLY IRON AGE TO THE 1970s (St. Martin's Press 1986); MARGARET BALLINGER, FROM UNION
TO APARTHEID: A TREK IN ISOLATION ( Praeger 1969) for studies in protest politics in South
Africa.
257. REP. S. AFR. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1961).
258. The Sharpeville Massacre occurred March 21, 1960, and was "an important step on the
road to death squads." JACQUES PAUW, IN THE HEART OF THE WHORE: THE STORY OF
APARTHEID'S DEATH SQUADS 99; (1992). The police had opened fire on a crowd of 5,000 people
who were peacefully protesting against the Pass Laws (i.e., the Abolition of Passes and Coordina-
tion of Documents Act (1952)). See id. The incident resulted in the fatal shooting of 69 people
and the wounding of 180 people. See id. Nearly all the victims were shot in the back. See id.
(citing BRIAN LAPPING, APARTHEID: A HISTORY (Paladin Grafton Books 1987)).
259. In the aftermath of the Sharpeville incident, South Africa's Prime Minister, Hendrik
Verwoerd, "reacted with repression" See id. Verwoerd introduced more repressive laws and also
appointed a new Minister of Justice, John Vorster, who strengthened security laws and "gave the
police increased freedom to ignore civil liberties." Id.
208 NATIONAL BLACK LAW JOURNAL
nants of a modest civil society.26 ° The political value of scapegoating
opponents,261 together with the skilled exploitation of white insecurity as
expressed in "Die Swart Gevaar"or the "Black Danger," led to the formu-
lation of a near pristine construction of a national security state with a top-
to-bottom "security management system., 262 The operations of this system
included assassination, torture, mass murder, and orchestration of "black-
on-black" violence as essential elements of social control.263
A great deal is known about the inner workings of these mysterious
processes of violence run amuck because of luck. Almond Nofomela, a
security police operative and member of an assassination squad, murdered
a white farmer and was sentenced to death.264 The security forces prom-
ised him a reprieve that would come at the last minute. 265 Nofomela felt he
might be left to fate, so he told an attorney with the non-governmental
organization Lawyers for Human Rights what he knew about the death
squads in which he had participated.266 The clues from Nofomela's revela-
tions led the ANC to help Captain Dirk Coetzee, another security opera-
tive, leave South Africa. Captain Coetzee later gave a most chilling view
about being "inside the belly of the beast. '267 Not all questions and con-
cerns were resolved, but enough credible evidence was published showing a
chain of decision-making and responsibility for grave human rights viola-
tions through diverse forms of violence, including mass murder.268
The genocide in the former Yugoslavia is another contemporary exam-
ple of mass killing. As earlier suggested, it has been widely accepted that
war is rooted in a form of group hatred and buried in historical memory.269
As a distinguished international lawyer said, "These people have been kill-
ing themselves for centuries." When history is used in such a way to ex-
plain the production and reproduction of conflict, it must selectively
remember the negative symbols of group-based hatreds and develop a
powerful collective amnesia about positive, cooperative behaviors of inter-
group relations. History, in this sense, can serve a political objective: the
260. Section 17 of the General Law Amendment Act 37 of 1963 (90 days detention without
trial); Section 215bis of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955 as inserted by s 7 of the Criminal
Procedure Amendment Act 96 of 1965 (180 days detention); and Section 6 of Act 83 of 1967 (the
Terrorism Act: indefinite detention without trial, in solitary confinement, for the purpose of inter-
rogation; habeas corpus is discarded; the detainee is refused the right to see his or her attorney,
medical advisor, or anyone other than an official of the State).
261. Here the Communist label worked as effectively as the label "native" or "kaffer" or
"coolie".
262. See generally PAUW, supra note 242.
263. See id.
264. See id. at 22.
265. See id.
266. See id.
267. See PAUW, supra note 258, at 22-29.
268. See id. at 29-30. The murders of various individuals by the apartheid death squads was
described by Dirk Coetzee in personal interviews (November 1989), and also later related before
the Harms Commission of Inquiry into Certain Alleged Murders, Pretoria (1990), and in the case
Neethling v. Du Preez and Others, Rand Supreme court, Johannesburg (1990).
269. The relatively small geographic area of Serbia/Yugoslavia has had, in this century alone,
more than its share of political and human rights infamy. From the seeds of the first World War,
to the fundamental structural and political problems under Tito, to the heavy-handedness of
Slobodan. Milosevic after Tito's death, this area has been an overripe source of problems for
human rights scholars and world leaders alike to analyze and react to.
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promotion of harmony or conflict. The real issue is one of acquiring a
sharper appreciation of the way in which historical memory penetrates the
channels of effective political communication. In Lasswellian terms, the
issues are who is invoking what symbols, communicates what message,
through what channel, to what target audience, with what result, and with
what effect. 270 The conflict in the former Yugoslavia is certainly a conflict
that is more complex than the "ethnic conflict" label it has been given.271
At the same time, this Article argues the conflict in the former Yugoslavia
is a political conflict more amenable to being meaningfully unpacked than
is commonly assumed.
The emphasis on the form of conflict is invoked to only stress issues of
responsibility and accountability in an effort to make more transparent the
nature of ethnic conflicts. This, in turn, means examining the chain of deci-
sion-making responsibilities for ethnic violence and uncovering the who,
what, where, when and why of the conflict under scrutiny.
In another study, the systemic background of the conflict in former
Yugoslavia was traced to the disclosure of the infamous Serbian Memoran-
dum (SANU Memorandum) in 1986.272 The Memorandum was an odd
continuation of strident Serbian nationalism and Marxist-Leninist progres-
sivism.2 7 3 It sent shockwaves through the Communist establishment of the
former SFRY. 274 The revelations of this product of the Serbian Academy
postulated, in effect, the demolition of the 1974 Constitutional dispensa-
tion.275 Envisioned in the SANU Memorandum was a more "centralized"
SFRY under Serbian/Leninist hegemony or a "greater Serbia" occupying
as much of the SFRY as possible.276 The SANU Memorandum essentially
formed Milosevic's platform, and was an important strut in his purging of
the Serbian Community Party as part of his rise to power.277 Other "inci-
dents," like the mass demonstrations in Belgrade in 1991,278 the Kosovo
speech,27 9 and scapegoating Muslims in that autonomous province,80 con-
270. H. D. LASSWELL, N. LEITES, ET AL, LANGUAGE OF POLITICS: STUDIES IN QUANTITATIVE
SEMANTICS (M.I.T. Press, 1965).
271. See, e.g., DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN CONFLICT 99 (University of California
Press 1985). See also CHERIF BASSIOUNI &MANIKAS, supra note 27 at 1-63, 441-79, discussing the
complexities of the conflict, especially at Ch. I (Background of the Conflict in the Former Yugo-
slavia), and Ch. VII (Characterization of the Conflict).
272. See generally Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences: Memorandum 1986 (hereinafter
"SANU Memorandum"), in GREATER SERBIA: FROM IDEOLOGY TO AGGRESSION (Croation In-
formation Centre, 1992).
273. See id.; See also Aleksandar Pavkovic, The Serb National Idea 1986-92, in SLAVONIC AND
EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW, Vol. 72, No. 3, 446 (July 1994).
274. Pavkovic, supra note 257 at 445.
275. See SANU Memorandum, supra note 256; BASSIOUNI & MANIKAS, supra note 27, at 20.
276. See SANU Memorandum, supra note 256; PAVKOVIC, supra note 257, at 446.
277. MISHA GLENNY, THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA: THE THIRD BALKAN WAR 33(Penguin
Books, rev. ed. 1994) (The SANU Memorandum "prepared the ideological ground for Milosevic
by focusing public opinion yet more tightly on the Kosovo issue"); PAVKOVIC, supra note 257, at
446-47.
278. For a description of the 1993 mass demonstrations in Belgrade, see The Police on Bel-
grade Streets: The June 1, 1993 Demonstrations, SPOTLIGHT REPORT No. 5, JULY 1993, in SPOT-
LIGHT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TIMES OF ARMED CONFLICT 31-41(The Humanitarian
Law Center 1995). See also GLENNY, supra note 261, at 50-55.
279. See id. at 34-35. The "Kosovo Speech" refers to a speech given by Serbian President,
Slobodan Milosevic, on June 28, 1989 in the Serbian settlement of Kosovo Polje (i.e., The Field of
Blackbirds). The speech, a display of Serbian nationalism, was given in an area populated largely
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tributed to the countdown to war. However, the SANU Memorandum in-
cident is critical. To put this insight into more practical terms for the
ascription of responsibility and accountability, the following questions need
to be addressed: Who ordered the use of force against certain of the Re-
publics of the former Yugoslavia? Who ordered and implemented the ter-
ror tactics against both armed opposition and civilians? Who ordered the
"ethnic cleansing" (i.e., genocide) and the rape, murder, massacre, en-
forced pregnancy, torture, and castration to implement it? Who ordered
attacks on civilians? Who planned and implemented the policies of inten-
tional displacement of people? Who planned and implemented the policy
to destroy the cultural heritage of certain of the Republics?
The problems of genocidal behaviors in both Burundi and Rwanda
have been benchmarks in the failure of decolonization and independence
processes.28 1 Nothing in the prior history of Rwanda compares to the
events triggered by the shooting down of President Juv6nal Habyarimana's
by Albanians and was seen as a warning to Slovenes, Croats, Moslems, Albanians, and
Macedonians.
The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that at one time, [we] were brave and
dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated. Six centuries later [after
the Battle of Kosovo Polje], again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed
battles, though such things should not be excluded yet.
Excerpt from Slobodan Milosevic's "Kosovo Speech," in OTN explores Kosovo: Milosovic sweeps
to power, at <http://www.megastories.com/kosovo/power.htm>. The result of the Kosovo speech
was increased Serbian nationalism, and a revival of the nationalisms of the smaller Yugoslavian
republics.
280. See Kosovo Albanians I: Repression and Discrimination, SPOTLIGHT REPORT No. 6, Au-
GUST 1993, in SPOTLIGHT ON HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN TIMES OF CONFLICT, supra note
262, at 42-55; Kosovo Albanians H, SPOTLIGHT REPORT No. 16, FEBRUARY 1995, in SPOTLIGHT
ON: HUMAN RIGHTS IN SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO 15-71(The Humanitarian Law Center, 1996).
281. From: Facts on Rwanda Alliance for a Global Community, a project of InterAction, 1717
Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036; e-mail: alliance@interaction.org - 1994). The
original inhabitants of Rwanda were the Twa, a Pygmoid people engaged in hunting and pottery
making. Exactly when the Hutu arrived in Rwanda is not known, but they were established when
the Tutsi appeared beginning in the 14th century. The pastoral Tutsi established dominance over
the Hutu agriculturist by their superior military skills and by a series of land and cattle contracts.
By the beginning of the 20th century Rwanda was a unified state with a centralized military
structure.
The Germans claimed Rwanda as a part of German East Africa from 1890 but their presence
was minimal. In 1916, during World War I, the Belgians occupied Rwanda without opposition.
In 1923 the League of Nations created Ruanda-Urundi as a Belgian mandate. The Belgians ruled
through the Tutsi kings and retained the traditional feudal structure, thus allowing the Tutsi to
hold on to their dominant position in the society. The Belgians sought to establish a more demo-
cratic society, and this led to the rise of the Hutu lower classes. In 1959, civil war erupted between
the Tutsi and the Hutu causing a mass exodus of Tutsis to neighboring Burundi and Uganda. In
1961 Rwanda was declared a republic and became independent from Belgium under the leader-
ship of new Hutu leaders.
Large numbers of Tutsi were forced to leave the country after independence. A raid launched
from Burundi by Tutsi exiles in 1963 brought severe reprisals against Tutsi within Rwanda. A
military coup took place in 1973 leading to the establishment of a government lead by Juvdnal
Habyarimana, a member of the Hutu tribe, who was to serve as the nation's leader until 1993. A
new constitution (1978) paved the way for normalization of government. Elections held in 1981
brought Rwanda its first elected legislature since the military coup of 1973 with Habyarimana
being elected president. The Revolutionary Movement for National Development was the sole
political party until 1991. Tutsi exiles based in Uganda mounted an unsuccessful invasion of
Rwanda in 1990 and another invasion in 1993.
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plane as it approached the Kigali airport on April 6, 1994.282 Reports from
Amnesty International, African Rights, Africa Watch, and other docu-
ments detail the use of the "incident" as the beginning of a planned genoci-
dal campaign to exterminate the Tutsis and all other opposition groups,
including loosely-styled moderate Hutsi.283 In other words, for the purpose
of mass killing an "other," a "Tutsi," was anyone identified as an opponent
or potential opponent. The organization of security forces, paramilitary
youth gangs, the armed forces, and the media were all part of an organized
plan of genocide. "It was a political strategy adopted by a clique of power-
ful people at the centre of the government of Rwanda. Their plan was to
hold on to the power at all cost."'284 The preparatory work of genocide was
centered on "Hutu ideology" and the infamous document entitled the
"Hutu Ten Commandments." '285 This document contains ten principles of
inter-ethnic "hate. ' 286 For example, a traitor is "any Muhutu. . . who mar-
ries a Tutsi woman[,] befriends a Tutsi woman[, or] employs a Tutsi woman
as a secretary or concubine. 287 A Hutu's "only aim is the supremacy of his
ethnic group. ' 288 It is also indicated that "the Rwandanese Armed Forces
should be exclusively Hutu. '289 Estimates range from a half-million to a
million persons murdered in this orgy of killing.29° When the Pope recently
282. See Final Report of the Commission of Experts pursuant to Security Council Resolution
935 (1994), S/1994/1405, Dec. 9, 1994, at 13-14. See also Facts on Rwanda Alliance for a Global
Community, a project of InterAction, 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, D.C. 20036; e-
mail: alliance@interaction.org - 1994). In August 1993, the Arusha Accords were agreed upon by
the Rwandan government and the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front. This agreement ended the
1993 invasion, provided for multi-party elections, the withdrawal of French troops, and allowed
the Tutsis to station a garrison in Kigali. The accords were gradually being implemented when,
on April 6, 1994, Habyarimana and the president of neighboring Burundi were killed in an unex-
plained plane crash. Habyarimana's death touched off a wave of violence. Government-trained
Hutu militias began mass attacks on Tutsis and on moderate Hutus. Then the Rwandan Patriotic
Front began a new offensive. After two months of fighting, the RPF captured Kigali and on July
19 swore in a provisional government. Simultaneously, the remnants of the old Hutu-led govern-
ment and its army were driven out of the country, taking refuge in Zaire and Tanzania.
283. See Carla J. Ferstman, Domestic Trials for Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity: The
Example of Rwanda, 9 AFRICAN J. INT'L. AND COMP. LAW (RADIC) 857,858-59 (1997); Rwanda,
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT, at 249-52 (1995) See also generally Rwanda: Death, Despair,
and Defiance, AFRICAN RIGHTS (September 1994).
284. See Rwanda: Death, Despair, and Defiance, AFRICAN RIGHTS (September 1994).
285. In late 1992, Hassan Ngeze, a Hutu journalist, published the manifesto, "The Hutu Ten
Commandments" in the monthly journal, Kangura. Commandment number two says: "Every
Muhutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as
woman,wife and mother of the family." Another gives favours to Batutsi in business (obtaining
import licenses, bank loans, construction sites, public markets); number eight commands the
Hutu to "stop having mercy on the Tutsi." See Hutu Ten Commandments, in KANGURA, No. 6
(December 10, 1990).
286. See id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Around May 1994, at least 200,000 people, and possibly as many as 500,000 people, were
estimated to have been killed in the Rwandan genocide crisis. By the end of June 1994, estimates
were as high as one million people killed. See THE UNITED STATES AND RWANDA 1993-1996,
supra note 18, at 61 (citing Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
on his mission to Rwanda of 11-12 May 1994, E/CN.4/S-3/3, 19 May 1994).
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mentioned the ancient roots of ethnic killings in Rwanda, that government
correctly responded that the genocide was a planned political conspiracy. 291
The theory of group deprivations is complex, but not incomprehensi-
ble. This Article has suggested that it is critical that the issue of group
deprivations be socially constructed using a disciplined and systematic
method for contextualizing the phenomenon. This Article also has sug-
gested that group deprivations or specific kinds of group deprivations such
as racism, apartheid, or genocide must account for the element of human
agency. In this regard, contextualizing the concept of agency in a disci-
plined and systematic way is required. The relevance of the agency con-
struct is underscored by the continued normative and empirical relevance
of the Nuremberg process where the Tribunal insisted the abstraction of
the state be made sufficiently transparent in order to expose and hold re-
sponsible the human agents who conspired and implemented the policies
and practices that led to the Holocaust. The focus on human agency cen-
ters upon the human intervention decision. This Article suggests a careful
study of agency and its decision-making must, in turn, be contextually un-
derstood both from the perspectives of the potential victimizer, victim, and
third party intervener. The "incident," as it relates to violence or coercion,
ties in with the agency, which triggers the action. These elements are of
course clearly discernible in the approach taken in Nuremberg. Actions
are not committed by abstractions; finite agents of decision commit them.
The question is whether a methodology can be developed to systematically
delineate the interrelationships between agency, action, and social conse-
quence. Here, the contribution of Professor McDougal is a useful adden-
dum to this perspective.
This Article has been examining inter- or intra-group coercion and vi-
olence. To give some clarity to the use of the "incidents" aspect of this
analysis, it may be useful to direct inquiry into the processes of coercion
and decision, thus emphasizing interrelated factors that unpack the
processes of coercion and violence. For example, stated in chronological
order, this Article inquires about the following:29 2 (i) who creates the vio-
lence-provoking incident(s); (ii) what events constitute the invocation of
coercion or scapegoating; (iii) what type and intensity of coercion, such as
violence, industrial killing, pogroms, and death camps, is to be imple-
mented with what result; (iv) what expectations, such as the lack of capac-
ity of self-defense for survival, are created in both the victim and victimizer
group; (v) whether rejection of normative restraints, such as the rejection
of "proportionality" and the demand for absolute extinction of the enemy,
exist; (vi) whether the desire for establishing responsibility is marked by
291. See Rwandan Government Says Pope Misunderstood Rwandan Genocide, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE (International News Section) (September 23, 1995), which stated:
The Rwandan foreign ministry . . . criticised Pope John Paul II's remarks on ethnic
conflict in Rwanda and Burundi .... The pope... blamed ethnic conflict for loss of lives
... The foreign ministry said last year's genocide was "not a result of any ethnic conflict
among the Rwandese people, but it was rather a culmination of an organized political
campaign by the former government leaders aimed at eliminating a portion of the
Rwandese people."
See also Rwanda Criticizes Pope's Comments on Last Year's Genocide, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS
(International News Section) (September 23, 1995).
292. See McDOUGAL AND FELICIANO, supra note 233, at 60-67.
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efforts to deny the incident happened, for example the limited willingness
to accept community intervention on part of the victimizer; and (vii) what
is the best method of juridical, administrative, diplomatic, economic, or
military intervention.
This focus on the realism of perspective requires a clearer understand-
ing of the occasion of group deprivations. The occasion of genocide, for
example, is a crucial predictive element in any sanctioning regime aimed at
preventing or eradicating genocide. Here, the occasions of genocide, and
more generally all group deprivations, may be more easily comprehended
if their temporal characteristics are more adequately understood. This Ar-
ticle suggests the Schmid, Jongman, and Gupta model of the "Five Stages
of Conflict" as an especially useful conceptual guide to predicting the occa-
sion of group deprivations.293
Essentially, the five stages of conflict and their signals are as follows:
294
1. The Peaceful Situation. This situation implies a stable pattern of so-
cial organization and a regime whose authority is rooted in its own
people. The general characteristic of such a regime is a high degree
of political security, and the protection of out-groups is secured by
the legal system. The specific signals that typify such a regime are
usually the existence of a working democracy, peaceful regime transi-
tions, an independent judiciary and a strong legal profession. Free-
dom of the press is secure. Political dissidence and irredentists have
no mass following. Changes in either the political situation or the
economic situation do not signal any aspect of abrupt deterioration.
2. Increased Political Tension. In the situation of increased political ten-
sion, intensified levels of "systemic frustration" begin to appear, gen-
erating accented social cleavages, often of a sectarian character. The
specific signals of this kind of situation include both new and old po-
litical parties exploiting issues of political polarization or sectarian-
ism. Elections are usually heavily challenged. The courts are
considered politically compromised. Press freedoms are under pres-
sure. Protests in non-violent ways and even violence "against prop-
erty and national symbols" become apparent. Political protests, often
by students, labor interests groups, and sectarian groups become
more frequent. Increased levels of unemployment and economic
stagnation are further signals of increased political tension.
3. The Serious Dispute Stage. The general characteristic involves a
weakening of political authority of the national government and a
greater acceptance "of sectarian politics." The specific signals include
293. See Schmid, Jongman, Gupta, The Risk of Political and Humanitarian Crisis, PIOOM
Newsletter (1994). Professor Schmid and his colleagues have developed an important heuristic
framework for understanding the structure of conflict and the overt signals that characterize each
stage of conflict. Although the model is a general model designed to illuminate the graduated
intensities of dangerous conflict-prone situations, the model is especially useful for those who
wish to take the prevention of domicide and genocide seriously.
This model, of course, is the preventive mechanism of early warning intelligence. A good deal
more is implicated in rational sanctioning interventions, apart from early warning preventive
strategies. This includes some notion of retribution which could be punishment specific, judicial
or other legal procedures to establish accounting and responsibility, or retributive transparency,
which is primarily the work of "truth and reconciliation" commissions. Here confessions lead at
times to the award of amnesty, which is accompanied by the sanction of social stigmatization, and
public shame. Rehabilitation of both victims and sometimes victimizers and socio-political "re-
construction" reflect vast and complex "new" orderings that lead to ideas of good governance,
democratization, and operational human rights legal and political culture.
294. See id.
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the increased tendency of inflammatory communication by elites and
counter-elites. Elections are often characterized by fraud and vio-
lence. The courts and the legal profession become politicized by the
State. Press freedoms are challenged by radicals and by governmen-
tal pressure. Sporadic incidents of violence often target individual
politicians, ideologues, or members of disfavored ethnic groups. Ter-
rorism and vigilantism appear on the political scene. Usually, the
economy is under pressure from unemployment and inflation.
4. Lower Intensity Conflict. The general characteristics of a lower inten-
sity situation are that hostilities are now overt. There is armed con-
flict between variously situated groups. Patterns of insurgency,
reaction, and repression become evident. The specific signals of this
outcome reflect a concentration of power among contending forces.
Rule by civil authority is threatened by the ascendance of the military
and politics. The rule of law is undermined, as is the freedom of the
press, often through the use of emergency powers. Full states of
emergency herald the ascendance of security forces and often the sys-
tematic abuse of human rights. In economic terms, a situation of
lower intensity conflict is an unattractive investment for the prudent
investor. Capital leaves, and disinvestment often happens.
5. The High Intensity Conflict. The general characteristic of high inten-
sity conflict is open war between the contenders for power. The spe-
cific signals are the breakdown of government and the demise of civil
society. Multiple contenders lay claim to sovereignty. The rule of
law is a critical casualty. The press and the media become instru-
ments of propaganda. The high intensity conflict situation also wit-
nesses the ascendance of military rule or the permanent state of
emergency. In effect, the political culture becomes a garrison State.
The political economy of a garrison State is dominated by being un-
productive, and the black market flourishes.
This summary of the findings of Schmid, Jongman, and Gupta is ex-
tremely useful because it stresses within the context of a phase analysis the
salience of accounting for the temporal factor in the context of social con-
flict where intervention is contemplated. The temporal factor, in fact, gives
early warning indicators about the scope, nature, and intensity of inter-
group conflict such that concerns for genocide and mass murder might be
timelier assayed to determine the circumstances and the strategies of inter-
vention. Moreover, early stages of the warning signals may be extremely
valuable in helping parties avert catastrophe when these warning signals
are understood in terms of their potential for Holocaust-type outcomes.
The way to approach these issues, is to develop more systematically a con-
textual background to the processes of effective power, and to locate more
easily in space and time the critical points of decision that shaped the form,
whether it be genocide, democide, or other forms of mass murder, a partic-
ular conflict has taken.
This Article sought to show a deeper understanding of the process of
inter-group conflict from a perspective of policy-sensitive methods and
techniques. The stress on the issue of mapping and the insistence on the
value of the phase analysis permit an understanding of the problems in
planetary, situation, or region specific, contexts. In short, this Article dem-
onstrates a disciplined procedure of relating the whole to the part and vice
versa. This aspect of the incidents and decision-focused methodology may
in turn be mapped onto the effort to provide deterrence or preventative
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strategies of intervention by a closer examination of the "stages of conflict
and their signals." This generalized map of group, ethnic, and racial con-
flict now leads to a closer examination of the principles of intervention to
prevent genocide and mass murder.
B. The Processes of International Decision Relating to Sanctioning
Policies for Interventions to Group Deprivations
The social process generates power outcomes or results. These out-
comes reflect stages of conflict of graduated intensity. Some of these con-
flicts, often of high intensity, are fashionably labeled ethnic conflicts, but
more broadly, they represent patterns of conflict that are the outcome of
social stratification or segmentation that reinforces "otherness." These
conflicts secure culturally understood markers of otherness and ascribe an
identity distinguishing the "we" from the "them." Constituted authority
may either fail or conspire not only reinforcing the processes of identifica-
tion and otherness, but further intensifying expectations of insecurity, con-
flict, and violence. On the other hand, constituted authority at the
international level seeks to secure precisely for itself a capacity to intervene
and sanction circumstances of "internal" or "external" conflict as an obliga-
tion ergo omnes. The decision/policy processes need to be assayed here
with a greater level of precision and comprehensiveness.
The rational context of a preventive obligation intervention strategy is
to determine, as clearly as possible, who the victims or potential victims
may be, who the potential or actual perpetrators may be, and who the criti-
cal agencies of decision may be for effectively deploying "interventions."
In short, this Article needs to isolate the key institutions of international,
continental, and national decision-making. Thus, an inventory is needed in
every case or situation where inter-group conflict might lead to genocide
and mass murder, and of all decision structures specialized to processes of
"negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settle-
ment, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means
.... "295 In effect, the inventory of possible agencies of intervention must
range from the most formal global and international to the most informal
and local institutions that can be employed to intervene in the genocide/
mass murder process. For example, in the United States, the role of NGOs
specializing in monitoring and, on occasion, in litigating against "hate"
groups is a vital early indicator of incipient and potentially real indications
of a genocidal animus. At the other end of the spectrum, the NATO-
backed interventions in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia were an im-
portant factor in both terminating hostilities and painfully moving the par-
ties to the Dayton Accord process. The generation of ad hoc institutions of
adjudication and the interventions of peacekeeping or/and peace-enforcing
units, although not invariably successful, have established a practice that
gives some substance to the idea of a preventive obligation or expectation
in the international community. Perhaps the movement toward a perma-
295. This is drawn from Article 33 of the U.N. Charter. These are processes indicated in
Chapter VI and indicative of a Security Council role in calling on parties to avail themselves of
such means of dispute resolution. United Nations, art. 34 (2).
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nent international criminal court will give even more coherence to the de-
terrence component of the sanctioning process.
1. The Perspectives of Intervention: Matters of Identity
Those who intervene must themselves have embraced a pattern of
identity that does not disidentify with the victim. In short, to avoid the
specter of interveners taking advantage of the victims, their training and
outlook must embrace a more inclusive sense of human dignity. Should the
intervener fall short on this matter, the effectiveness and/or appropriate-
ness, as well as the legitimacy of intervention, will be called into question.
Doubtlessly, allegations made about the UN taking advantage of captured
Bosnian Muslim women will be recalled. Canadian troops, it has been
claimed, were compromised in Somalia. U.N. peacekeeping mandates, it
was suggested, created irreconcilable conflicts between the passivity of
peacekeeping and the obligation to prevent genocide or mass murder. Fi-
nally, the creation of the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia generated a
concern that perhaps race was a defining element in the tardy commitment
to the Rwandan tribunal.
2. The Objectives of Intervention
The objectives of the interveners will vary, but will be focused on ap-
propriate sanctioning goals to restore and secure "minimum order," and in
more appropriate contexts, to employ sanctioning policies that gravitate
toward a more optimal, transparent rule of law-governed culture that im-
proves upon its human rights performance. The appropriate sanctioning
objectives will depend on the nature of the context within which interven-
tions will occur as well as the nature and quality of the interventions
required.
A rational, sanctioning policy for interventions will have seven interre-
lated phases or sequences. These are listed as follows:
1. Prevention. Here the purpose of intervention is to preempt the occa-
sion of either genocide or mass murder by a strategy of "prevention."
This may take a variety of decision-making forms from coercive to
persuasive interventions such as economic sanctions, military inter-
vention, good offices, conciliation, negotiation, and a horde of other
diplomatic strategies.
2. Suspension. This assures that when acts of genocide and mass murder
are happening, an urgent task of intervention will be secured for its
suspension. Thus, the interim order of the ICJ in the Bosnia Geno-
cide case is a representative illustration of a call to suspension. Eco-
nomic coercion or even unitary intervention may transcend
peacekeeping as a strategy of suspending genocide.
3. Deterrence. This is the primary objective of genocide sanctioning pol-
icy. It assumes that the investigation, detection, apprehension, con-
viction, and punishment of the genocide offender will serve as a
deterrent, social surgery in the case of the actual offender, to the
other would-be genocide perpetrators.
4. Restoration. Since genocide and mass murder assume intense levels
of conflict, they also assume violations of basic public order expecta-
tions. The rational sanctioning objective of restoration is to stabilize
the situation and to restore some level of public order.
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5. Correction. The sanctioning policy of correcting the conduct or be-
haviors that condition genocide and mass murder require a measure
of "peace," a semblance of "contained tension," and a generation of
public and private motives. These motives should be designed to hu-
manize and empathetically identify with the presumed otherness of
both victim targets and perpetrator actors, more than to breach the
so-called impermeability of some levels of group identity like race,
ethnicity, language, religion, political ideological affinity, and more.
In effect, correcting is the stratagem of moving a social order from
conflict, to contained tension, to active collaboration.
6. Rehabilitation. In order to strengthen the basis for trust and reconcil-
iation between victim and those identified with the victimizer, the vic-
tim's individual, as well as collective, sense of justice must be secured.
Thus, legislation like the Torture Victims Protection Act helps in re-
habilitating the victim. The Alien Tort Claims Act, which has been
interpreted to provide a claim upon which relief can be granted in the
form of compensatory justice in a domestic court, is a further instance
of how the sense of justice and compensation may be tied to the idea
of rehabilitation. In the case of genocide or mass murder, after-the-
fact accounting and justice may not help those who have been killed.
However, those who survive should have a right to rehabilitation and
either public or private compensation.
7. Reconstruction. Professor Reisman suggests the process of recon-
struction "involves identifying social situations that generate or pro-
vide fertile ground for violations of public order, and introducing
resources and institutions that can obviate such situations. '"2 96 If we
accept the Rummel thesis that totalitarian/authoritarian societies are
most frequently identified with policies and practices of genocide and
mass murder, then reconstruction in favor of a democratic rule of
law-governed system of public order with regular elections, public
transparency, and vigorous and secure civil societies, may hold a key
to reconstructive efforts to suppress or prevent genocide.
3. The Perspectives of Expectation Relating to Interventions to Prevent
and Deter Group Deprivation
The general expectations to sustain intervention involve international
law in its greatest significance. These expectations find institutional expres-
sion in the International Bill of Rights, as well as the covenants that relate
to group identity, such as the legal instruments on genocide, race, minori-
ties, indigenous rights, religious, gender and other forms of deprivation.
They also find expression in the efforts to broaden the bases of humanita-
rian law, as well as outlaw aggression and secure a right to peace and mech-
anisms for the peaceful resolution of disputes. In practical terms, these also
include institutional modalities and practices, which may be seen as institu-
tional bases of power to vindicate the public order of the international
community.
4. Bases of Power
The central base of power of all human rights lies in the actual per-
spectives of all individual members of the international community. Au-
296. W. M. Reisman, Institutions and Practices for Restoring and Maintaining Public Order,
DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 175 (1995).
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thority for an anti-genocide/mass murder process lies in the people
themselves, the ultimate consumers of human rights. More specifically,
there are many important agencies and parties that secure the public order
and directly or indirectly prevent mass murder and genocide outcomes such
as:
(1) [H]uman rights law, the law of state responsibility, and the developing
law of liability without fault; (2) international criminal tribunals; (3)
universalization of the jurisdiction of national courts for certain delicts,
called International crimes; (4) non-recognition or the general refusal to
recognize and to allow violators the beneficial consequences of actions
deemed unlawful; (5) incentives in the form of foreign aid or other re-
wards; (6) commissions of inquiry or truth commissions; (7) compensa-
tion commissions; and (8) amnesties.297
To these practices, the institutionalization of peacekeeping operations
through the U.N. may be added, as well as other institutions of interna-
tional decision-making. These practices of securing world public order de-
pend on a resource base to fund them. They also depend on the
seriousness with which states seek to prevent intervention in their internal
affairs298 and the strength of international concern. If democracy reduces
the risk and occasion of genocide, does this not suggest that respect for the
authority base of the people is a vital genocide-preventing stratagem? The
role and resources of NGOs in the context of the former Yugoslavia were
other important bases of intervention to prevent genocide.
5. Situations within which Genocide and Mass Murder Occur and which
Enhance or Constrain Prevention
The situations of genocide are geographic since they invariably happen
under the body politic called the nation-state. For all the modern develop-
ments of international law and the expansions of both international juris-
dictional concern and universal jurisdiction buttressed by obligations erga
omnes, there is still immense difficulty in organizing and sustaining interna-
tional interventions. The temporal or time factor in genocide makes the
need for early intervention crucial when the signals and the intelligence
discover it. 299 The temporal factor is tied to the sequences of conflict as it
gravitates from low to high intensity. The institutional component of re-
sponding to genocide is weak since the U.N., for example, depends upon
states with diverse interests to commit resources, peacekeepers or troops,
or support the development of international tribunals for policing and try-
ing perpetrators.
Responses to the crisis of genocide and mass murder underline the
lack of decisive methods of dealing with genocide around the world. The
strategies include intervention of a diplomatic nature, efforts to secure a
more inclusive ideological profile of human rights, the prospects of early
warning, economic coercion, military interventions or peace monitoring, or
enforcing initiatives. Since genocide happens on the ground, it is critical
that strategies be developed in specific contexts to moderate and/or man-
age the prospect of intense intergroup conflict, particularly where the con-
297. Id. at 177.
298. See U.N. Article 2.7.
299. In Rwanda 800,000 people were liquidated in 60 days.
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flict contains elements that may lead to genocidal outcomes. These would
include strategies in the crafting of fundamental or constitutional law and
strategies in securing laws that promote nondiscrimination and affirmative
prescriptive initiatives to promote and sustain good multi-group relations.
A constitutional order providing for a vigorous civil society might pro-
vide incentives for a NGO to play an important role in socializing people to
the principles and practices of the culture of human rights. Such NGOs
could already be committed to promoting anti-discrimination norms, like
those found in the context of South Africa in its famous institute of race
relations. These entities are important for alerting others to the prospect of
imminent conflict and often maintain connections and techniques of inter-
vention that facilitate the diffusing of intergroup conflict. Still other mech-
anisms could include the work of transparent truth and reconciliation
commissions as well as judicial commissions of inquiry and many other
methods useful in exposing incipient conspiracies and tendencies to possi-
bly implement intergroup hate, prejudice, discrimination, domination, and
genocide.
The outcomes of "prevention" ought to lead to a basic framework of
peace. Moving from peace or minimum order to reconstruction is more
problematic because resources, patience and the short political will of de-
mocracies sometimes do not sustain international obligations outside of cri-
sis. Some structure providing empirical indicators for intervention before
catastrophic killings take place is critical. The Genocide Convention gives
a clue by suggesting that conspiracy to commit genocide is prohibited as
well. This Article suggests we go beyond the ambiguity of conspiracy and
examine essentially the phase sequences of social conflict themselves and
invoke strategies in societies where there are strong patterns of differentia-
tion in ensuring the culture of tolerance and good inter-group relations are
dominant, constitutive, and public order expectations. It has been said that
good race relations do not simply happen; they require social effort. Inter-
vening at the peaceful situation stage is the most effective form of prevent-
ing mass extinction of human beings. Different levels of conflict will of
course require different and more determined strategies of intervention, if
prevention itself is a major purpose of the public and constitutional
order.30
300. When we consider the question of rational sanctioning policies as a global response to the
ubiquity of genocide and mass murder, one particular sanctioning goal is preeminent namely, the
most effective strategy for preventing genocide is to intervene before it happens. Rationally such
intervention would occur at least in technical juridical terms at the "conspiracy to commit geno-
cide stage." However, if we accept the broader level of analysis which holds that group depriva-
tions are relatively less lethal but already effectually prohibited in international law, then the
timing of intervention could occur if we conceptualize racial prejudice, cultural prejudice, anti-
Semitism, and other forms of conspicuous group deprivation as indicators triggering the need for
intervention. Intervention can occur at many levels of social organization, for example, states may
have domestic watch dog groups such as the South African Institute of Race Relations or domes-
tic commissions whose purpose is to monitor and give more practical effect to human rights and
they are traditional, judicial and bureaucratic remedies as well as legislative initiatives that can be
invoked to moderate the trained towards prejudice dominance and possibly genocide. These
levels of intervention should be seen as complimentary initiatives to those that could be taken on
a regional, continental and or international context. The central point is that the international
jurisdiction based on matters of international concern are clearly defined constitutionally sanc-
tioned processes for intervening in matters which would otherwise be within the domestic juris-
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on both a description of the social processes
of group deprivations, requiring a keen appreciation of the etiology and
dynamics of social conflict, as well as a realistic appreciation of the
processes of community sanctions, in the form of effective decision-making
interventions, are critical to the development of a general theory of group
deprivations. The sanctioning component of intervention must be a realis-
tic part of understanding the conditions, consequences, typology, and grav-
ity of group deprivations. The fuller study of sanction-inspired
interventions, as part of a theory of group deprivations, must aspire to be
comprehensive because group deprivations are global in scope, and partic-
ularly because their impacts are felt in specific contexts. This presents an
explicit challenge on how to construct and appropriately prescribe and ap-
ply a local to global regime of effective sanctions for diminishing or
preventing the processes of group deprivations from actually occurring.
This suggests an agenda of inquiry that is problem-specific in regards
to the gravity and the types of group deprivations. This inquiry should in-
clude a clearer specification of the normative objectives the problem com-
promises, such as the deprivation of human respect, the relevant trends in
decision, the conditions influencing those trends, the prediction of probable
outcomes regarding those trends and conditions without the agency of deci-
sional intervention, and the invention of creative ways to creatively inter-
vene with licit sanctioning goals to improve the prospect of enhanced equal
respect and dignity.
The strategy of intervention has been assayed so the concepts of pre-
vention and punishment are seen within the larger and more coherent
framework of rational, sanctioning interventions. Although the impulse to
punish in the conventional sense looms large in the pantheon of interna-
tional criminal sensibility, the fundamental fact is that punishment in the
narrow sense is an inadequate response to genocide. The only adequate
response to genocide is capsulated in the words, "never again." In other
words, every available theoretical, practical, political, scientific, and juridi-
cal tool must be used for timely interventions in conflicts most likely to
lead to genocide, but even more important, they stress the responsibility
for social justice and dignity on the universal basis as the foundation of
human solidarity and the clear antidote to hate and prejudice. Therefore,
initiatives like affirmative action are modest components of a genuine com-
mitment to social justice and human rights and are crucial elements in the
framework of intervention to ameliorate racial conflict, group conflict, and
deprivations based on group identity. There is great wisdom in the ringing
words of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which hold as fol-
lows: "[i]t is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a
diction of a state. The point where prejudice or cultural dominance may be presumed to be a
threat to international peace and security may sanction much stronger interventions which fall
within the jurisdiction inter alia of the Security Council, since such extreme levels of deprivation
often represent a breach of peace and international security. To the extent that group depriva-
tions are the harbinger of social conflict with international ramifications the work of Professor
Schmidt and his collaborators is a very useful addendum to what we have suggested.
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last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights
should be protected by the rule of law ... "301
It should be clear today that genocide is not a tragedy to be confined
specifically to the Holocaust. "Never again" is a phrase that should be of
universal relevance to Jews and non-Jews alike. What is abundantly clear
from this study is the process of group deprivations is also a process of
conflict. The process of group equity and justice is a process of human
collaboration. In both instances, sanctioning interventions are necessary.
In the case of group deprivations and conflict, intervention must occur not
simply to prevent conflict, but to ameliorate or cure the conditions that
nurture it. This means active social intervention to eradicate racial discrim-
ination and prejudice, anti-Semitism, and apartheid-like practices. It is also
abundantly clear that good race, ethnic, or inter-group relations do not sim-
ply happen. This requires social effort, collective goods, and political will.
Furthermore, it requires a commitment to social justice and to the idea that
human progress is ineluctably tied to the nurturing of the development of
all human potential for which, ultimately, the basic respect of human dig-
nity represents solidarity over division, conflict, chaos, and tragedy.
301. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 31, at Preamble.
